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Crossing the margin (1 to 2) is treated as a violation and produces effort to return operations to the "normal" (2 to 3).

Repeated margin crossing (3 to 4) without accident leads to the belief that operating there is "normal". The marginal boundary may shift even though the acceptable performance boundary has not moved.

The "new normal" may not seem dangerous!

Highly efficient systems can shift suddenly from loose to tight coupling. This makes the normally predictable and small movements of the OP become unpredictable and large.

If the OP is already near the acceptable performance boundary...
A brief look at the New Look in complex system failure, error, safety, and resilience

Accident investigation normally concludes that human error by practitioners was the 'cause' of the event.

Practitioners work at the sharp end of the system. The blunt end of the system generates resources, constraints and conflicts that shape the world of technical work and produce latent failures.

Complex systems fail because of the combination of multiple small failures, each individually insufficient to cause an accident. These failures are latent in the system and their pattern changes over time.

Post-accident reviews identify human error as the 'cause' of failure because of hindsight bias. Outcome knowledge makes the path to failure seem to have been foreseeable - although it was not foreseen.

Organizational reactions to failure focus on human error. Common reactions: blame & train, sanctions, new regulations, rules, and technology. These interventions increase complexity and introduce new forms of failure.

Competing demands, dilemmas, conflicts, and uncertainty are the central features of operations at the sharp end. Organizational and technical conflicts overlap and interact.

Successful operations are the rule. Failure is rare.

People make safety. Sharp end work bridges gaps & prevents or minimizes failures. These activities form much of technical work. The result is systemic resilience. Productive approaches recognize, appreciate & support these activities.