A320, en route, Eastern Mediterranean, 2016
A320, en route, Eastern Mediterranean, 2016
Summary
On 19 May 2016, fire broke out on board an Airbus A320 en route to Cairo at night. The fire spread rapidly from the forward area of the aircraft and rapidly intensified. Loss of control due to conditions on the flight deck resulted in descent and sea impact with all 66 occupants killed. Work for the Investigation (reproduced in the final report) which identified a leak from the flight crew emergency oxygen system as the fire source was eventually discounted. It was concluded that the origin was activation of explosive materials in the forward galley just behind the flight deck.
Flight Details
Aircraft
Operator
Type of Flight
Public Transport (Passenger)
Flight Origin
Intended Destination
Take-off Commenced
Yes
Flight Airborne
Yes
Flight Completed
No
Phase of Flight
Cruise
Location
Approx.
Eastern Mediterranean Sea
FIRE
Tag(s)
Dangerous Goods,
Fire-Galley
LOC
Tag(s)
Significant Systems or Systems Control Failure,
Flight Crew Incapacitation,
Malicious Interference
CS
Tag(s)
Malicious interference
Outcome
Damage or injury
Yes
Aircraft damage
Hull loss
Non-aircraft damage
No
Non-occupant Casualties
No
Occupant Fatalities
Most or all occupants
Number of Occupant Fatalities
66
Off Airport Landing
No
Ditching
No
Safety Recommendation(s)
Group(s)
None Made
Investigation Type
Type
Independent
Description
On 19 May 2016, an Airbus A320 (SU-GCC) operated by Egypt Air on a scheduled international passenger flight from Paris (Charles de Gaulle Airport) to Cairo as MSR 804 was in cruise at FL370 at night with the first officer acting as pilot flying (PF) and communicating with ATC. At this time, the captain was “resting in his seat." One of the cabin crew was occupying the supernumerary crew seat located immediately behind the first officer’s seat. Fire was called in the flight deck after apparently beginning in the forward galley immediately behind the right-hand side of the flight deck. Fire and smoke spread rapidly and the flight crew were unable to retain control. The aircraft crashed into the sea and was destroyed, which resulted in all occupants - 6 crew members and 60 passengers - being killed.
Investigation
An accident investigation was carried out by the Accident Investigation Directorate of the Egyptian Ministry of Civil Aviation. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) were recovered and their data were downloaded. Relevant recorded radar and ATC transcripts were obtained. The wreckage was located, and human remains and selected pieces of wreckage were recovered.
It was noted that the 36-year-old captain had a total of 6,639 hours flying experience, of which 2,108 hours were on type. The 25-year-old first officer had a total of 2,966 hours flying experience, of which all but 195 hours were on type. Both pilots were Egyptian nationals.
No evidence was found to suggest either relevant pre-existing airworthiness issues or flight crew issues in respect of the origin of the fire. However, five pieces of wreckage from the right side of the fuselage just ahead of the forward right-hand side door were found to show a starburst outward buckling of the fuselage. This was indicative of internal overpressure that had occurred at the position where the forward galley service carts were stowed just ahead of door 1R. It was noted that there were “no aircraft systems likely to produce overpressure taking into account that the oxygen storage cylinder was on the left hand side of the aircraft."
Other fire damage was evident but it was found that the wreckage as a whole did not show “significant effects” of any fire away from the front of the aircraft and this could be “explained by the fire beginning, continuing and ending when the supply of oxygen available in the atmosphere surrounding the flammable parts ran out." It was also considered of note that even though there was CVR evidence that a fire extinguisher was called for, a fire fuelled by additional oxygen could not have been extinguished using the available Halon Fire Extinguishers. That is because Halon extinguishers work by acting on the normal level of oxygen present and would be unable to extinguish a fire being supplied with additional oxygen. Such a scenario would then have resulted in opaque smoke rapidly invading the area around the which fire had clearly been centred - around the forward right galley and the adjacent flight deck. It would also have explained the subsequent activation of the smoke detector in the toilet located immediately behind the left-hand side of the flight deck. No evidence of damage to wiring insulation was found, which led to the conclusion that the temperature was not high enough to affect it. This finding was considered to support the conclusion that the fire had not started in the flight deck.
It was concluded that “an explosive package containing two explosive substances TNT (Trinitrotoulene) and DNT (Dinitrotolulene) was placed into the crew meal carts which were placed in the galley stowage located immediately behind the flight deck” and timed to detonate during the flight and affect the oxygen supply pipe which was located behind the stowage.
The Probable Cause of the Accident was determined as “the aircraft flight path was uncontrollable as the aircraft and the flight crew were severely affected by fire and smoke (which) resulted from the effects of the explosive materials located at the forward galley just behind the rear section of the cockpit (and) the aircraft crashed into the sea."
Three Contributory Factors were identified as:
- The fire/smoke event took place very quickly and the flight crew were disabled.
- Several aircraft systems failed.
- An explosion resulted in oxygen flow in the cockpit which enriched the fire/smoke.
A 663 page English language translation of the Final Report was released on 29 October 2024 at the same time as the definitive Arabic version.
