Accident and Serious Incident Reports: LOC
Accident and Serious Incident Reports: LOC
Definition
Reports relating to accidents or serious incidents which involved in flight Loss of Control as a significant causal factor.
The accident and serious incident reports are grouped together below according to causal factors which led to loss of control.
Airframe Structural Failure
On 4 October 2023, an Airbus A321 climbing out of London Stansted with the 18 occupants all seated towards the front of the passenger cabin was discovered to have several missing or damaged windowpanes on the left side towards the rear. The aircraft returned to land where damage was also found to one of the horizontal stabilisers. The window panes fell out because of damage by infrared energy emitted from high-intensity lights during a filming event the previous day. Four previous similar events were identified but it was found that knowledge of them was not widespread in the aviation community.
On 19 November 2022, an Airbus A320 was descending below 13,000 feet towards its destination of Omaha, clear of clouds at night and at 290 knots, when an explosive decompression occurred as a result of bird strike damage. An emergency was declared, and once on the ground, three locations where the fuselage skin had been broken open were discovered. The structural damage was assessed as substantial, and the aircraft was withdrawn from service for major repairs. The birds involved were identified by DNA analysis as migrating Snow or Ross’s Geese, the former of which can weigh up to 2.6kg.
On 2 February 2016, an Airbus A321 Boeing 757-200F in the climb after departing from Mogadishu had just passed FL100 when an explosion occurred inside the passenger cabin. This led to significant structural damage to a small area of the fuselage, which caused cabin depressurisation, the ejection of one passenger, and led to three others being seriously injured. The damaged aircraft was recovered to Mogadishu without any further consequences, and the explosion was found to have been intentionally caused by the ejected male passenger. A series of Safety Recommendations were issued, aimed at improving security screening of passengers boarding flights from Mogadishu.
On 5 January 2024, a Boeing 737-9 which had just departed Portland was climbing through 14,800 feet when there was a loud bang followed by a rapid decompression. The cause - the loss of a fuselage plug fitted at an unused door location - was immediately obvious. An emergency was declared and a landing back at Portland was made after a total of twenty minutes airborne. The Investigation is continuing but has found that the fuselage plug involved was installed without being properly secured and noted that the aircraft had only recently been delivered new to the operator.
On 1 August 2019, an Airbus A320 annunciated an abnormal gear status indication when retraction was attempted after takeoff. Soon afterwards, an aircraft part was observed by an aircraft following the same taxi route as the A320 and recovered. After completing relevant drills, the A320 returned and completed a landing with significant damage to the left main gear which was nevertheless locked down. The runway was vacated and passengers disembarked. The Investigation found that the cause of the problem was the cyclic fatigue of a pin linking the two parts of the left main gear torque link of manufacturing origin.
Significant Systems or Systems Control Failure
On 19 May 2016, fire broke out on board an Airbus A320 en-route to Cairo at night. The fire spread rapidly from the forward area of the aircraft and rapidly intensified. Loss of control due to conditions on the flight deck resulted in descent and sea impact with all 66 occupants killed. Work for the Investigation (reproduced in the final report) which identified a leak from the flight crew emergency oxygen system as the fire source was eventually discounted and it was concluded that the origin was activation of explosive materials in the forward galley just behind the flight deck.
On 26 August 2022, an experienced UAV pilot lost control of a DJI Mavic 3 in central Bergen and it flew at high speed towards a building and crashed through a third-floor window slightly injuring a person inside. Why control was lost could not be established but it appeared to be associated with a fault in the transition between two flight modes. The absence of adequate and timely technical assistance from the UAV manufacturer - which had a European import approval for it - limited the ability to establish the cause of the event prompting three related safety recommendations.
On 17 January 2023, an ATR 72-200 in the final stages of a CAT 2 ILS night approach to East Midlands experienced an electrical malfunction which disabled one set of primary flight instruments and triggered multiple system status indication failures. These included false system warnings and radio communications problems. The approach was discontinued, a MAYDAY declared and a successful manually flown diversion to Birmingham was made. The cause of the electrical malfunction was found to be a wiring defect, which was considered to have probably been caused by incorrect use of mechanical wire-stripping tools during third party maintenance.
On 20 December 2012, a PW4168A-engined Airbus A330-200 was climbing through FL220 after departing Phuket, Thailand, at night when sudden uncontained left engine failure occurred. Engine shutdown and initiation of a return was followed by loss of the green and then blue hydraulic systems. Shortly after this, a relatively uneventful landing followed with only minor damage but “without pilot assessment or knowledge of the safety margin." As the findings of the investigation raised still-relevant concerns about the way this multiple-failure scenario was handled, it was felt useful to publish the 148-page final report eleven years later.
On 8 June 2016, a Boeing 737-800 en-route to Seville, Spain, had already reverted to alternate automatic pressurisation control when this also failed. Manual system control was attempted but was unsuccessful, so an emergency descent followed by diversion to Toulouse, France, was completed without further event. A similar pressurisation control fault had occurred earlier that day but had not been properly dealt with by an appropriately qualified engineer. Both system controllers were showing faults and were replaced, as were a ruptured flexible hose and a series of malfunctioning drain valves. More reliable controllers and routine checking of system performance were recommended.
Degraded flight instrument display
On 23 February 2019, a Raytheon B200 King Air which had recently departed Saanen was passing FL155 for cleared altitude FL240 when a total electrical failure occurred. On subsequently making contact with ATC on a hand-held personal radio, the pilot advised his intention to exit controlled airspace and complete an already commenced visual diversion to Lausanne which was then done. It was found that failure to use the prescribed normal checklists had resulted in an undetected electrical system selection error which had led to the successive discharge of both main batteries when corresponding alerts and warnings also went unnoticed.
On 6 February 1996, a Boeing 757-200 took off from Puerto Plata at night despite awareness at the 80 knot check that the Captains altimeter was not working. Thereafter, the crew became confused as to their actual airspeed and lost control before the aircraft hit the sea surface less than five minutes after takeoff. The Investigation found that the Captain’s pitot probe was blocked and that the three pilots on the flight deck had become confused about which airspeed indications were reliable and had then not recovered from an aerodynamic stall which followed the wholly avoidable mismanagement of the aircraft flight path.
On 18 July 2018, an Airbus A330-300 failed to reject its night takeoff from Brisbane despite the absence of any airspeed indication for either pilot. A PAN call was made as a climb to FL110 continued. Once there, preparations for a somewhat challenging return were made and subsequently achieved. The Investigation noted multiple missed opportunities, including non-compliance with several procedural requirements, to detect that all pitot mast covers had remained in place and was extremely concerned that the takeoff had been continued rather than rejected. Flawed aircraft operator ground handling procedures and ineffective oversight of contractors were also deemed contributory.
On 9 June 2021, an Airbus A320 Captain performing a relatively light weight and therefore rapid-acceleration takeoff from London Heathrow recognised as the standard 100 knot call was imminent that he had no speed indication so announced and performed a high speed rejected takeoff. Subsequent maintenance inspection found that the left pitot mast was blocked by the nest of a seasonally active solitary flying insect, noting that the aircraft had previously been parked for 24 hours on a non-terminal stand. Similar events, including another rejected takeoff, then followed and a comprehensive combined Investigation found all were of similar origin.
On 7 February 2018, a Boeing 737-800 experienced an airspeed mismatch during takeoff on a post maintenance positioning flight but having identified the faulty system by reference to the standby instrumentation, the intended flight was completed without further event. After the recorded defect was then signed off as “no fault found” after a failure to follow the applicable fault-finding procedure, the same happened on the next (revenue) flight but with an air turnback made. The Investigation found that the faulty sensor had been fitted at build three years earlier with a contaminated component which had slowly caused sensor malfunction to develop.
Uncommanded AP disconnect
On 17 January 2023, an ATR 72-200 in the final stages of a CAT 2 ILS night approach to East Midlands experienced an electrical malfunction which disabled one set of primary flight instruments and triggered multiple system status indication failures. These included false system warnings and radio communications problems. The approach was discontinued, a MAYDAY declared and a successful manually flown diversion to Birmingham was made. The cause of the electrical malfunction was found to be a wiring defect, which was considered to have probably been caused by incorrect use of mechanical wire-stripping tools during third party maintenance.
On 5 April 2019, a Boeing 737-500 crew declared an emergency shortly after departing Madrid Barajas after problems maintaining normal lateral, vertical or airspeed control of their aircraft in IMC. After two failed attempts at ILS approaches in unexceptional weather conditions, the flight was successfully landed at a nearby military airbase. The Investigation found that a malfunction which probably prevented use of the Captain’s autopilot found before departure was not documented until after the flight but could not find a technical explanation for inability to control the aircraft manually given that dispatch without either autopilot working is permitted.
On 4 March 2016, the flight crew of an ATR72-500 decided to depart from Manchester without prior ground de/anti icing treatment judging it unnecessary despite the presence of frozen deposits on the airframe and from rotation onwards found that manual forward control column input beyond trim capability was necessary to maintain controlled flight. The aircraft was subsequently diverted. The Investigation found that the problem had been attributable to ice contamination on the upper surface of the horizontal tailplane. It was considered that the awareness of both pilots of the risk of airframe icing had been inadequate.
On 27 February 2012, the crew of an Airbus A330 en route at night and crossing the East African coast at FL360 encountered sudden violent turbulence as they flew into a convective cell not seen on their weather radar and briefly lost control as their aircraft climbed 2000 feet with resultant minor injuries to two occupants. The Investigation concluded that the isolated and rapidly developing cell had not been detected because of crew failure to make proper use of their weather radar, but noted that activation of flight envelope protection and subsequent crew action to recover control had been appropriate.
On 20 July 2011, the flight crew of a Swiss European Avro RJ-100 on a positioning flight from Nuremburg to Zurich responded inappropriately to an unexpected ‘bank angle’ alert in IMC. Near loss of control followed during which a PAN was eventually declared. The situation was resolved by a belated actioning of the QRH checklist applicable to the failure symptoms experienced. The subsequent investigation attributed the event to inappropriate crew response to a failure of a single IRU and poor manual flying skill whilst the situation was resolved.
AP Status Awareness
On 23 February 2019, a Boeing 767-300 transitioned suddenly from a normal descent towards Houston into a steep dive and high speed terrain impact followed. The Investigation found that after neither pilot had noticed the First Officer’s inadvertent selection of go around mode during automated flight, the First Officer had then very quickly responded with an increasingly severe manual pitch-down, possibly influenced by a somatogravic illusion. He was found to have had a series of short air carrier employments terminating after failure to complete training, had deliberately and repeatedly sought to conceal this history and lacked sufficient aptitude and competency.
On 20 July 2011, the flight crew of a Swiss European Avro RJ-100 on a positioning flight from Nuremburg to Zurich responded inappropriately to an unexpected ‘bank angle’ alert in IMC. Near loss of control followed during which a PAN was eventually declared. The situation was resolved by a belated actioning of the QRH checklist applicable to the failure symptoms experienced. The subsequent investigation attributed the event to inappropriate crew response to a failure of a single IRU and poor manual flying skill whilst the situation was resolved.
On 22 May 2020, an Airbus A320 made a high-speed unstabilised ILS approach to runway 25L at Karachi, Pakistan, and did not extend the landing gear for touchdown. It continued along the runway, skidding on both engines before getting airborne again with the crew announcing their intention to make another approach. Subsequently, both engines failed due to the damage sustained. The aircraft crashed in a residential area near the airport and was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire. Ninety-seven of the 99 occupants died, and four persons on the ground were injured with one subsequently dying.
On 20 October 2013, a Boeing 757-200 Co-Pilot believed his aircraft was at risk of stalling when he saw a sudden low airspeed indication on his display during a night descent and reacted by increasing thrust and making abrupt pitch-down inputs. Other airspeed indications remained unaffected. The Captain took control and recovery to normal flight followed. The excursion involved a significant Vmo exceedance, damage to and consequent failure of one of the hydraulic systems and passengers and cabin crew injuries. The false airspeed reading was attributed by the Investigation to transient Ice Crystal Icing affecting one of the pitot probes.
On 17 November 2013, the crew of a Boeing 737-500 failed to establish on the ILS at Kazan after not following the promulgated intermediate approach track due to late awareness of LNAV map shift. A go around was eventually initiated from the unstabilised approach but the crew appeared not to recognise that the autopilot used to fly the approach would automatically disconnect. Non-control followed by inappropriate control led to a high speed descent into terrain less than a minute after go around commencement. The Investigation found that the pilots had not received appropriate training for all-engine go arounds or upset recovery.
Non-normal FBW flight control status
On 6 November 2018, an Airbus A340-600 in cruise northbound over the Swiss Alps received an overspeed warning after encountering an unexpected wind velocity change. However, the crew failed to follow the prescribed response procedure. This led initially to a climb above their cleared level, and further inappropriate actions were then followed by PAN and MAYDAY declarations as control of the aircraft was briefly lost in a high-speed descent below their cleared level. The operator subsequently enhanced pilot training realism by providing it in a simulator configured for the aircraft variant operated by the company. The operator also introduced upset recovery training.
On 14 September 2010, the crew of a Sichuan Airlines Airbus A319 continued an ILS approach into Wuxi despite awareness of adverse convective weather conditions at the airport. Their inattention to automation management then led to a low energy warning and the inappropriate response to this led to the activation of flight envelope protection quickly followed by a stall warning. Inappropriate response to this was followed by loss of control and a full stall and high rate of descent from which recovery was finally achieved less than 900 feet agl.
On 28 February 2018, an Airbus A320 would not rotate for a touch-and-go takeoff and flightpath control remained temporarily problematic and the aircraft briefly settled back onto the runway with the gear in transit damaging both engines. A very steep climb was then followed by an equally steep descent to 600 feet agl with an EGPWS ‘PULL UP’ activation before recovery. Pitch control was regained using manual stabiliser trim but after both engines stopped during a MAYDAY turnback, an undershoot touchdown followed. The root cause of loss of primary pitch control was determined as unapproved oil in the stabiliser actuator.
On 12 September 2015, an Airbus A320 autopilot and autothrust dropped out as it climbed out of Perth and multiple ECAM system messages were presented with intermittent differences in displayed airspeeds. During the subsequent turn back in Alternate Law, a stall warning was disregarded with no actual consequence. The Investigation attributed the problems to intermittently blocked pitot tubes but could not establish how this had occurred. It was also found that the priority for ECAM message display during the flight had been inappropriate and that the key procedure contained misleading information. These ECAM issues were subsequently addressed by the aircraft manufacturer.
On 5 May 2019, a Sukhoi RRJ-95B making a manually-flown return to Moscow Sheremetyevo after a lightning strike caused a major electrical systems failure soon after departure made a mismanaged landing which featured a sequence of three hard bounces of increasing severity. The third of these occurred with the landing gear already collapsed and structural damage and a consequential fuel-fed fire followed as the aircraft veered off the runway at speed. The subsequent evacuation was only partly successful and 41 of the 73 occupants died and 3 sustained serious injury. An Interim Report has been published.
Loss of Engine Power
On 29 November 2021, the crew of a Bombardier CRJ900 (C-GJZV) which had just taken off from San Diego at night were presented with a fuel imbalance indication. The imbalance slowly increased until, once level at FL340, a further annunciation indicated that the maximum permitted imbalance had been reached. Actioning the corresponding checklist did not resolve the problem so procedurally recommended shutdown of the low fuel side engine was performed followed by a MAYDAY diversion to Los Angeles. The imbalance was attributed to inadvertent crew selection of ‘gravity crossflow’ prior to takeoff instead of the immediately adjacent ‘crossflow auto override’.
On 25 September 2020, a Sikorsky S92A returning from an offshore platform was in descent approximately 40nm from destination Stavanger when main gear box low pressure and left engine oil temperature cautions were annunciated. The affected engine was reduced to idle and a MAYDAY declared. A further related alert prompted descent to 200 feet, and sixteen minutes after the initial malfunction, a normal landing was completed at Stavanger. A significant oil leak found in the main gear box was attributed to oil flow reduction and consequent overheating caused by a loose washer inadvertently left inside the gearbox during routine maintenance.
On 20 December 2012, a PW4168A-engined Airbus A330-200 was climbing through FL220 after departing Phuket, Thailand, at night when sudden uncontained left engine failure occurred. Engine shutdown and initiation of a return was followed by loss of the green and then blue hydraulic systems. Shortly after this, a relatively uneventful landing followed with only minor damage but “without pilot assessment or knowledge of the safety margin." As the findings of the investigation raised still-relevant concerns about the way this multiple-failure scenario was handled, it was felt useful to publish the 148-page final report eleven years later.
On 10 February 2023, a Boeing 767-300ER had problems setting climb thrust after takeoff from Edinburgh, and a right engine control fault was annunciated. It was decided that the intended transatlantic flight should divert to Prestwick. Right engine vibration became apparent and the engine was set to idle, and it shut down after landing. On arrival at the assigned parking position, fuel was seen leaking from the right wing, and a rapid passenger disembarkation was completed. Vibration due to engine imbalance after turbine blade fracture was found to have caused the fuel leak.
On 14/15 April 2022, refuelling of an Airbus A330-300 in Accra was delayed by multiple automated interruptions but resolved by changing from tanker to hydrant. Departure to Johannesburg was delayed to the following day. During the cruise at FL410, a right wing fuel pump low pressure annunciation prompted descent to FL190 to activate gravity fuel feed. An ‘ENGINE 2 STALL’ annunciation then appeared and could only be removed by manually controlling thrust at below-normal level. The fuel pump low pressure annunciation remained after landing. Initially suspected fuel contamination with water in both cases was eliminated during the investigation.
Crew Incapacitation
On 19 May 2016, fire broke out on board an Airbus A320 en-route to Cairo at night. The fire spread rapidly from the forward area of the aircraft and rapidly intensified. Loss of control due to conditions on the flight deck resulted in descent and sea impact with all 66 occupants killed. Work for the Investigation (reproduced in the final report) which identified a leak from the flight crew emergency oxygen system as the fire source was eventually discounted and it was concluded that the origin was activation of explosive materials in the forward galley just behind the flight deck.
On 19 October 2022, an Embraer E175-200 had just departed Dublin when the First Officer, who was acting as ‘Pilot Flying’, became incapacitated. The Captain immediately took over all flying duties, requested assistance for the First Officer from the cabin crew and declared a MAYDAY. The aircraft then returned to land without further significant event although a bird strike occurred on approach. The 35 year-old First Officer was medically assessed and the conclusion was that he had “low blood pressure (and) a possible lack of water and food” which would have been exacerbated by the rising cabin altitude after departure.
On 6 June 2023, a Boeing 717-200 was on base leg about 10 nm from Hobart, Australia, when chlorine fumes became evident on the flight deck. As the aircraft became fully established on final approach, the captain recognised signs of cognitive impairment and handed control to the initially unaffected first officer. Just before touchdown, the first officer was similarly affected but was able to safely complete the landing and taxi in. The same aircraft had experienced a similar event two days earlier with no fault found. The Investigation determined that the operator’s procedures for responding to crew incapacitation in flight had been inadequate.
On 17 January 2022, about 30 minutes after takeoff from Fort-de-France, Martinique, on an Extended Operations (ETOPS) flight, an Airbus A330-900 was approaching its initial cruise altitude when the apparently unconscious captain appeared initially unresponsive. On being more aggressively roused, he seemed normal, and a doctor on board initially assessed him as fit to continue. However, about two hours into the flight, his condition subsequently deteriorated. The first officer called the chief purser to take his seat to assist. A PAN, later upgraded to a MAYDAY, was declared and a diversion was made to the Azores where the captain was hospitalised.
On 21 February 2019, the Captain of an Airbus A350-900 in the cruise en-route to Hong Kong became and remained incapacitated. The First Officer took over control and completed the flight as planned without further event. The Cabin Crew Manager was called to the flight deck and advised and a doctor on board provided medical assistance to the Captain who remained conscious but with slurred speech and was hospitalised on arrival. It was concluded that the response to the situation had been effectively handled and the remainder of the flight was completed in accordance with all applicable procedures and training.
Flight Management Error
On 7 June 2022, when a Boeing 737-400F arrived at Auckland after a night cargo flight, a main fuel tank low pressure warning occurred because centre tank fuel transfer had inadvertently not been selected on prior to takeoff. The aircraft ahead had made two unsuccessful approaches due to fog before diverting and there would have been insufficient main tank fuel remaining to go around and complete another approach or divert without fuel exhaustion being “very likely”. Also, the flight’s nominated alternate airports had not complied with applicable requirements due to failures on the part of both flight crew and operator.
On 29 November 2021, the crew of a Bombardier CRJ900 (C-GJZV) which had just taken off from San Diego at night were presented with a fuel imbalance indication. The imbalance slowly increased until, once level at FL340, a further annunciation indicated that the maximum permitted imbalance had been reached. Actioning the corresponding checklist did not resolve the problem so procedurally recommended shutdown of the low fuel side engine was performed followed by a MAYDAY diversion to Los Angeles. The imbalance was attributed to inadvertent crew selection of ‘gravity crossflow’ prior to takeoff instead of the immediately adjacent ‘crossflow auto override’.
On 20 February 2023, a Fokker 70 flight crew only realised the landing altitude for their destination, Port Moresby, had not been set late in the descent. With insufficient time to eliminate the cabin pressure differential automatically, an attempt to use the abnormal manual control procedure was made. When it became clear that this had not worked, a go-around was initiated but when the cabin pressure differential then rose rapidly to 6 psi, multiple passenger ear/nose/throat injuries resulted, some serious. Another abnormal procedure was then actioned and this fortuitously resolved the situation and the aircraft was able to land.
On 17 August 2023, a privately operated Hawker Beechcraft 390 Premier 1 on final approach to Subang departed controlled flight in benign weather conditions and crashed. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact and post crash fire, and the eight occupants and two persons on the ground were killed. Control of the aircraft was lost after the aircraft lift dump spoilers were inadvertently deployed. The context for this inappropriate action was found to have been deviations from standard operating procedures, inadequate pilot training, regulatory grey areas, and deficiencies in communication and decision-making between the two pilots during the flight.
On 19 October 2022, an unstable approach to Sandy Lake by a de Havilland DHC8-300 was followed by a mishandled landing attempt by the first officer involving excessive pitch up and a tail strike. When the captain recognised a go-around was intended, he took over and completed the landing. The captain had recently been promoted after 3,000 hours as a first officer, and the first officer had just been released on his first two-pilot aircraft type after over 70 hours line training. The investigation noted that if an operator's safety management system (SMS) does not actively monitor flight data, unsafe practices may not be identified, increasing the risk that they will continue.
Flight Control Error
On 29 April 2023, the flight crew of an Airbus A321 did not complete the intended touchdown at Abu Dhabi from the flare to land and initiation of a go-around resulted in a tail strike due to improper high pitch control input whilst the airspeed was still low and the configuration not correct. The mishandling arose from confusion by both pilots as to the aircraft air/ground status after touchdown and involved significant dual sidestick input with no transfer of control. Once established in the climb, the remainder of the subsequent circuit to land was completed without further event.
On 4 December 2023, a Boeing 737-8200 crew misjudged positioning onto the ILS approach for arrival at London Stansted. Having decided to go around, they then continued to climb above the 3,000 feet missed approach altitude which they had failed to set until alerted by the controller. The descent following a 1,000 feet level bust then continued back through the missed approach altitude at almost 9,000 fpm with an EGPWS ‘PULL UP’ Warning just as recovery from 1,740 feet agl was being initiated. After levelling at 3,000 feet, radar-vectoring onto the ILS was provided with the approach then completed normally.
On 6 September 2023, control of a Boeing 738-800 was temporarily lost approaching cruise altitude. When reaching to unlock the flight deck door after a cabin crew access request, the captain operated the rudder trim switch to its full travel. Neither pilot recognised the error, and an EGPWS alert followed as left bank increased towards its maximum autopilot-engaged limit of 42°. This prompted successful upset recovery action. However, the underlying cause was recognised only after the first officer suggested checking the rudder trim position. Contrary to company procedures, prior positive identification of the intended switch had not preceded activation.
On 19 October 2022, an unstable approach to Sandy Lake by a de Havilland DHC8-300 was followed by a mishandled landing attempt by the first officer involving excessive pitch up and a tail strike. When the captain recognised a go-around was intended, he took over and completed the landing. The captain had recently been promoted after 3,000 hours as a first officer, and the first officer had just been released on his first two-pilot aircraft type after over 70 hours line training. The investigation noted that if an operator's safety management system (SMS) does not actively monitor flight data, unsafe practices may not be identified, increasing the risk that they will continue.
On 24 February 2020, a Sikorsky S92 helicopter crew departing at night from an oil rig in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea in adverse weather temporarily lost pitch control after both pilots became spatially disorientated prior to reaching minimum speed for autopilot engagement. Recovery was successful and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. But the Investigation concluded that operator procedures were insufficiently robust, and that helicopters engaged in offshore operations could be equipped with low-speed flight modes to mitigate consequences of pilot spatial disorientation during low-level manoeuvring.
Environmental Factors
On 24 February 2020, a Sikorsky S92 helicopter crew departing at night from an oil rig in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea in adverse weather temporarily lost pitch control after both pilots became spatially disorientated prior to reaching minimum speed for autopilot engagement. Recovery was successful and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. But the Investigation concluded that operator procedures were insufficiently robust, and that helicopters engaged in offshore operations could be equipped with low-speed flight modes to mitigate consequences of pilot spatial disorientation during low-level manoeuvring.
On 9 August 2024, an ATR 72-500 at FL170 encountered weather conditions which led to airframe icing. Indicated airspeed decreased quickly without corrective action despite corresponding alerts. Almost immediately after an ‘INCREASE SPEED’ alert during a turn, the aircraft stalled, eventually entering a flat spin until impacting terrain in a residential area. Impact and a post-crash fire destroyed the aircraft, and all occupants were killed. The investigation is continuing.
On 31 January 2022, a Bombardier Challenger 604 pilot lost control during the final stages of a London Stansted night crosswind landing. A bounced nose-gear-first touchdown was followed by a brief runway excursion onto grass before a return to the runway and a climb away. A diversion to London Gatwick followed without further event but subsequent inspection revealed structural and other damage sufficient to result in the aircraft being declared an economic hull loss. The Stansted touchdown was found to have occurred after a premature flare at idle thrust continued towards the stall and a momentary stick pusher activation occurred.
On 18 December 2022, a Boeing 777-200 which had just departed Kahului in IMC had reached 2,100 feet over the sea in cloud when it began to descend in response to flight control inputs without the Captain as pilot flying recognising what was occurring. Recognition and recovery was slow and only prompted by a combination of EGPWS and verbal PULL UP warnings from the First Officer with a high speed descent to within less than 800 feet of the sea surface. The occurrence was not reported - nor apparently required to be - and the Investigation scope was thereby significantly compromised.
On 25 October 2022, a Boeing 777-300ER encountered deteriorating weather conditions after initiating a delayed arrival diversion from Singapore Changi to nearby Batam where four approaches were flown and a ‘MAYDAY Fuel’ declared before a landing was achieved. By this time, the fuel remaining was “significantly below final reserve” although the actual figure was not published in the Investigation Report. It was concluded that the delay in commencing the diversion and the inappropriate attempt to perform an autoland on RWY04 at Batam airport by the flight crew contributed to the potentially hazardous circumstances.
Bird or Animal Strike
On 19 November 2022, an Airbus A320 was descending below 13,000 feet towards its destination of Omaha, clear of clouds at night and at 290 knots, when an explosive decompression occurred as a result of bird strike damage. An emergency was declared, and once on the ground, three locations where the fuselage skin had been broken open were discovered. The structural damage was assessed as substantial, and the aircraft was withdrawn from service for major repairs. The birds involved were identified by DNA analysis as migrating Snow or Ross’s Geese, the former of which can weigh up to 2.6kg.
On 28 September 2012, control of a Sita Air Dornier 228 being flown by an experienced pilot was lost at approximately 100 feet aal after take off from Kathmandu in benign daylight weather conditions and the aircraft stalled without obvious attempt at recovery before impacting the ground where a fire broke out. All occupants were killed and the aircraft was destroyed. The comprehensive investigation found that insufficient engine thrust was being delivered to sustain flight but, having eliminated engine bird ingestion and aircraft loading issues, was unable to establish any environmental, airworthiness or loading issue which might have caused this.
On 19 January 2013, a Rolls Royce Trent 700-powered Virgin Atlantic Airbus A330-300 hit some medium sized birds shortly after take off from Orlando, sustaining airframe impact damage and ingesting one bird into each engine. Damage was subsequently found to both engines although only one indicated sufficient malfunction - a complete loss of oil pressure - for an in-flight shutdown to be required. After declaration of a MAYDAY, the return to land overweight was completed uneventfully. The investigation identified an issue with the response of the oil pressure detection and display system to high engine vibration events and recommended modification.
On 3 August 2006, a Qantas Boeing 767-300 encountered a large flock of birds during rotation and sustained multiple strikes on many parts of the aircraft. Left engine vibration immediately increased but as reducing thrust also reduced the vibration, it was decided following consultation with maintenance to continue to the planned destination, Sydney.
On 10 November 2008, a Boeing 737-800 about to land at Rome Ciampino Airport flew through a large and dense flock of starlings, which appeared from below the aircraft. After the crew had made an unsuccessful attempt to go around, they lost control due to malfunction of both engines when full thrust was applied and a very hard impact half way along the runway caused substantial damage to the aircraft. The Investigation concluded that the Captain's decision to attempt a go around after the encounter was inappropriate and that bird risk management measures at the airport had been inadequate.
Aircraft Loading
On 1 December 2023, a Boeing 737-400 crew about to depart East Midlands on a night cargo flight set up the departure based on an incorrect loadsheet. As a result, the actual takeoff weight was 10 tonnes heavier than anticipated. Although no handling abnormality was detected, a ‘bump’ was heard during rotation and suspected to be either load shift or a tail strike. After an inspection eliminated load shift, it was decided to assume a tail strike and complete the 45-minute flight at a lower altitude. This occurred without further event and a tail strike was subsequently confirmed.
On 3 February 2022, a Boeing 737-200F collided with a tree shortly after a daylight normal visibility takeoff from Puerto Carreño which resulted in engine stoppage although a subsequent restart was partially successful and a return to land was subsequently completed without further event. The collision was attributed to a combination of a slightly overweight takeoff and a slight delay in rotation which in the prevailing density altitude conditions prevented the rate of climb necessary to clear the obstacle. The context for the accident was assessed as a deficient operational safety culture at the company involved.
On 27 January 2020, an MD83 made an unstabilised tailwind non-precision approach to Mahshahr with a consistently excessive rate of descent and corresponding EGPWS Warnings followed by a very late nose-gear-first touchdown. It then overran the runway end, continued through the airport perimeter fence and crossed over a ditch before coming to a stop partly blocking a busy main road. The aircraft sustained substantial damage and was subsequently declared a hull loss but all occupants completed an emergency evacuation uninjured. The accident was attributed to the actions of the Captain which included not following multiple standard operating procedures.
On 21 July 2020, a Boeing 737-800 flight crew identified significant discrepancies when comparing their Operational Flight Plan weights and passengers by category with those on the Loadsheet presented. After examining them and concluding that the differences were plausible based on past experience, the loadsheet figures were used for takeoff performance purposes with no adverse consequences detected. It was found that a system-wide IT upgrade issue had led to the generation of incorrect loadsheets and that ineffective communication and an initially ineffective response within the operator had delayed effective risk resolution although without any known flight safety-related consequences.
On 17 December 2017, it was discovered after completion of an Airbus A330-300 passenger flight from Sydney to Bejing that freight loading had not been correctly documented on the load and trim sheet presented to and accepted by the Captain and as a result, the aircraft had exceeded its certified MTOW on departure. The Investigation found that the overload finding had not been promptly reported or its safety significance appreciated, that the error had its origin in related verbal communications during loading and noted that the aircraft operator had since made a series of improvements to its freight loading procedures.
Malicious Interference
On 19 May 2016, fire broke out on board an Airbus A320 en-route to Cairo at night. The fire spread rapidly from the forward area of the aircraft and rapidly intensified. Loss of control due to conditions on the flight deck resulted in descent and sea impact with all 66 occupants killed. Work for the Investigation (reproduced in the final report) which identified a leak from the flight crew emergency oxygen system as the fire source was eventually discounted and it was concluded that the origin was activation of explosive materials in the forward galley just behind the flight deck.
On 2 February 2016, an Airbus A321 Boeing 757-200F in the climb after departing from Mogadishu had just passed FL100 when an explosion occurred inside the passenger cabin. This led to significant structural damage to a small area of the fuselage, which caused cabin depressurisation, the ejection of one passenger, and led to three others being seriously injured. The damaged aircraft was recovered to Mogadishu without any further consequences, and the explosion was found to have been intentionally caused by the ejected male passenger. A series of Safety Recommendations were issued, aimed at improving security screening of passengers boarding flights from Mogadishu.
On 8 January 2020, a Boeing 737-800 was destroyed by a ground to air missile when climbing through approximately 4800 feet aal three minutes after takeoff from Tehran for Kiev and its 176 occupants were killed. The Investigation is continuing but it has been confirmed that severe damage and an airborne fire followed the detonation of a proximity missile after a military targeting error, with subsequent ground impact. It is also confirmed that the flight was following its ATC clearance and that a sequence of four separate errors led to two missiles being fired at the aircraft.
Temporary Control Loss
On 6 September 2023, control of a Boeing 738-800 was temporarily lost approaching cruise altitude. When reaching to unlock the flight deck door after a cabin crew access request, the captain operated the rudder trim switch to its full travel. Neither pilot recognised the error, and an EGPWS alert followed as left bank increased towards its maximum autopilot-engaged limit of 42°. This prompted successful upset recovery action. However, the underlying cause was recognised only after the first officer suggested checking the rudder trim position. Contrary to company procedures, prior positive identification of the intended switch had not preceded activation.
On 24 February 2020, a Sikorsky S92 helicopter crew departing at night from an oil rig in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea in adverse weather temporarily lost pitch control after both pilots became spatially disorientated prior to reaching minimum speed for autopilot engagement. Recovery was successful and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. But the Investigation concluded that operator procedures were insufficiently robust, and that helicopters engaged in offshore operations could be equipped with low-speed flight modes to mitigate consequences of pilot spatial disorientation during low-level manoeuvring.
On 8 April 2022, an Airbus A320 made a multiple-bounce touchdown at Copenhagen followed by thrust reverser deployment. The captain rejected the landing and began a go-around, but as the left main gear had bounced and was not on the ground when thrust was set, the left engine reverser did not stow. Full aircraft control was briefly lost and a runway excursion narrowly avoided before a recovery to a single engine MAYDAY circuit and landing followed. Engine software design prevented thrust reverser stowage without weight on wheels, which was why rejected landings after reverser deployment were prohibited.
On 6 November 2018, an Airbus A340-600 in cruise northbound over the Swiss Alps received an overspeed warning after encountering an unexpected wind velocity change. However, the crew failed to follow the prescribed response procedure. This led initially to a climb above their cleared level, and further inappropriate actions were then followed by PAN and MAYDAY declarations as control of the aircraft was briefly lost in a high-speed descent below their cleared level. The operator subsequently enhanced pilot training realism by providing it in a simulator configured for the aircraft variant operated by the company. The operator also introduced upset recovery training.
On 25 July 2021, a Boeing 737-800 which had previously been manoeuvring visually around storm cells over the Alps during the initial descent into Nice turned back on track believing the avoidance action was complete but was then unable to avoid penetrating a further cell during which severe turbulence caused a serious injury to one of the cabin crew and a lesser injury to another. Multiple aircraft in the area had been simultaneously requesting track deviations at the time with ATC displays not showing weather returns. In the absence of plans to introduce this, a corresponding safety recommendation was made.
Extreme Bank
On 6 September 2023, control of a Boeing 738-800 was temporarily lost approaching cruise altitude. When reaching to unlock the flight deck door after a cabin crew access request, the captain operated the rudder trim switch to its full travel. Neither pilot recognised the error, and an EGPWS alert followed as left bank increased towards its maximum autopilot-engaged limit of 42°. This prompted successful upset recovery action. However, the underlying cause was recognised only after the first officer suggested checking the rudder trim position. Contrary to company procedures, prior positive identification of the intended switch had not preceded activation.
On 25 July 2021, a Boeing 737-800 which had previously been manoeuvring visually around storm cells over the Alps during the initial descent into Nice turned back on track believing the avoidance action was complete but was then unable to avoid penetrating a further cell during which severe turbulence caused a serious injury to one of the cabin crew and a lesser injury to another. Multiple aircraft in the area had been simultaneously requesting track deviations at the time with ATC displays not showing weather returns. In the absence of plans to introduce this, a corresponding safety recommendation was made.
On 6 February 1996, a Boeing 757-200 took off from Puerto Plata at night despite awareness at the 80 knot check that the Captains altimeter was not working. Thereafter, the crew became confused as to their actual airspeed and lost control before the aircraft hit the sea surface less than five minutes after takeoff. The Investigation found that the Captain’s pitot probe was blocked and that the three pilots on the flight deck had become confused about which airspeed indications were reliable and had then not recovered from an aerodynamic stall which followed the wholly avoidable mismanagement of the aircraft flight path.
On 23 January 2020, a Cessna S550 departed George to conduct a calibration flight under VFR with three persons on board and was about to begin a DME arc at 4,000 feet QNH when control was lost after entering IMC. Recovery from a significant descent which followed was not achieved before the aircraft hit mountainous terrain 1,800 feet below and was destroyed killing all occupants. The Investigation considered that the transition into IMC had probably occurred without preparation and that the inability of the crew to perform a prompt recovery reflected unfavourably on the conduct of the aircraft operator.
On 21 January 2019, a Piper PA46-310P en-route north northwest of Guernsey was reported missing and subsequently confirmed to have broken up in flight during an uncontrolled descent. The Investigation found that neither the pilot nor the aircraft involved were able to be used for commercial passenger flight operations but also found that although the direct cause of loss of control was unproven, it was most likely the consequence of carbon monoxide poisoning originating from an exhaust system leak. The safety implications arising from operation of private flights for commercial passenger transport purposes contrary to regulatory requirements were also highlighted.
Extreme Pitch
On 4 December 2023, a Boeing 737-8200 crew misjudged positioning onto the ILS approach for arrival at London Stansted. Having decided to go around, they then continued to climb above the 3,000 feet missed approach altitude which they had failed to set until alerted by the controller. The descent following a 1,000 feet level bust then continued back through the missed approach altitude at almost 9,000 fpm with an EGPWS ‘PULL UP’ Warning just as recovery from 1,740 feet agl was being initiated. After levelling at 3,000 feet, radar-vectoring onto the ILS was provided with the approach then completed normally.
On 24 February 2020, a Sikorsky S92 helicopter crew departing at night from an oil rig in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea in adverse weather temporarily lost pitch control after both pilots became spatially disorientated prior to reaching minimum speed for autopilot engagement. Recovery was successful and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. But the Investigation concluded that operator procedures were insufficiently robust, and that helicopters engaged in offshore operations could be equipped with low-speed flight modes to mitigate consequences of pilot spatial disorientation during low-level manoeuvring.
On 11 October 2019, an Embraer ERJ195LR abandoned an initial landing attempt at Warsaw after a hard bounce but the correct go-around procedure was not followed. The rate of climb rapidly increased to over 4000 feet per minute. Concurrently, the required engine thrust was not set and airspeed rapidly diminished to a point where the stick shaker was activated. Stall and Upset Recovery procedures were not correctly followed, and the aircraft commander was slow to take control of the situation. Full control was regained at 1,200 feet above ground level and a subsequent approach and landing were made without further event.
On 6 February 1996, a Boeing 757-200 took off from Puerto Plata at night despite awareness at the 80 knot check that the Captains altimeter was not working. Thereafter, the crew became confused as to their actual airspeed and lost control before the aircraft hit the sea surface less than five minutes after takeoff. The Investigation found that the Captain’s pitot probe was blocked and that the three pilots on the flight deck had become confused about which airspeed indications were reliable and had then not recovered from an aerodynamic stall which followed the wholly avoidable mismanagement of the aircraft flight path.
On 20 December 2019, an Airbus A318 making a tailwind ILS approach to Toulon-Hyères with the autopilot engaged and expecting to intercept the glideslope from above had not done so when reaching the pre-selected altitude and after levelling off, it then rapidly entered a steep climb as it captured the glideslope false upper lobe and the automated stall protection system was activated. Not fully following the recovery procedure caused a second stall protection activation before a sustained recovery was achieved. The Investigation noted Captain's relative inexperience in that rank and a First Officer's inexperience on type.
Last Minute Collision Avoidance
On 14 February 2012 a Latvian-operated Saab 340 acknowledged an ATC clearance to make a procedural ILS approach to Mariehamn and then completely disregarded the clearance by setting course direct to the aerodrome. Subsequently, having lost situational awareness, repeated GPWS PULL UP warnings at night in VMC were ignored as control of the aircraft was lost with a recovery only achieved an estimated 2 seconds before ground impact would have occurred and then followed by more ignored PULL UP Warnings due to continued proximity to terrain before the runway was sighted and a landing achieved.
On 15 December 2014, the Captain of a Saab 2000 lost control of his serviceable aircraft after a lightning strike when he attempted to control the aircraft manually without first disconnecting the autopilot and despite the annunciation of a series of related alerts. The aircraft descended from 4,000 feet to 1,100 feet at up to 9,500 fpm and 80 knots above Vmo. A fortuitous transient data transmission fault caused autopilot disconnection making it possible to respond to EGPWS 'SINK RATE' and 'PULL UP' Warnings. The Investigation concluded that limitations on autopilot disconnection by pilot override were contrary to the type certification of most other transport aircraft.
On 3 January 3 2004, a Boeing 737-300 being operated by Flash Airlines on a passenger charter flight from Sharm el-Sheikh Egypt to Cairo for a refuelling stop en route to Paris CDG crashed into the sea 2½ minutes after a night take off into VMC and was destroyed and all 148 occupants killed. The Investigation was unable to establish a Probable Cause but found evidence of AP status confusion and the possibility of distraction leading to insufficient attention being paid to flight path control.
Hard landing
On 17 February 2025 a Mitsubishi (formerly Bombardier) CRJ-900LR was on the final stage of an approach to Toronto International and touched down at a very high rate of descent on the right main landing gear which collapsed inwards. This caused the right wing to break from the fuselage which then rolled inverted, detaching the tailplane, and slid for some distance before stopping, complicating the subsequent evacuation. A fuel-fed fire immediately ignited around the right wing/fuselage attachment point but all 80 occupants escaped, almost all using just two exits. There were only two serious injuries and 19 minor injuries.
On 19 October 2022, an unstable approach to Sandy Lake by a de Havilland DHC8-300 was followed by a mishandled landing attempt by the first officer involving excessive pitch up and a tail strike. When the captain recognised a go-around was intended, he took over and completed the landing. The captain had recently been promoted after 3,000 hours as a first officer, and the first officer had just been released on his first two-pilot aircraft type after over 70 hours line training. The investigation noted that if an operator's safety management system (SMS) does not actively monitor flight data, unsafe practices may not be identified, increasing the risk that they will continue.
On 8 April 2022, an Airbus A320 made a multiple-bounce touchdown at Copenhagen followed by thrust reverser deployment. The captain rejected the landing and began a go-around, but as the left main gear had bounced and was not on the ground when thrust was set, the left engine reverser did not stow. Full aircraft control was briefly lost and a runway excursion narrowly avoided before a recovery to a single engine MAYDAY circuit and landing followed. Engine software design prevented thrust reverser stowage without weight on wheels, which was why rejected landings after reverser deployment were prohibited.
On 31 January 2022, a Bombardier Challenger 604 pilot lost control during the final stages of a London Stansted night crosswind landing. A bounced nose-gear-first touchdown was followed by a brief runway excursion onto grass before a return to the runway and a climb away. A diversion to London Gatwick followed without further event but subsequent inspection revealed structural and other damage sufficient to result in the aircraft being declared an economic hull loss. The Stansted touchdown was found to have occurred after a premature flare at idle thrust continued towards the stall and a momentary stick pusher activation occurred.
On 11 October 2019, an Embraer ERJ195LR abandoned an initial landing attempt at Warsaw after a hard bounce but the correct go-around procedure was not followed. The rate of climb rapidly increased to over 4000 feet per minute. Concurrently, the required engine thrust was not set and airspeed rapidly diminished to a point where the stick shaker was activated. Stall and Upset Recovery procedures were not correctly followed, and the aircraft commander was slow to take control of the situation. Full control was regained at 1,200 feet above ground level and a subsequent approach and landing were made without further event.
Take off Trim Setting
On 1 December 2023, a Boeing 737-400 crew about to depart East Midlands on a night cargo flight set up the departure based on an incorrect loadsheet. As a result, the actual takeoff weight was 10 tonnes heavier than anticipated. Although no handling abnormality was detected, a ‘bump’ was heard during rotation and suspected to be either load shift or a tail strike. After an inspection eliminated load shift, it was decided to assume a tail strike and complete the 45-minute flight at a lower altitude. This occurred without further event and a tail strike was subsequently confirmed.
On 2 April 2012, the crew of an ATR72-200 which had just taken off from Tyumen lost control of their aircraft when it stalled after the flaps were retracted and did not recover before it crashed and caught fire killing or seriously injuring all occupants. The Investigation found that the Captain knew that frozen deposits had accumulated on the airframe but appeared to have been unaware of the danger of not having the airframe de-iced. It was also found that the crew had not recognised the stall when it occurred and had overpowered the stick pusher and pitched up.
On 25 January 2010, a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Ethiopian Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight from Beirut to Addis Ababa in night IMC disappeared from ATC radar soon after departure from Runway 21 and was subsequently found to have impacted the sea in an unintentional out of control condition some five miles south west of the airport less than five minutes after getting airborne Impact resulted in the destruction of the aircraft and the death of all 90 occupants.
On 18 January 2007 an ATR 42-300 freighter developed a control difficulty just after a night take off from Stansted UK, which led the flight crew to declare an emergency and undertake an immediate return to land. The landing was uneventful but the approach flown was unstable, with EGPWS warnings, and the origin of the handling difficulty was considered to be, in part, due to inappropriate control inputs by one of the pilots.
Incorrect Thrust Computed
On 23 July 2021, the takeoff roll of a Boeing 737-800 making an intersection departure from Yerevan on a non revenue positioning flight using reduced thrust in daylight exceeded the length of runway available by 81 metres but was undamaged and completed its intended flight. The Investigation found that the Onboard Performance Tool when preparing for departure had been wrongly configured but that when the crew realised there was insufficient runway length left to reject the takeoff, the thrust had not been increased and the response had been the commencement of a slow rotation 20 knots before the appropriate speed.
On 27 January 2020, an MD83 made an unstabilised tailwind non-precision approach to Mahshahr with a consistently excessive rate of descent and corresponding EGPWS Warnings followed by a very late nose-gear-first touchdown. It then overran the runway end, continued through the airport perimeter fence and crossed over a ditch before coming to a stop partly blocking a busy main road. The aircraft sustained substantial damage and was subsequently declared a hull loss but all occupants completed an emergency evacuation uninjured. The accident was attributed to the actions of the Captain which included not following multiple standard operating procedures.
On 26 February 2020, an Airbus A330-300 tailstrike occurred during rotation for takeoff from Zurich and was not detected by the crew who completed the planned 7½ hour flight to Nairobi before learning that the aircraft was not airworthy as a result. The Investigation concluded that the tailstrike had been the direct result of the crew’s use of inappropriate inputs to their takeoff performance calculation on the variable headwind encountered during the takeoff and noted a very similar event had previously occurred to the same aircraft type operated by an airline within the same overall ownership.
On 14 April 2012, a Titan Airways Boeing 737-300 attempted to take off from Chambery with incorrect reference speeds taken from the EFB used for performance calculations. As a consequence, the pressure hull was damaged by a tail strike during take off, although not sufficiently to affect cabin pressure during the subsequent flight. The Investigation concluded that the accident raised regulatory issues in respect of the general design and use of EFB computers to calculate performance data.
On 27 October 2017, an Embraer E195-200 missed approach was attempted in response to a predictive windshear alert on short final at Salzburg without ensuring sufficient engine thrust was set and when a stall warning followed, the correct recovery procedure was not initiated until over a minute had elapsed. Thereafter, following two holds, an approach and landing was completed without further event. The operator did not report the event in a timely or complete manner and it was therefore not possible to identify it as a Serious Incident requiring an independent investigation until almost three months after it had occurred.
Unintended transitory terrain contact
On 29 April 2023, the flight crew of an Airbus A321 did not complete the intended touchdown at Abu Dhabi from the flare to land and initiation of a go-around resulted in a tail strike due to improper high pitch control input whilst the airspeed was still low and the configuration not correct. The mishandling arose from confusion by both pilots as to the aircraft air/ground status after touchdown and involved significant dual sidestick input with no transfer of control. Once established in the climb, the remainder of the subsequent circuit to land was completed without further event.
On 6 May 2022, a Boeing 737-800 sustained a tail strike during takeoff from Kathmandu during a flight to revalidate a captain’s airport familiarisation training. Running the applicable non-normal procedure was delayed until above the unusually high minimum safe altitude, but when actioned, some of its requirements were not initially or fully followed. A precautionary diversion to Kolkata was subsequently completed. The Investigation found that an excessive pitch rate during rotation had resulted in the pitch angle limit being exceeded. The absence of sufficient procedural guidance on tail strike response and some crew unfamiliarity with depressurisation procedures was noted.
On 2 January 2022, an Airbus A350-1000 floated during the landing flare at London Heathrow and when a go-around was commenced, a tail strike accompanied main landing gear runway contact. A subsequent further approach during which the Captain took over as handling pilot was completed uneventfully. The Investigation attributed the tailstrike to a full pitch up input made simultaneously with the selection of maximum thrust when very close to the runway surface, noting that although the initial touchdown had been just beyond the touchdown zone, 2,760 metres of runway remained ahead when the go around decision was made.
On 10 September 2017, the First Officer of a Gulfstream G550 making an offset non-precision approach to Paris Le Bourget failed to make a correct visual transition and after both crew were initially slow to recognise the error, an unsuccessful attempt at a low-level corrective realignment followed. This had not been completed when the auto throttle set the thrust to idle at 50 feet whilst a turn was being made over the runway ahead of the displaced threshold and one wing was in collision with runway edge lighting. The landing attempt was rejected and the Captain took over the go-around.
On 26 February 2020, an Airbus A330-300 tailstrike occurred during rotation for takeoff from Zurich and was not detected by the crew who completed the planned 7½ hour flight to Nairobi before learning that the aircraft was not airworthy as a result. The Investigation concluded that the tailstrike had been the direct result of the crew’s use of inappropriate inputs to their takeoff performance calculation on the variable headwind encountered during the takeoff and noted a very similar event had previously occurred to the same aircraft type operated by an airline within the same overall ownership.
Collision Damage
On 15 January 2021, the pilot of a DJI Inspire 2 UAV being operated on a contracted aerial work task under a conditional permit lost control of it and, after it exitied the approved operating area, the UAV collided with the window of a hotel guest room causing consequential minor injuries to the occupant. The Investigation found that the loss of control was attributable to “strong magnetic interference” almost immediately after takeoff which caused the compass to feed unreliable data to the Internal Management Unit which destabilised its accelerometer and led to the loss of directional control which resulted in the collision.
On 16 June 2021, a Boeing 737-400 was taxiing for departure at night after push back from stand when the ground crew who completed the push back arrived back at their base in the tug and realised that the tow bar they had used was not attached to it. The aircraft was prevented from taking off and it was then found that it had taxied over the unseen towbar and sustained damage to both nose gear tyres such that replacement was necessary. The Investigation concluded neither ground crew had checked that the area immediately ahead of the aircraft was clear.
On 30 August 2018, a Boeing 747-400F making a crosswind landing at Hong Kong which was well within limits veered and rolled abnormally immediately after touchdown and runway impact damaged the two right side engines. The Investigation found that the flight was an experienced Captain’s line check handling sector and concluded that a succession of inappropriate control inputs made at and immediately after touchdown which caused the damage may have been a consequence of the Check Captain’s indication just before touchdown that he was expecting a landing using an alternative technique to the one he was familiar with.
On 14 July 2019, after control of a DJI-Inspire 2 UA was lost, it descended into people on the ground under power causing multiple minor injuries. The Investigation found that “professional drone pilots” were operating the UA in gross breach of the approval obtained, had deleted all recorded controller evidence of the accident flight and that their account of the loss of control was not compatible with the evidence recovered from the UA. It also noted that the risk of injury to third parties was increased by the absence of protection around the propellers which was not a regulatory requirement.
On 6 July 2013, an Asiana Boeing 777-200 descended below the visual glidepath on short finals at San Francisco after the pilots failed to notice that their actions had reduced thrust to idle. Upon late recognition that the aircraft was too low and slow, they were unable to recover before the aircraft hit the sea wall and the tail detached. Control was lost and the fuselage eventually hit the ground. A few occupants were ejected at impact but most managed to evacuate subsequently and before fire took hold. The Probable Cause of the accident was determined to be the mismanagement of the aircraft by the pilots.
Incorrect Aircraft Configuration
On 29 April 2023, the flight crew of an Airbus A321 did not complete the intended touchdown at Abu Dhabi from the flare to land and initiation of a go-around resulted in a tail strike due to improper high pitch control input whilst the airspeed was still low and the configuration not correct. The mishandling arose from confusion by both pilots as to the aircraft air/ground status after touchdown and involved significant dual sidestick input with no transfer of control. Once established in the climb, the remainder of the subsequent circuit to land was completed without further event.
On 21 December 2023, a Boeing 737-800 experienced a flap load protection response to turbulence during a night go-around at Billund, which locked the flaps in a mid-range position. A diversion to Copenhagen was commenced, but when it became clear that the fault would result in landing with slightly below minimum reserve fuel, a MAYDAY was declared. The flight was completed without further event. It was concluded that flap system locking had probably resulted from the crew’s manual selection of 15° flap just as the flap load relief system was responding, as designed, to a turbulence-caused flap overspeed condition.
On 25 November 2021, a Fokker F50 departing Helsinki experienced an engine malfunction that resulted in an uncommanded propeller feathering. The associated engine continued to run until shutdown, during which time it began to overspeed. The aircraft landed safely, but the failure experienced was untrained, and this led to both direct and indirect consequences that resulted in a suboptimal crew response to the emergency. The Investigation also highlighted opportunities to improve aspects of the air traffic control emergency response during such emergencies and identified language proficiency certification issues.
On 3 August 2009, control of a rotary UAV being operated by an agricultural cooperative for routine crop spraying in the south western part of South Korea was lost and the remote pilot was fatally injured when it then collided with him. The Investigation found that an inappropriately set pitch trim switch went unnoticed and the consequentially unexpected trajectory was not recognised and corrected. The context was assessed as inadequacies in the operator’s safety management arrangements and the content of the applicable UAV Operations Manual as well as lack of recurrent training for the operators’ qualified UAV remote pilots.
On 15 January 2023, an ATR 72-500 positioning visually for an approach to Pokhara, Nepal, suddenly departed controlled flight and impacted terrain. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact and all 71 occupants were killed. A type-experienced training captain was overseeing new airport familiarisation for a line captain acting as pilot flying. The training captain unintentionally feathered both propellers in response to a call for flaps 30 but did not recognise their error or respond to calls that no power was coming from the engines. The airline’s operational safety-related processes and regulatory oversight of them were both assessed as comprehensively inadequate.
Aerodynamic Stall
On 9 August 2024, an ATR 72-500 at FL170 encountered weather conditions which led to airframe icing. Indicated airspeed decreased quickly without corrective action despite corresponding alerts. Almost immediately after an ‘INCREASE SPEED’ alert during a turn, the aircraft stalled, eventually entering a flat spin until impacting terrain in a residential area. Impact and a post-crash fire destroyed the aircraft, and all occupants were killed. The investigation is continuing.
On 11 October 2019, an Embraer ERJ195LR abandoned an initial landing attempt at Warsaw after a hard bounce but the correct go-around procedure was not followed. The rate of climb rapidly increased to over 4000 feet per minute. Concurrently, the required engine thrust was not set and airspeed rapidly diminished to a point where the stick shaker was activated. Stall and Upset Recovery procedures were not correctly followed, and the aircraft commander was slow to take control of the situation. Full control was regained at 1,200 feet above ground level and a subsequent approach and landing were made without further event.
On 20 January 2020, a DHC8-300 encountered severe icing conditions, and both engines successively failed during its approach to Bergen. The automatic ignition system restarted the engines but for a short time the aircraft was completely without power. It was concluded that ice had accreted on and then detached from the engine air inlets and either entered the combustion chamber partly melted and caused a flameout or disrupted the airflow into the engine sufficiently to stall it. Shortcomings were identified in the operator’s documentation for operation in icing conditions and further review of weather radar use by ATC was recommended.
On 8 February 2021, an Embraer 500 Phenom 100 (9H-FAM) crew lost control of their aircraft shortly before the intended touchdown when it stalled due to airframe ice contamination. The resulting runway impact collapsed the nose and main gear, the latter causing fuel leak and resultant fire as the aircraft slid along the runway before veering off it. The Investigation found that flight in icing conditions during the approach had not been accompanied by the prescribed use of the airframe de-icing system and that such non compliance appeared to be routine and its dangers unappreciated.
On 15 January 2023, an ATR 72-500 positioning visually for an approach to Pokhara, Nepal, suddenly departed controlled flight and impacted terrain. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact and all 71 occupants were killed. A type-experienced training captain was overseeing new airport familiarisation for a line captain acting as pilot flying. The training captain unintentionally feathered both propellers in response to a call for flaps 30 but did not recognise their error or respond to calls that no power was coming from the engines. The airline’s operational safety-related processes and regulatory oversight of them were both assessed as comprehensively inadequate.
Minimum Fuel Call
On 16 September 2019, an ATR 72-200 diverted to Itaituba, Brazil, when landing at its intended destination of Manaus was prevented by the airport's unexpected closure due to an aircraft accident. During this diversion, intermittent indications of low fuel quantity were annunciated, and one engine subsequently ran down on final approach and the other whilst backtracking after landing. It was found that due to a series of undetected faults in the aircraft’s fuel quantity sensing system, the flight deck indications of fuel tank contents were over-reading and the low fuel indication system was also malfunctioning for the same reason.
On 2 March 2018, a Cessna 441 conducting a single-pilot scheduled passenger flight to Broome suffered successive failures of both engines due to fuel exhaustion and a MAYDAY was declared. Unable to reach the destination or any other aerodrome by the time this occurred, an uneventful landing was made on the area’s main highway. The Investigation found that the fuel quantity was over-reading due to water in the fuel tanks, that cross-checking of fuel used versus indicated fuel in tanks was not done and that when the possibility of fuel exhaustion was first indicated, an available diversion was not made.
On 10 October 2016, an Airbus 319 was cleared to divert to its first alternate after failing to land off its Cat II ILS approach at Porto and obliged to land at its second alternate with less than final reserve fuel after the first alternate declined acceptance due to lack of parking capacity. The Investigation concluded that adjacent ATC Unit coordination in respect of multiple diversions was inadequate and also found that the crew had failed to adequately appraise ATC of their fuel status. It also noted that the unsuccessful approach at the intended destination had violated approach ban visibility conditions.
Flight Envelope Protection Activated
On 19 August 2017, an Airbus A340-300 encountered significant unforecast windshear on rotation for a maximum weight rated-thrust night takeoff from Bogotá and was unable to begin its climb for a further 800 metres during which angle of attack flight envelope protection was briefly activated. The Investigation noted the absence of a windshear detection system and any data on the prevalence of windshear at the airport as well as the failure of ATC to relay in English reports of conditions from departing aircraft received in Spanish. The aircraft operator subsequently elected to restrict maximum permitted takeoff weights from the airport.
On 27 November 2017, an Embraer EMB 550 crew ignored a pre-takeoff indication of an inoperative airframe ice protection system despite taxiing out and taking off in icing conditions. The flight proceeded normally until approach to Paris Le Bourget when the Captain was unable to flare for touchdown at the normal speed and a 4g runway impact which caused a main gear leg to pierce the wing followed. The Investigation found that the crew had failed to follow relevant normal and abnormal operating procedures and did not understand how flight envelope protection worked or why it had activated on approach.
On 24 March 2012, an Air France Airbus A319 Captain continued descent towards destination Tunis at high speed with the landing runway in sight well beyond the point where a stabilised approach was possible. With 5nm to go, airspeed was over 100 KIAS above the applicable VApp and the aircraft was descending at over 4000fpm with flaps zero. EGPWS activations for Sink Rate, PULL UP and Too Low Terrain apparently went unnoticed but at 400 feet agl, ATC granted a crew request for a 360° turn. The subsequent approach/landing was without further event. Investigation attributed the event to “sloppy CRM”.
On 3 April 2012, the crew of an Air France Airbus A320 came close to loosing control of their aircraft after accepting, inadequately preparing for and comprehensively mismanaging it during an RNAV VISUAL approach at Tel Aviv and during the subsequent attempt at a missed approach. The Investigation identified significant issues with crew understanding of automation - especially in respect of both the use of FMS modes and operations with the AP off but the A/T on - and highlighted the inadequate provision by the aircraft operator of both procedures and pilot training for this type of approach.
On 27 February 2012, the crew of an Airbus A330 en route at night and crossing the East African coast at FL360 encountered sudden violent turbulence as they flew into a convective cell not seen on their weather radar and briefly lost control as their aircraft climbed 2000 feet with resultant minor injuries to two occupants. The Investigation concluded that the isolated and rapidly developing cell had not been detected because of crew failure to make proper use of their weather radar, but noted that activation of flight envelope protection and subsequent crew action to recover control had been appropriate.
Further Reading
- Aircraft Loss of Control: Causal Factors and Mitigation Challenges, by S. R. Jacobson (NASA)
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