Hot Spots at Aerodromes

Hot Spots at Aerodromes

Definition

Hot spot. A location on an aerodrome movement area with a history or potential risk of collision or runway incursion, and where heightened attention by pilots/drivers is necessary. 

Source: ICAO Doc 9870, Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions

Description

Many aerodromes have hazardous locations on taxiways and/or runways where incidents have occurred or could potentially occur. Such positions are commonly referred to as "hot spots".

According to ICAO PANS-ATM Doc 4444 (Chapter 7) the aerodrome operator is responsible for designating those hot spots. Formal definition of hotspots can alert pilots and drivers to movement area design issues which cannot be readily mitigated by signage or lighting or where poor visibility may contribute to reduced Situational Awareness in relation to active runways. It can also alert to potentially critical points where the visual control room (VCR) or other surveillance systems are less effective usually.

ICAO recommends the local generation of AIP charts to show runway hotspots, which, once issued, must be kept up to date and revised as necessary. The identification and discussion of hot spots should be a standing topic in meetings of Local Runway Safety Teams (LRST).

All identified hot spots should be examined for short or long term opportunities for mitigation of or removal of the hazard identified. These actions include:
  • awareness campaigns;
  • enhanced visual aids (signs, markings and lights);
  • use of alternative routings;
  • changes to the movement area infrastructure, such as construction of new taxiways, and decommissioning of taxiways;
  • closed-circuit television (CCTV) for critical VCR sight line deficiencies.

Depending on the selected method of disseminating the information on hot spots on a specific aerodrome it can be either found as text in the airport operating information section or as a separate hot spot chart (e.g. in Amsterdam) or in a table format on the airport ground chart listing all relevant information. Additionally, certain airport moving map applications also allow displaying the relevant information just by tipping on the relevant hot spot symbol on that chart. 

It is essential that the charts produced by commercial providers (which are used by pilots/drivers) include at least all information on hot spots from the official AIP enriched by possible additionally available information from other sources (e.g. aerodrome safety management).

A 2016 global “hot spot” survey conducted by EUROCONTROL discovered that hot spots were not always presented effectively on charts. Therefore, they concluded the following best practices to be observed for the style of presenting hot spot information:

  • Each Hot Spot depicted by a clear bright red circle and joined to a red label box, e.g. HS1
  • Large tabulated textual information elaborating the action required of pilots/drivers in and around the Hot Spot. This may be on the main aerodrome diagram or on the obverse page if clarity is best served.
  • The use of additional graphical boxes depicting the Hot Spots in greater detail. These additional boxes should be physically linked by lines or arrows to the hot spot on the main diagram, if possible.
  • Where the aerodrome diagram would otherwise be too cluttered to present Hot Spots effectively, the use of specific Hot Spot pages can be effective.
  • The use of a color-coded format which assists the depiction of runways, Hot Spot areas and normal taxiways.
     

Two ICAO examples of runway hotspot charts and information are shown below.


Sample Aerodrome/Heliport Chart

 

Sample Chart

Risk Factors

The following (non-exhaustive) list highlights some frequent risk factors leading to designating positions on the maneuvering area as hot spots:

  • Angled taxiways
  • Intersecting or crossing runways
  • Crossing of runways with service roads
  • Unclear or ambiguous markings
  • Insufficient or distracting lighting
  • Small or frequently congested ramps
  • Actual runway or taxiway incursion incidents

The following risk factors may often increase the risk of front-line operators (ATCOs, pilots, drivers) being not sufficiently cautions about hot spots:

  • For Pilots: Unfamiliarity with the aerodrome
  • For Pilots/Drivers: Superficial preflight or TEM-briefing only
  • For all: Distraction or task overload (during taxi, driving or controlling)
  • For all: Operational Pressure (time or efficiency related)

Solutions

The Global Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions (GAPPRI) summarizes some of the common solutions and best practices regarding hot spots on aerodromes which different aviation stakeholders can use to mitigate the risk of collision and runway incursion:

Applicable for all stakeholders

GAPPRI demands empowering and equipping aviation personnel by fostering an organizational culture that prioritizes safe runway operations over commercial pressures and emphasizing the importance of taking sufficient time for critical safety tasks (see GAPPRI executive summary).

Aerodrome operators

  • Ensure that the AIP information is kept up to date and it reflects current information and conclusions from the LRST meetings (e.g. on changes or work in progress on the maneuvering area) (see GAPPRI ADR6).
  • Provide airport briefing/familiarization trainings for airports including airport specific procedures, configuration and hot spots (see GAPPRI ADR 2).
  • Consider making every attempt to remove the cause of the “hot spots” even if temporary strategies have been put in place (note: this recommendation was made by IFALPA in 2018 and is not explicitly articulated in GAPPRI)
  • Ensure safe runway operation communication procedures and technology being in place for Airside drivers (see GAPPRI ADR24-27, 30-33)

Aircraft operators

  • Make use of TEM-based briefing policies with a special attention to the taxi phase threats emphasizing runway crossings and hot spots. Additionally, pilots/crews should properly plan execution of checks and actions to be performed during taxi-out and taxi-in to prevent distraction when approaching hot spots (see GAPPRI AO8, AO31).
  • Include training on hot spot symbology (see GAPPRI AO4).
  • Provide aerodrome briefings, including frequently used parking positions, taxi hot spots and typical taxi-out or taxi-in routes (see GAPPRI AO7)
  • Ensure by policy and training that pilots/crews feel psychologically safe to take as much time as needed to safely complete all pre-departure and after-landing tasks in a safe, methodical and unhurried way (see GAPPRI AO17). 

Air Navigation Service Providers

  • Do not assume pilots/crews familiarity with the airport
  • Standard Taxi Routes (STR) through hotspots should be avoided (see GAPPRI ANSP 18).
  • Ensure enhanced procedures for safe runway operation are implemented (see GAPPRI ANSP29, 30, 31).
    Support aerodrome operators to develop proper familiarization tools for pilots/drivers using that aerodrome (see GAPPRI ANSP2).

Accidents and Incidents

On 13 January 2023, in good night visibility, a Boeing 777-200 with an augmented crew did not comply with its departure taxi clearance and crossed a runway in front of a 737 on the takeoff roll. ATC responded to an automated conflict warning by cancelling the takeoff clearance, and the 737 initiated a high-speed rejected takeoff from approximately 105 knots. Minimum separation as the 777 cleared the edge of the departure runway was approximately 300 metres. The investigation concluded that the 777 operator’s risk controls and the airport’s methods for detecting and preventing runway conflicts were both inadequate.

On 28 April 2018, a Boeing 737-800 exited the landing runway at Perth and without clearance crossed a lit red stop bar protecting the other active runway as another 737 was accelerating for takeoff. This aircraft was instructed to stop due to a runway incursion ahead and passed 15 metres clear of the incursion aircraft which by then had also stopped. The Investigation concluded that, after failing to refer to the aerodrome chart, the Captain had mixed up two landing runway exits of which only one involved subsequently crossing the other active runway and decided the stop bar was inapplicable.

On 12 July 2015, a Japanese-operated Boeing 767-300 deviated from its acknowledged clearance and lit-centreline taxi routing and began take-off from a parallel taxiway in good night visibility, crossing a lit red stop bar in the process. When ATC observed this, the aircraft was instructed to stop which was achieved without further event. A subsequent take-off was uneventful. The crew did not report the event to their airline or their State authorities because the Captain determined that this case did not need to be reported and these organisations only became aware when subsequently contacted by the Investigating Agency.

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