Missed Approach
Missed Approach
Description
When, for any reason, it is judged that an approach or landing cannot be continued to a successful landing, a missed approach or go-around shall be flown.
Reasons for discontinuing an approach or landing may include the following:
- The required visual references have not been established by the Decision Altitude/Height (DA/DH) or Minimum Descent Altitude/Height (MDA/MDH) or is acquired but is subsequently lost;
- The approach or landing is, or has become unstabilised;
- The aircraft is not positioned so as to allow a controlled touch down within the designated runway touchdown zone with a consequent risk of aircraft damage with or without a Runway Excursion if the attempt is continued;
- The runway is obstructed;
- Landing clearance has not been received or is issued and later cancelled;
- A go-around is being flown for training purposes with ATC approval.
Missed Approach Procedure
A missed approach procedure is the procedure to be followed if an approach cannot be continued. It specifies a point where the missed approach begins, and a point or an altitude/height where it ends. (ICAO Doc 8168: PANS-OPS)
A missed approach procedure is specified for all airfield and runway Precision Approach and Non-Precision Approach procedures. The missed approach procedure takes into account de-confliction from ground obstacles and from other air traffic flying instrument procedures in the airfield vicinity. Only one missed approach procedure is established for each instrument approach procedure.
Usually a go-around from an instrument approach should follow the specified missed approach procedure unless otherwise instructed by air traffic control or if safety reasons dictate otherwise.
If a missed approach is initiated below the DA/H in precision approach procedures, or beyond the missed approach point (MAPt) or below MDA/H in non-precision approach procedures pilots must consider if they can still safely follow the published missed approach or if they require a special routing e.g. in case of an engine failure during go-around (e.g. by birdstrike) when, depending on aircraft performance, it may be necessary to follow special engine failure turn procedures or using visual references only.
If a missed approach is initiated before arriving at the missed approach point (MAPt), it is important that pilots proceed to the MAPt (or to the middle marker fix or specified DME distance for precision approach procedures) and then follow the missed approach procedure in order to remain within the protected airspace. The MAPt may be overflown at an altitude/height greater than that required by the procedure; but in the case of a missed approach with a turn, the turn must not take place before the MAPt, unless otherwise specified in the procedure.
The MAPt in a procedure is defined by:
- the point of intersection of an electronic glide path with the applicable DA/H in precision approaches; or,
- a navigation facility, a fix, or a specified distance from the final approach fix in non-precision approaches.
A visual go around may be made after an unsuccessful visual approach if no published missed approach is available.
A go-around is often unexpected and places special demands on the pilots, who may not often have an opportunity to practice this procedure other then in the simulator. Some aspects of the go-around which deserve special study are:
- Flying a manual go-around;
- Go-around from low airspeed and/or low thrust;
- The transition to instrument flying;
- Monitoring and Crew coordination during go-around initiation;
- Awareness of initial level-off altitude vs pitch attitude and thrust setting;
- Awareness of remaining fuel and options available.
Often, if an emergency or abnormal situation develops during the final stages of an approach, it is likely that the approach will be continued to land. However, in some cases, such as a configuration issue (flaps or gear position), performing a missed approach, completing the appropriate drills and checklists to prepare for a non-standard approach and then conducting a second approach to a landing or diverting to a more suitable airfield might be the more prudent course of action.
Accidents and Incidents
The following events occurred during missed approach or involved a missed approach:
On 21 December 2023, a Boeing 737-800 experienced a flap load protection response to turbulence during a night go-around at Billund which locked the flaps in a mid-range position. A diversion to Copenhagen was commenced but when it became clear that the fault would result in landing with slightly below minimum reserve fuel, a MAYDAY was declared. The flight was completed without further event. It was concluded that flap system locking had probably resulted from the crew’s manual selection of 15° flap just as the flap load relief system was responding, as designed, to a turbulence-caused flap overspeed condition.
On 6 October 2022, a solo student pilot departing Seville in a PA28 was instructed to hold short of the active runway on reaching it, but without the controller noticing then entered the runway. An Airbus A320 already cleared to land then called that there was a light aircraft on the runway and after initially just repeating the clearance, the controller then saw it. The context for the conflict was assessed as the controller’s use of English for PA28 communications and Spanish for A320 communications and the absence of any requirement to activate controllable stop bars in visual daylight conditions.
On 4 February 2023, a Boeing 767-300 which had initiated a night go-around in freezing fog passed within 115 feet of a Boeing 737-700 taking off from the same runway. The aircraft had been respectively cleared to land and takeoff by the same controller but on sighting the 737 on the runway ahead, the 767 crew deemed a go around was necessary to avoid a ground collision. The experienced controller’s poor judgement was attributed to a combination of expectation bias, lack of awareness of a predictable delay to the 737’s departure and absence of any training in low visibility operations.
On 29 April 2022, an Airbus A320 and a Boeing 737-800 came into close proximity at Barcelona at night - 247 metres laterally and 44 feet vertically - after the A320 received landing clearance for runway 02 and the 737 was then given takeoff clearance on runway 06R. Both aircraft were following ATC instructions issued shortly after runway use had changed from daytime (parallel runways in use) to nightime configuration (near-intersecting runways in use). The landing clearance was issued contrary to procedures by a controller who had failed to reconfigure their position when runway use changed.
On 31 December 2022, an Airbus A320 crew cleared to land on runway 23 at Bordeaux in good day visibility had not noticed a stationary light aircraft at the runway threshold. Only a call from the concerned light aircraft pilot on a busy frequency prompted the controller to order the A320 to go around which it did from just over 100 feet agl before passing overhead the unseen DR400 light aircraft at 178 feet agl. The controller, who was covering GND/TWR/APP/INFO positions due to short staffing, had forgotten their earlier instruction to the light aircraft to line up and wait.
On 11 February 2022 an Airbus A320 making a visual approach to Guadeloupe at night was advised by ATC of a descent below the minimum safe altitude after continuing the approach after visual reference was temporarily lost. A repeat of this warning by ATC prompted crew recognition that the aircraft was not on the required approach track or profile and a go around was initiated from 460 feet agl. The decision to attempt a visual approach in unsuitable circumstances and a delay in recognising the need for a go-around were found to have been symptomatic of poor tactical decision making.
On 29 April 2023, a Boeing 737-800 night takeoff clearance at Sydney was delayed by unexpectedly slow landing traffic clearance and it became necessary for another Boeing 737-800 on approach to the same runway to be instructed to go around and minimum separation was reduced below safe distances both laterally and vertically. It was found that the conflict had resulted from a combination of inappropriate intervention by the Tower Supervisor and the controller’s own actions. A review of potential conflicts during mixed mode runway use at Sydney to improve resilience to inevitable pilot and controller error was initiated by ATC.
On 15 October 2022 an airport authority vehicle entered an active runway without clearance with a Boeing 737-8 on short final which was instructed to and completed a go around. The experienced driver involved had correctly read back a clearance to remain at the holding point on reaching it but did not stop and it was found the insufficiently obvious nature of the installed signage was contributory. Drivers were found to have routinely used to cross active runways to save time instead of using the available perimeter road as per the airport authority directives.
On 31 January 2022, a Bombardier Challenger 604 pilot lost control during the final stages of a London Stansted night crosswind landing. A bounced nose-gear-first touchdown was followed by a brief runway excursion onto grass before a return to the runway and a climb away. A diversion to London Gatwick followed without further event but subsequent inspection revealed structural and other damage sufficient to result in the aircraft being declared an economic hull loss. The Stansted touchdown was found to have occurred after a premature flare at idle thrust continued towards the stall and a momentary stick pusher activation occurred.
On 25 October 2022, a Boeing 777-300ER encountered deteriorating weather conditions after initiating a delayed arrival diversion from Singapore Changi to nearby Batam where four approaches were flown and a ‘MAYDAY Fuel’ declared before a landing was achieved. By this time, the fuel remaining was “significantly below final reserve” although the actual figure was not published in the Investigation Report. It was concluded that the delay in commencing the diversion and the inappropriate attempt to perform an autoland on RWY04 at Batam airport by the flight crew contributed to the potentially hazardous circumstances.
On 6 December 2019, a Boeing 737-800 below Decision Altitude on an ILS approach at Paris Orly was unexpectedly instructed to go-around in day VMC without explanation. The go around was mishandled and the aircraft began to descend after initially climbing which triggered EGPWS Warnings and controller alerting before recovery was achieved. It was suspected that surprise at the go-around and the early climbing turn required may have initiated the crew’s mismanagement of automated flight path control with further surprise leading to failure to revert to manual control when they no longer understood the automated system responses to their inputs.
On 27 February 2023, an Embraer 190 was flaring for an imminent night touchdown on runway 04R at Boston in normal visibility when a Learjet 60 began takeoff from intersecting runway 09. As the Embraer descended through 30 feet AGL, the Learjet entered runway 04R, taking two seconds to cross it. The incursion had triggered an ATC alert and just after the crossing, the Embraer was instructed to go around and did so from around 10 feet AGL. The Investigation found that the Learjet crew correctly read back their line up and wait clearance but then took off without clearance.
On 18 October 2022, an Airbus A321 on approach to Venice in thick fog was observed on TCAS by a Boeing 737-800 crew awaiting takeoff clearance from the same runway after a lineup and wait instruction. When no takeoff clearance followed, the 737 crew transmitted, advising its position without any response. The crew then transmitted on 121.5, instructing the A321 to go around, and they received no response. They were about to vacate the runway when the controller instructed the A321 to go around, which only occurred as it approached 100 feet AGL. The controller involved had failed to plug in his headset properly.
On 11 October 2019, an Embraer ERJ195LR abandoned an initial landing attempt at Warsaw after a hard bounce but the correct go-around procedure was not followed. The rate of climb rapidly increased to over 4000 feet per minute. Concurrently, the required engine thrust was not set and airspeed rapidly diminished to a point where the stick shaker was activated. Stall and Upset Recovery procedures were not correctly followed, and the aircraft commander was slow to take control of the situation. Full control was regained at 1,200 feet above ground level and a subsequent approach and landing were made without further event.
On 21 October 2020, an Embraer ERJ170 on short final at Paris CDG responded to a windshear warning by breaking off the approach and climbing. The warning soon stopped but the aircraft drifted sideways in the strong crosswind towards the adjacent parallel runway from which an Airbus A320 had just taken off. A Short-Term Conflict Alert on the controller's display was accompanied by a TCAS RA event triggered for both aircraft. The Investigation was concerned about the implications of failure to climb straight ahead from parallel runways during unexpected go-arounds. Safety Recommendations were made on risk management of parallel runway operations by both pilots and safety regulators.
Further Reading
- ICAO Annex 6 (Aircraft Operations)
- ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS)
- IR-OPS CAT.OP.MPA.110 & 120 & CAT.POL.A.245
- IR-OPS AMC3&4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
- EU-OPS
- FAA Information for Operators 17009: Committed-to-Stop Point on Landings, July 2017
EUROCONTROL, European Regions Airline Association, and Flight Safety Foundation
Flight Safety Foundation
- ALAR Briefing Note 6.1 — Being Prepared to Go Around
- ALAR Briefing Note 6.2 — Manual Go-around
- ALAR Briefing Note 6.4 — Bounce Recovery — Rejected Landing
- Go-Around Decision-Making and Execution Project, Tzvetomir Blajev, Capt William Curtis (Flight Safety Foundation), March 2017
The Flight Safety Foundation ALAR Toolkit provides useful training information and guides to best practice. Copies of the FSF ALAR Toolkit may be ordered from the Flight Safety Foundation ALAR website.
Flight Data Services Case Studies
Go-Around Safety Forum
- Go-Around Safety Forum (GASF), Brussels 2013: Findings and Conclusions
- "Do you really understand how your trim works?" - Captain Alex Fisher
Airbus Descent Management Briefing Notes
EASA