MD83, Are/Ostersund Sweden, 2007

MD83, Are/Ostersund Sweden, 2007

Summary

On 9 September 2007, an MD83 being operated by Austrian Company MAP Jet, which was over the permitted weight for the runway and conditions, made a night take off from Are/Ostersund airport, Sweden, very near the end of the runway and collided with the approach lights for the opposite runway before climbing away.

Event Details
When
09/09/2007
Event Type
GND, HF, RE
Day/Night
Night
Flight Conditions
On Ground - Normal Visibility
Flight Details
Operator
Type of Flight
Public Transport (Passenger)
Flight Origin
Intended Destination
Take-off Commenced
Yes
Flight Airborne
Yes
Flight Completed
Yes
Phase of Flight
Take Off
Location
Location - Airport
Airport
General
Tag(s)
Inadequate Aircraft Operator Procedures, Ineffective Regulatory Oversight
HF
Tag(s)
Data use error, Procedural non compliance, Violation
RE
Tag(s)
Overrun on Take Off, Unable to rotate at VR
Outcome
Damage or injury
Yes
Aircraft damage
Minor
Non-aircraft damage
Yes
Non-occupant Casualties
No
Occupant Injuries
None
Occupant Fatalities
None
Off Airport Landing
No
Ditching
No
Causal Factor Group(s)
Group(s)
Aircraft Operation
Safety Recommendation(s)
Group(s)
Aircraft Operation
Investigation Type
Type
Independent

Description

On 9 September 2007, an MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD-83 being operated by Austrian Company MAP Jet, which was over the permitted weight for the runway and conditions, made a night take off from Are/Ostersund airport, Sweden, and after failing to get airborne until almost the end of the runway, collided with the approach lights for the opposite runway direction before climbing away and completing the intended flight to Antalya.

The Investigation

An Annex 13 Serious Incident Investigation was carried out by the Swedish AIB and their Report was published on 18 September 2009. The Investigation found that:

  • The take off was made more than 3 tonnes above the maximum permitted weight for the runway and prevailing conditions.
  • Rotation was initiated when 630 metres of the runway remained and was slower than normal
  • The nose wheel lifted when 250 metres of the runway remained.
  • The main wheels lifted when 30 metres of the runway remained.
  • The height of the aircraft as it passed the runway threshold was less than 30 cm.

It also concluded that both the arrangements under which the flight crew were operating as employees of the aircraft lessor (MAP) and the implementation of JAR-OPS procedures by that aircraft operator were not properly constituted.

The overall conclusion published in the Final Report was that:

"The incident was caused by deficiencies in the company’s handling of the balance between flight safety and production. These deficiencies lead, among other things, to that take off performance calculations was carried out without some limiting factors, implying that the aircraft mass exceeded the maximum allowed under the prevailing conditions."

Safety Recommendations

Two Safety Recommendations were made in the Final Report:

  1. "The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to increase the number of SAFA inspections (Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft), and in the international flight safety community (to) work for these inspections (to be) completed with control of the statements regarding operational documentation of the actual flight.
  2. The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to (support) the Austrian Civil Aviation Authority (to) follow up the work of improvement within the (aircraft operator) regarding (the) Safety Management System (and the) employment routines and training of cockpit crew."

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