On 2 October 2010 a Boeing 737-400 being operated by Turkish operator Corendon Airlines on a passenger flight from Dalaman to Amsterdam made a late touchdown on landing runway 22 at destination in normal daylight visibility conditions and failed to stop before the end of the runway. The overrun occurred at low speed and there were no injuries to the 173 occupants and only minor damage to the aircraft.
An Investigation was carried out by the Dutch Safety Board. It was found that the 30 minute Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) had not been stopped after the incident and consequently contained no useful data, which the Board stated had “hampered the investigation and made reconstructing the event difficult”. Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data was found to be of “poor quality” but fortunately equivalent data had been recorded on the QAR and was successfully downloaded. The Investigation report does not contain any reference to interviews with the pilots involved.
The final resting position of the nose of the aircraft was recorded as 9 metres beyond the runway paved surface with the main landing gear remaining on the runway.
It was established that the aircraft commander had been PF for the approach which had been stabilised with the AP engaged until 200ft aal and the A/T remaining selected for landing. Flight data suggested that the landing flare had then been commenced prematurely with the consequence that the touchdown was delayed. Radar data indicated that touchdown occurred at approximately 1154 metres beyond the landing threshold of the 2014 metre runway, leaving only 860 metres remaining in which to stop. Whilst maximum braking was then applied and the thrust reversers promptly deployed, it was noted that the recorded position of the spoiler selection handle did not reach the normal fully deployed position.
Diagram taken from the Official Report showing the touchdown position of the accident aircraft and those of previously landing aircraft
The Investigation ascertained and plotted the touchdown positions of several previous landing aircraft which, as can be seen from the illustration above all touched down beyond - in some cases significantly beyond - the marked touch down aiming point which is sited abeam taxiway G2, the first crossing taxiway after the start of the runway.
It was noted that for the accident landing, a light cross wind had prevailed at the surface as indicated on the current Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) and that there had been no tailwind component. Forward visibility on final approach had been reduced in drizzle but although the runway surface was wet and analysis of the actual rate of deceleration indicated the expected effect of this, there had been no aquaplaning.
It was also noted that the landing runway had initially been advised as 18R (which has an LDA of 3530 metres) but that this had been changed to the much shorter runway 22 when the aircraft was at FL200, some 15 minutes prior to landing “due to changing weather conditions”. This statement was not explained in the Investigation report. The subsequent landing clearance for runway 22 was given at about 600 feet aal, which it was stated was normal practice for the runway concerned due to the absence of any RETs and a preference to clear the runway at the last exit to minimise taxi time to the terminal area.
The Conclusions of the Investigation were:
- As a result of an early flare manoeuvre, the aircraft landed approximately halfway down the runway.
- The partially deployed speed brakes reduced braking performance.
- The remaining runway and braking performance with partial speed brakes were insufficient for the aircraft to stop prior to the end of the runway.
- The visual conditions and rain at the time of landing may have impaired the crew’s visual depth perception on the runway
The Final Report 2010077 - Serious Incident of the Investigation was published on 19 April 2012. No Safety Recommendations were made.