A321, north of Mogadishu Somalia, 2016
A321, north of Mogadishu Somalia, 2016
Summary
On 2 February 2016, an Airbus A321 Boeing 757-200F in the climb after departing from Mogadishu had just passed FL100 when an explosion occurred inside the passenger cabin. This led to significant structural damage to a small area of the fuselage, which caused cabin depressurisation, the ejection of one passenger, and led to three others being seriously injured. The damaged aircraft was recovered to Mogadishu without any further consequences, and the explosion was found to have been intentionally caused by the ejected male passenger. A series of Safety Recommendations were issued, aimed at improving security screening of passengers boarding flights from Mogadishu.
Flight Details
Aircraft
Operator
Type of Flight
Public Transport (Passenger)
Flight Origin
Intended Destination
Actual Destination
Take-off Commenced
Yes
Flight Airborne
Yes
Flight Completed
Yes
Location
Approx.
North of Mogadishu
General
Tag(s)
Air Turnback,
Malicious interference
LOC
Tag(s)
Airframe Structural Failure,
Malicious Interference
EPR
Tag(s)
“Emergency” declaration
CS
Tag(s)
Malicious interference
Outcome
Damage or injury
Yes
Aircraft damage
Major
Non-aircraft damage
No
Non-occupant Casualties
No
Occupant Injuries
Few occupants
Occupant Fatalities
Few occupants
Number of Occupant Fatalities
1
Off Airport Landing
No
Ditching
No
Causal Factor Group(s)
Group(s)
Airport Operation
Safety Recommendation(s)
Group(s)
Airport Management
Investigation Type
Type
Independent
Description
On 2 February 2016, an Airbus A321 (SX-BHS) operated by Hermes Airlines on a Daallo Airlines scheduled passenger flight from Mogadishu to Djibouti as DAO 159 was in the climb and passing 10,400 feet when the flight crew heard an explosion in the passenger cabin, and a pressurisation failure was annunciated. An emergency return to Mogadishu was made, with a landing completed 12 minutes later. Significant damage to the right-hand side of the fuselage was found at row 16. One passenger from that vicinity was missing, and three others nearby sustained serious injuries. The other 70 passengers and all 7 aircrew on board were uninjured.
The hole caused by the explosion. [Reproduced from the Official Report]
Investigation
An Accident Investigation was carried out by the Accident Investigation Branch of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. On request from the Investigator in Charge, all relevant data from both the FDR and the CVR were successfully downloaded by the French BEA, and they provided most of the information required by the Investigation. ATC communications between the aircraft and Mogadishu were not recorded by the ANSP but could be heard on the CVR recording. The CVR and FDR timings were synchronised using VHF keying, the autopilot disconnect audio alarm, and the sound assumed to be the explosion.
The nationality and experience of the flight crew was not recorded, but the aircraft was on the Greek aircraft register and was being operated for Daallo Airlines by the Greek ACMI Hermes Airlines at the time the accident occurred. This aircraft operator and its parent company ceased trading two weeks after the accident occurred.
What Happened
With the first officer as PF, the flight took off from runway 05 at Mogadishu, and after initially making a right turn onto a northerly heading, was cleared to continue climbing to FL 300. Six minutes after takeoff, it passed FL 100 and after a further 400 feet of climb at 260 KCAS, the explosion occurred when a male passenger in seat 16F intentionally activated an explosive device. This caused a hole in the right-hand side of the fuselage and led to an immediate cabin depressurisation.
The captain immediately took over as PF, disconnected the AP, stopped the climb, and began a descending left turn to begin a return to Mogadishu. Five seconds after the explosion, ECAM messages indicated that a depressurisation had occurred, and the Captain instructed the First Officer to run the corresponding Non-Normal Checklist. These ECAM messages were triggered when the cabin altitude rose to more than 9,550 feet.
ATC were advised of the situation and approved the emergency return with a request to report on final for runway 05. The SCCM then requested permission to enter the flight deck, and having been permitted to do so, was reassured there was no danger and that she should tell the passengers that the aircraft was returning to Mogadishu.
The return was completed without further event, and the aircraft touched down after just over 12 minutes airborne. It was quickly established that the explosion had been triggered via laptop computer by the missing passenger in 16F. His body was subsequently recovered from the location where the explosion occurred.
The ground track of the 12 minute flight. [Reproduced from the Official Report]
Safety Recommendations to the Somali Airport Authority and to the Somali Civil Aviation Authority on improvements to security screening at Mogadishu Airport as a result of the Investigation were as follows:
- Search all passenger baggage and employees at Mogadishu airport.
- Have all laptops switched on before checking in.
- Perform random questioning of passengers based on profiles.
- Implement Somali Police Force (SPF) watchers in uniform at each access point.
- Minimize entrance of unnecessary personnel.
- Install random swabs with disposable explosive detection kits.
- Reinforce the separation between the passenger terminals and the cargo handling areas.
- Prepare a thorough (security) assessment of the airport by a competent external and independent authority appointed by the Somalia Government.
The Final Report was published on behalf of the Somali Accident Investigation Branch by the BEA France in the original English language version on 28 July 2023 after an earlier French language translation had been released online 23 May 2023.
