Missed Approach

Missed Approach

Description

When, for any reason, it is judged that an approach or landing cannot be continued to a successful landing, a missed approach or go-around shall be flown.

Reasons for discontinuing an approach or landing may include the following:

Missed Approach Procedure

A missed approach procedure is the procedure to be followed if an approach cannot be continued. It specifies a point where the missed approach begins, and a point or an altitude/height where it ends. (ICAO Doc 8168: PANS-OPS)

A missed approach procedure is specified for all airfield and runway Precision Approach and Non-Precision Approach procedures. The missed approach procedure takes into account deconfliction from ground obstacles and from other air traffic flying instrument procedures in the airfield vicinity. Only one primary missed approach procedure is established for each instrument approach procedure. However, alternate missed approach procedures may also be published. Alternate procedures are normally used when the navigation aid on which the primary approach is predicated becomes inoperative.

Usually a go-around from an instrument approach should follow the specified missed approach procedure unless otherwise instructed by air traffic control or if safety reasons dictate otherwise.

If a missed approach is initiated below the DA/H in precision approach procedures, or beyond the missed approach point (MAPt) or below MDA/H in non-precision approach procedures pilots must consider if they can still safely follow the published missed approach or if they require a special routing e.g. in case of an engine failure during go-around (e.g. by birdstrike) when, depending on aircraft performance, it may be necessary to follow special engine failure turn procedures or using visual references only.

If a missed approach is initiated before arriving at the missed approach point (MAPt), it is important that pilots proceed to the MAPt (or to the middle marker fix or specified DME distance for precision approach procedures) and then follow the missed approach procedure in order to remain within the protected airspace. The MAPt may be overflown at an altitude/height greater than that required by the procedure; but in the case of a missed approach with a turn, the turn must not take place before the MAPt, unless otherwise specified in the procedure.

The MAPt in a procedure is defined by:

  • the point of intersection of an electronic glide path with the applicable DA/H in precision approaches; or,
  • a navigation facility, a fix, or a specified distance from the final approach fix in non-precision approaches.

A visual go around may be made after an unsuccessful visual approach if no published missed approach is available.

A go-around is often unexpected and places special demands on the pilots, who may not often have an opportunity to practice this procedure other then in the simulator. Some aspects of the go-around which deserve special study are:

Often, if an emergency or abnormal situation develops during the final stages of an approach, it is likely that the approach will be continued to land. However, in some cases, such as a configuration issue (flaps or gear position), performing a missed approach, completing the appropriate drills and checklists to prepare for a non-standard approach and then conducting a second approach to a landing or diverting to a more suitable airfield might be the more prudent course of action.

Accidents and Incidents

The following events occurred during missed approach or involved a missed approach:

On 29 April 2023, the flight crew of an Airbus A321 did not complete the intended touchdown at Abu Dhabi from the flare to land and initiation of a go-around resulted in a tail strike due to improper high pitch control input whilst the airspeed was still low and the configuration not correct. The mishandling arose from confusion by both pilots as to the aircraft air/ground status after touchdown and involved significant dual sidestick input with no transfer of control. Once established in the climb, the remainder of the subsequent circuit to land was completed without further event.

On 4 December 2023, a Boeing 737-8200 crew misjudged positioning onto the ILS approach for arrival at London Stansted. Having decided to go around, they then continued to climb above the 3,000 feet missed approach altitude which they had failed to set until alerted by the controller. The descent following a 1,000 feet level bust then continued back through the missed approach altitude at almost 9,000 fpm with an EGPWS ‘PULL UP’ Warning just as recovery from 1,740 feet agl was being initiated. After levelling at 3,000 feet, radar-vectoring onto the ILS was provided with the approach then completed normally.

On 3 December 2020 an Embraer 195-200 on final approach to Sao Paulo Congonhas was given clearance to land on a runway which the same controller had already cleared a Boeing 737-800 to line up and wait on. Despite good day visibility and a late call from the E195 crew querying an aircraft on the runway, only a call from the 737 prompted the controller to instruct the E195 to go around which they then only commenced after a repeat instruction. The resulting vertical clearance between the E195 and the 737 was calculated as having been only 22 metres.

On 20 February 2023, a Fokker 70 flight crew only realised the landing altitude for their destination, Port Moresby, had not been set late in the descent. With insufficient time to eliminate the cabin pressure differential automatically, an attempt to use the abnormal manual control procedure was made. When it became clear that this had not worked, a go-around was initiated but when the cabin pressure differential then rose rapidly to 6 psi, multiple passenger ear/nose/throat injuries resulted, some serious. Another abnormal procedure was then actioned and this fortuitously resolved the situation and the aircraft was able to land.

On 17 January 2023, an ATR 72-200 in the final stages of a CAT 2 ILS night approach to East Midlands experienced a significant electrical malfunction which disabled one set of primary flight instruments and triggered multiple system status indication failures. These included false system warnings and radio communications problems. The approach was discontinued, a MAYDAY declared and a successful manually-flown diversion to Birmingham was then made. The cause of the electrical malfunction was found to be a wiring defect which was considered to have probably been caused by the incorrect use of mechanical wire stripping tools during third party maintenance.

On 21 December 2023, a Boeing 737-800 experienced a flap load protection response to turbulence during a night go-around at Billund which locked the flaps in a mid-range position. A diversion to Copenhagen was commenced but when it became clear that the fault would result in landing with slightly below minimum reserve fuel, a MAYDAY was declared. The flight was completed without further event. It was concluded that flap system locking had probably resulted from the crew’s manual selection of 15° flap just as the flap load relief system was responding, as designed, to a turbulence-caused flap overspeed condition.

On 6 October 2022, a solo student pilot departing Seville in a PA28 was instructed to hold short of the active runway but, without the controller noticing, entered the runway. An Airbus A320 already cleared to land then called that there was a light aircraft on the runway. After initially just repeating the clearance, the controller then saw the incursion. The context for the conflict was assessed as the controller’s use of English for PA28 communications and Spanish for A320 communications and the absence of any requirement to activate controllable stop bars in visual daylight conditions.

On 4 February 2023, a Boeing 767-300 which had initiated a night go-around in freezing fog passed within 115 feet of a Boeing 737-700 taking off from the same runway. The aircraft had been respectively cleared to land and takeoff by the same controller but on sighting the 737 on the runway ahead, the 767 crew deemed a go around was necessary to avoid a ground collision. The experienced controller’s error was attributed to a combination of expectation bias, lack of awareness of a predictable delay to the 737’s departure, and lack of training in low-visibility operations.

On 29 April 2022, an Airbus A320 and a Boeing 737-800 came into close proximity at Barcelona at night - 247 metres laterally and 44 feet vertically - after the A320 received landing clearance for runway 02 and the 737 was then given takeoff clearance on runway 06R. Both aircraft were following ATC instructions issued shortly after runway use had changed from daytime (parallel runways in use) to nightime configuration (near-intersecting runways in use). The landing clearance was issued contrary to procedures by a controller who had not reconfigured his position when runway use changed.

On 31 December 2022, an Airbus A320 crew cleared to land on runway 23 at Bordeaux in good day visibility had not noticed a stationary light aircraft at the runway threshold. Only a call from the concerned light aircraft pilot on a busy frequency prompted the controller to order the A320 to go around, which it did from just over 100 feet agl before passing overhead the unseen DR400 light aircraft at 178 feet agl. The controller, who was covering multiple positions due to short staffing, had forgotten his earlier instruction to the light aircraft to line up and wait.

On 11 February 2022 an Airbus A320 making a visual approach to Guadeloupe at night was advised by ATC of a descent below the minimum safe altitude. This advisory came as the crew continued the approach after visual reference was temporarily lost. A repeat of this warning by ATC prompted crew recognition that the aircraft was low and off the required approach track. A go-around was initiated from 460 feet agl. The decision to attempt a visual approach in unsuitable circumstances and a delay in recognising the need for a go-around were found to have been symptomatic of poor tactical decision-making.

On 29 April 2023, a Boeing 737-800 night takeoff clearance at Sydney was delayed by traffic that had just landed and took longer than expected to clear the runway. It became necessary for another Boeing 737-800 on approach to the same runway to go around, and minimum separation was reduced below safe distances both laterally and vertically. It was found that the conflict had resulted from a combination of inappropriate intervention by the Tower Supervisor and the controller’s own actions. A review of potential conflicts during mixed-mode runway use at Sydney was initiated by ATC.

On 15 October 2022 an airport authority vehicle entered an active runway without clearance with a Boeing 737-8 on short final, which was instructed to go around and did so. The experienced driver involved had correctly read back a clearance to remain at the holding point but did not stop. It was found that the visual cues available from airport signage were not adequately salient in this situation, which was contributory. Drivers were found to have routinely crossed active runways to save time instead of using the available perimeter road as per airport authority directives.

On 31 January 2022, a Bombardier Challenger 604 pilot lost control during the final stages of a London Stansted night crosswind landing. A bounced nose-gear-first touchdown was followed by a brief runway excursion onto grass before a return to the runway and a climb away. A diversion to London Gatwick followed without further event but subsequent inspection revealed structural and other damage sufficient to result in the aircraft being declared an economic hull loss. The Stansted touchdown was found to have occurred after a premature flare at idle thrust continued towards the stall and a momentary stick pusher activation occurred.

On 25 October 2022, a Boeing 777-300ER encountered deteriorating weather conditions after initiating a delayed arrival diversion from Singapore Changi to nearby Batam where four approaches were flown and a ‘MAYDAY Fuel’ declared before a landing was achieved. By this time, the fuel remaining was “significantly below final reserve” although the actual figure was not published in the Investigation Report. It was concluded that the delay in commencing the diversion and the inappropriate attempt to perform an autoland on RWY04 at Batam airport by the flight crew contributed to the potentially hazardous circumstances.

Further Reading

EUROCONTROL, European Regions Airline Association, and Flight Safety Foundation

Flight Safety Foundation

The Flight Safety Foundation ALAR Toolkit provides useful training information and guides to best practice. Copies of the FSF ALAR Toolkit may be ordered from the Flight Safety Foundation ALAR website.

Flight Data Services Case Studies

Go-Around Safety Forum

Airbus Descent Management Briefing Notes

EASA

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