Missed Approach
Description
When, for any reason, it is judged that an approach cannot be continued to a successful landing, a missed approach or go-around is flown.
Reasons for discontinuing an approach include the following:
- The required visal references have not been established by the Decision Altitude/Height (DA/DH) or Minimum Descent Altitude/Height (MDA/MDH) or is acquired but is subsequently lost;
- The approach is, or has become unstabilised;
- The aircraft is not positioned so as to allow a controlled touch down within the designated runway touchdown zone with a consequent risk of aircraft damage with or without a Runway Excursion if the attempt is continued;
- The runway is obstructed;
- Landing clearance has not been received or is issued and later cancelled;
- A go-around is being flown for training purposes with ATC approval.
Missed Approach Procedure
A missed approach procedure is the procedure to be followed if an approach cannot be continued. It specifies a point where the missed approach begins, and a point or an altitude/height where it ends. (ICAO Doc 8168: PANS-OPS)
A missed approach procedure is specified for all airfield and runway Precision Approach and Non-Precision Approach procedures. The missed approach procedure takes into account de-confliction from ground obstacles and from other air traffic flying instrument procedures in the airfield vicinity. Only one missed approach procedure is established for each instrument approach procedure.
A go-around from an instrument approach should follow the specified missed approach procedure unless otherwise instructed by air traffic control.
The missed approach should be initiated not lower than the DA/H in precision approach procedures, or at a specified point in non-precision approach procedures not lower than the MDA/H.
If a missed approach is initiated before arriving at the missed approach point (MAPt), it is important that the pilot proceeds to the MAPt (or to the middle marker fix or specified DME distance for precision approach procedures) and then follows the missed approach procedure in order to remain within the protected airspace. The MAPt may be overflown at an altitude/height greater than that required by the procedure; but in the case of a missed approach with a turn, the turn must not take place before the MAPt, unless otherwise specified in the procedure.
The MAPt in a procedure is defined by:
- the point of intersection of an electronic glide path with the applicable DA/H in precision approaches; or,
- a navigation facility, a fix, or a specified distance from the final approach fix in non-precision approaches.
A visual go around may be made after an unsuccessful visual approach.
A go-around is often unexpected and places special demands on the pilots, who may not often have an opportunity to practice this procedure. Some aspects of the go-around which deserve special study are:
Often, if an emergency or abnormal situation develops during the approach, the approach will be continued to land. However, in some cases, such as a configuration issue, performing a missed approach, completing the appropriate drills and checklists to prepare for a non-standard approach and then conducting a second approach to a landing is the more prudent course of action.
Accidents and Incidents
The following events occurred during missed approach or involved a missed approach:
On 19 October 2015, an ATR 72-600 crew mishandled a landing at Ende and a minor runway excursion occurred and pitch control authority was split due to simultaneous contrary inputs by both pilots. A go around and diversion direct to the next scheduled stop at Komodo was made without further event. The Investigation noted that the necessarily visual approach at Ende had been unstable with a nosewheel-first bounced touchdown followed by another bounced touchdown partially off-runway. The First Officer was found to have provided unannounced assistance to the Captain when a high rate of descent developed just prior to the flare.
On 4 February 2020, an Airbus A350-900 initiated a go around from its destination approach at 1,400 feet aal following a predictive windshear alert unsupported by the prevailing environmental conditions but the First Officer mishandled it and the stop altitude was first exceeded and then flown though again in a descent before control as instructed was finally regained four minutes later. Conflict with another aircraft occurred during this period. The Investigation concluded the underlying cause of the upset was a lack of awareness of autopilot status by the First Officer followed by a significant delay before the Captain took over control.
On 14 October 2019, a Sikorsky S92A manoeuvring below low cloud in poor daylight visibility in an unsuccessful attempt to locate the intended private landing site flew north towards rising ground approximately ¾ mile east of it, coming within a recorded 28 feet above terrain near to occupied houses before making an emergency climb and over-torqing the engines followed by an unstable but successful second approach. The Investigation found relevant operator procedures absent or ineffective, an intention by the management pilot in command to reach the landing site despite conditions and uncertainty about the applicable regulatory context for the flight.
On 16 July 2020, an Antonov AN26 on which a new Captain’s final line check was being performed made two consecutive non-precision approaches to Runway 33 at Birmingham both of which resulted in ATC instructing the aircraft to go around because of failure to follow the prescribed vertical profile. A third approach using the ILS procedure for runway 15 was successful. On the limited evidence available, the Investigation was unable to explain the inability to safely perform the attempted two non precision approaches to runway 33 or the continuation of them until instructed to go around by ATC.
On 24 July 2019, whilst a Sikorsky S92A was commencing a second missed approach at the intended destination platform, visual contact was acquired and it was decided that an immediate visual approach could be made. However control was then temporarily lost and the aircraft almost hit the sea surface before recovery involving engine overtorque and diversion back to Halifax. The Investigation concluded that the crew had failed to safely control the aircraft energy state in a degraded visual environment allowing it to enter a vortex ring condition. As context, operator procedures, Flight Manual content and regulatory requirements were all faulted.
Related Articles
- Go Around
- Go-around Decision Making
- Precision Approach
- Non-Precision Approach
- Visual References
- Decision Altitude/Height (DA/DH)
- Minimum Descent Altitude/Height (MDA/MDH)
- Bird Strike on Final Approach: Guidance for Flight Crews
- Pilot Workload
Further Reading
- ICAO Annex 6 (Aircraft Operations)
- ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS)
- IR-OPS CAT.OP.MPA.110 & 120 & CAT.POL.A.245
- IR-OPS AMC3&4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
- EU-OPS
- FAA Information for Operators 17009: Committed-to-Stop Point on Landings, July 2017
EUROCONTROL, European Regions Airline Association, and Flight Safety Foundation
Flight Safety Foundation
- ALAR Briefing Note 6.1 — Being Prepared to Go Around
- ALAR Briefing Note 6.2 — Manual Go-around
- ALAR Briefing Note 6.4 — Bounce Recovery — Rejected Landing
- Go-Around Decision-Making and Execution Project, Tzvetomir Blajev, Capt William Curtis (Flight Safety Foundation), March 2017
The Flight Safety Foundation ALAR Toolkit provides useful training information and guides to best practice. Copies of the FSF ALAR Toolkit may be ordered from the Flight Safety Foundation ALAR website.
Flight Data Services Case Studies
Go-Around Safety Forum
- Go-Around Safety Forum (GASF), Brussels 2013: Findings and Conclusions
- "Do you really understand how your trim works?" - Captain Alex Fisher
Airbus Descent Management Briefing Notes
EASA
