TCAS RA Survey

TCAS RA Survey

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Description

The EUROCONTROL Safety Improvement Sub-Group (SISG) identified TCAS RA Not Followed as one of the Top 5 ATM Operational Safety Priorities in 2017.

There was no reliable and representative data on the number of TCAS RA not followed. The results from different sources ranged from 1% to 35%. Therefore, a survey on the matter among pilots was conducted. It was voluntary and received 3800 responses from 90 countries.

The aim of the survey was to gather and analyze statistical data to better understand the factors that lead to TCAS RA non-compliance and the impact of the operational environment on such occurrences.

The time period covered by the survey was 5 years ending in 2017.

A dedicated study combined the results of the survey with theoretical analysis of relevant generic scenarios and possible safety barriers.

Study Findings

General Statistics

  • About 36% of the participants reported to have “encountered a TCAS RA situation in the past 5 years”.
  • About 5% of the participants reported experiencing a TCAS RA that was not followed either at all or not as commanded.
  • About 15% of all the pilots that experienced TCAS RA participated in a TCAS RA not followed event.
  • About 12% of the participants reported having 3 or more TCAS RAs during the 5-year period.

The statistical analysis that took into account the number of events (i.e. more than one event per person) concluded that the percentage of RAs that are not followed is likely to be around 11%.

Reasons for TCAS RA Not Followed

A total of 18 reasons (out of 20 possible) were stated for not following a TCAS RA.

  • The most reported reason was "Decision not to follow due to visual acquisition and/or avoidance of the conflicting traffic" (45% of all non-follow events).
  • The second most reported reason was "Short duration RA (RA terminated before a response could be taken)" (15% of all non-follow events, i.e. 3 times less frequent than the first one).
  • The third most reported reason was "Proximity to the ground" (11% of all non-follow events, i.e. 4 times less frequent than the first one).

Reason Analysis

  • The Top 3 reasons account for 70% of all responses (45 + 15 + 10).
  • ICAO documents state that all RAs should be followed unless the safety of the aircraft is at risk. Three reasons (proximity to terrain, priority of other alerts and performance issues) with a total of 14% fall within this definition.
  • Three other reasons are considered valid for non-compliance (short duration, false/incorrect RAs and closely spaced runways). These account for 24 % of the answers.
  • About 38% (14 + 24) of RAs Not Followed might be for legitimate reasons.
  • The "Decision not to follow due to visual acquisition and/or avoidance of the conflicting traffic" is not considered a valid reason and account for about 70% of the non-legitimate reasons. This is the prevailing answer for all flight levels.
  • The level of inability to follow RAs due to their short duration is constant across all altitude bands.
  • About 46% of RAs not followed are below 3000ft. Most of these involve a decision not the follow the RA after visual acquisition of the apparent intruder.

Pilot TCAS Training

  • Pilots who, in training, are not pre-warned that a TCAS RA is coming, are disposed to react better in live situations.
  • No one type of TCAS RA is trained more than 80% each time. The less common, but perhaps more demanding RAs such as Crossing Climb/Descend are only trained around 30% of the time.
  • About 5% of pilots involved in TCAS RA Not Followed events report no TCAS training within the previous 5 years.

Study Recommendations

The dedicated study made 5 recommendations:

  • that IATA, Pilot Associations, Aircraft Operators and Regulators review the findings of this study and consider undertaking operational safety analysis and improvement activities for “TCAS RA Not Followed”.
  • that IATA, Pilot Associations, Aircraft Operators and Regulators consider actions to support an increased active use of FDM in the monitoring of TCAS RA compliance and the provision of feedback to training organisations and flight crew involved.
  • that European ANSPs and the EUROCONTROL Safety Improvement Sub-Group (SISG) monitor occurrences involving “TCAS RA Not Followed” to determine changes in frequency and severity.
  • that all European stakeholders monitor and support the development of tools and procedures that may assist in the prevention and/or mitigation of “TCAS RA Not Followed” events.
  • in particular, that all European stakeholders promote and emphasise the requirement and importance of following TCAS RA commands despite an apparent intruder being visually identified and monitored (subject to the overriding safety of the aircraft).

Accidents and Incidents

A320 / E195, vicinity Brussels Belgium, 2018

On 23 February 2018, an Embraer 195LR and an Airbus A320 on SIDs departing Brussels lost separation after the 195 was given a radar heading to resolve a perceived third aircraft conflict which led to loss of separation between the two departing aircraft. STCA and coordinated TCAS RA activations followed but only one TCAS RA was followed and the estimated minimum separation was 400 feet vertically when 1.36 nm apart. The Investigation found that conflict followed an error by an OJTI-supervised trainee controller receiving extended revalidation training despite gaining his licence and having almost 10 years similar experience in Latvia.

A320 / B738, en-route, north northwest of Sofia Bulgaria, 2016

On 4 June 2016, a Boeing 737-800 instructed to climb from FL340 to FL380 by the controller of one sector in Bulgarian upper airspace came into sufficiently close proximity to an Airbus A320 under the control of a different sector controller to trigger co-ordinated TCAS RAs. Separation was eventually restored after the 737 followed its RA despite the A320, which had already deviated from its clearance on the basis of a prior TCAS TA without informing ATC, ignoring their RA. The Investigation found that the root cause of the conflict had been inadequate coordination between two vertically separated ATC sectors.

A319 / PRM1, en-route, near Fribourg Switzerland, 2011

On 10 June 2011 an ATC error put a German Wings A319 and a Hahn Air Raytheon 390 on conflicting tracks over Switzerland and a co-ordinated TCAS RA followed. The aircraft subsequently passed in very close proximity without either sighting the other after the Hahn Air crew, contrary to Company procedures, followed an ATC descent clearance issued during their TCAS ‘Climb’ RA rather than continuing to fly the RA. The Investigation could find no explanation for this action by the experienced crew - both Hahn Air management pilots. The recorded CPA was 0.6 nm horizontally at 50 feet vertically.

B752 / B752, en-route, north of Tenerife Spain 2011

On 20 November 2011, a problem in reading the altitude labels on the ATC radar control display led to a Finnair Boeing 757 being cleared to make a descent which brought it into proximity with a Thomas Cook Boeing 757 in day VMC. Co-ordinated TCAS RAs were generated onboard both aircraft but when the Finnair aircraft failed to respond to its Climb RA and continued descent, the other aircraft, which had responded correctly to its initial RA, received a further RA to reverse their descent to a climb. The Finnair aircraft reported retaining visual contact with the other aircraft throughout.

DH8A/DH8C, en-route, northern Canada, 2011

On 7 February 2011 two Air Inuit DHC8s came into head-to-head conflict en route over the eastern shoreline of Hudson Bay in non radar Class A airspace when one of them deviated from its cleared level towards the other which had been assigned the level 1000 feet below. The subsequent investigation found that an inappropriate FD mode had been used to maintain the assigned level of the deviating aircraft and noted deficiencies at the Operator in both TCAS pilot training and aircraft defect reporting as well as a variation in altitude alerting systems fitted to aircraft in the DHC8 fleet.

...further results

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