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Accident and Serious Incident Reports: RE

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Category: Runway Excursion Runway Excursion
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Definition

Reports relating to accidents which include Runway Excursion as an outcome.

The reports are organised in two sections. In the first section, reports are organised according to the sub-categories Overrun on Take Off, Overrun on Landing, and Veer Off. In the second section, events are organised according to the tagging system currently employed on Runway Excursion events in our database.

Events by Sub-Category

Overrun on Take Off

Overrun on Take Off.jpg

  • SW4, New Plymouth New Zealand, 2009 (A visual approach by a Swearingen SA227 at New Plymouth was rushed and unstable with the distraction of a minor propeller speed malfunction and with un-actioned GPWS warnings caused by excessive sink and terrain closure rates. After a hard touchdown close to the beginning of the runway, directional control was lost and the aircraft left the runway to the side before continuing parallel to it for the rest of the landing roll.)
  • LJ60, Columbia SC USA, 2008 (On September 19 2008, a Learjet 60 departing Columbia SC USA on a non scheduled passenger overran after attempting a rejected take off from above V1 and then hit obstructions which led to its destruction by fire and the death or serious injury of all six occupants. The subsequent investigation found that the tyre failure which led to the rejected take off decision had been due to under inflation and had damaged a sensor which caused the thrust reversers to return to their stowed position after deployment with the unintended forward thrust contributing to the severity of the overrun.)
  • FA20, Durham Tees Valley UK, 2012 (On 9 August 2012, a serviceable Cobham Leasing Fan Jet Falcon overran the 2291 metre long runway at Durham Tees Valley after beginning rejecting take off from above V1 because of a suspected bird strike. The crew believed there was a possibility of airframe damage from a single medium sized bird sighted ahead which might have been hit by the main landing gear. It was found that the overrun distance had been increased by low friction on the stopway and noted that the regulatory exemption issued for operation without FDR and CVR was no longer appropriate.)
  • B763, Manchester UK, 2008 (On 13 December 2008, a Thomsonfly Boeing 767-300 departing from Manchester for Montego Bay Jamaica was considered to be accelerating at an abnormally slow rate during the take off roll on Runway 23L. The aircraft commander, who was the pilot not flying, consequently delayed the V1 call by about 10 - 15 because he thought the aircraft might be heavier than had been calculated. During the rotation the TAILSKID message illuminated momentarily, indicating that the aircraft had suffered a tail strike during the takeoff. The commander applied full power and shortly afterwards the stick shaker activated briefly. The aircraft continued to climb away and accelerate before the flaps were retracted and the after-takeoff check list completed. The appropriate drills in the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) were subsequently actioned, fuel was dumped and the aircraft returned to Manchester for an overweight landing without further incident.)
  • GLF4, Bedford MA USA, 2014 (On 31 May 2014, a Gulfstream IV attempted to take off with the flight control gust locks engaged and, when unable to rotate, delayed initiating the inevitable rejected take off to a point where an overrun at high speed was inevitable. The aircraft was destroyed by a combination of impact forces and fire and all seven occupants died. The Investigation attributed the accident to the way the crew were found to have habitually operated but noted that type certification had been granted despite the aircraft not having met requirements which would have generated an earlier gust lock status warning.)

Overrun on Landing

Overrun on Landing.jpg

  • MD11, Riyadh Saudi Arabia, 2010 (On 27 July 2010, a Boeing MD11F being operated by Lufthansa Cargo on a scheduled flight from Frankfurt to Riyadh bounced twice prior to a third hard touchdown whilst attempting to land on 4205 metre-long Runway 33L at destination in normal day visibility. The fuselage was ruptured and, as the aircraft left the side of the runway, the nose landing gear collapsed and a fire began to take hold. A ‘MAYDAY’ call was made as the aircraft slid following the final touchdown. Once the aircraft had come to a stop, the two pilots evacuated before it was largely destroyed by fire. One pilot received minor injuries, the other injuries described as major.)
  • A321, Sandefjord Norway, 2006 (A321 experienced minimal braking action during the daylight landing roll in wet snow conditions and normal visibility and an overrun occurred. The aircraft came to a stop positioned sideways in relation to the runway centreline with the right hand main landing gear 2 metres beyond the limit of the paved surface.)
  • B738, Mumbai India, 2018 (On 10 July 2018, a Boeing 737-800 marginally overran the wet landing runway at Mumbai after the no 1 engine thrust reverser failed to deploy when full reverse was selected after a late touchdown following a stabilised ILS approach. The Investigation found that the overrun was the result of touchdown with almost 40% of the runway behind the aircraft followed by the failure of normal thrust reverser deployment when attempted due to a failed actuator in one of the reversers. The prevailing moderate rain and the likelihood that dynamic aquaplaning had occurred were identified as contributory.)
  • SB20, Werneuchen Germany, 2002 (On 10 July 2002, a Saab 2000 being operated by Swiss Air Lines on a scheduled public transport service from Basel to Hamburg encountered extensive thunderstorms affecting both the intended destination and the standard alternates and due to a shortage of fuel completed the flight with a landing in day VMC at an unmanned general aviation airstrip where the aircraft collided with an unseen obstruction. After the aircraft came to a stop with the landing gear torn off, the two cabin crew conducted the passenger evacuation on their own initiative. There was no fire and only one of the 20 occupants was injured. The aircraft was declared a hull loss due to the damage sustained relative to the location.)
  • CRJ7, Kanpur India, 2011 (On 20 July 2011, an Alliance Air CRJ 700 touched down over half way along the 9000 ft long runway at Kanpur after a stable ILS approach but with an unexpected limiting tailwind component and failed to stop before the end of the paved surface. Although an emergency evacuation was not necessary and there were no injuries, the aircraft was slightly damaged by impact with an obstruction. The subsequent investigation attributed the event to the commanders continued attempt at a landing when a late touchdown became increasingly likely.)

Veer Off

Directional Control.jpg On landing...

  • E145, Stuttgart Germany, 2009 (On 5 January 2009, a Flybe Embraer 145 made a late touchdown with slight snow falling on a runway pre-notified as affected by slush deposits and failed to stop until it had overrun into the RESA where it finally stopped on a heading 25º off the runway alignment. The Investigation concluded that although the airport operator process for determining braking action was flawed and two Safety Recommendations were made in that respect, the overrun of the 3045metres LDA was attributable to flight crew action and that operator guidance was deficient.)
  • GL5T, Fox Harbour NS Canada, 2007 (On 11 November 2007, a Bombardier BD-700 (Global 5000) operated by Canadian charter company Jetport touched down short of the runway at destination Fox Harbour in normal daylight visibility and then directional control was lost and the aircraft exited the side of the runway ending up having rotated 120° clockwise about its fore-aft axis and came to rest approximately 300metres from the threshold and approximately 50 meters from the runway edge. As a result, the co pilot and one of the passengers suffered serious injuries and the other eight occupants suffered minor injuries. The aircraft sustained major structural damage.)
  • MD11, Riyadh Saudi Arabia, 2010 (On 27 July 2010, a Boeing MD11F being operated by Lufthansa Cargo on a scheduled flight from Frankfurt to Riyadh bounced twice prior to a third hard touchdown whilst attempting to land on 4205 metre-long Runway 33L at destination in normal day visibility. The fuselage was ruptured and, as the aircraft left the side of the runway, the nose landing gear collapsed and a fire began to take hold. A ‘MAYDAY’ call was made as the aircraft slid following the final touchdown. Once the aircraft had come to a stop, the two pilots evacuated before it was largely destroyed by fire. One pilot received minor injuries, the other injuries described as major.)
  • BE20, Nadi Fiji, 2010 (On 25 April 2010, a Beech King Air touched down at Nadi with its landing gear in the transit position after flying a night approach during which a significant electrical system failure had occurred. The landing gear retracted and the aircraft left the runway to the side and came to a stop resting on its fuselage. The Investigation attributed the electrical failure, which directly affected the landing gear operating system and required two diodes to have both failed was likely to have meant that one would have failed on an earlier occasion with no apparent consequence.)
  • SU95, Moscow Sheremetyevo Russia, 2019 (On 5 May 2019, a Sukhoi RRJ-95B making a manually-flown return to Moscow Sheremetyevo after a lightning strike caused a major electrical systems failure soon after departure made a mismanaged landing which featured a sequence of three hard bounces of increasing severity. The third of these occurred with the landing gear already collapsed and structural damage and a consequential fuel-fed fire followed as the aircraft veered off the runway at speed. The subsequent evacuation was only partly successful and 41 of the 73 occupants died and 3 sustained serious injury. An Interim Report has been published.)

Directional Control.jpg On take off..

  • A320, Harstad/Narvik Norway 2004 (On 25 November 2004, a MyTravel Airways Airbus A320 departed the side of the runway at Harstad, Norway at a low speed after loss of directional control when thrust was applied for a night take off on a runway with below normal surface friction characteristics. It was found that the crew had failed to follow an SOP designed to ensure that any accumulated fan ice was shed prior to take off and also failed to apply take off thrust as prescribed, thus delaying their appreciation of the uneven thrust produced.)
  • B738, Nuremburg Germany, 2010 (On 8 January 2010, an Air Berlin Boeing 737-800 attempted to commence a rolling take off at Nuremburg on a runway pre-advised as having only ‘medium’ braking action. Whilst attempting to position the aircraft on the runway centreline, directional control was lost and the aircraft exited the paved surface onto soft ground at low speed before the flight crew were able to stop it. The event was attributed to the inappropriately high taxi speed onto the runway and subsequent attempt to conduct a rolling take off. Relevant Company standard operating procedures were found to be deficient.)
  • B735, Denver USA, 2008 (Runway Side Excursion During Attempted Take-off in Strong and Gusty Crosswind Conditions.)
  • B744, Maastricht-Aachen Netherlands, 2017 (On 11 November 2017, a type-experienced Boeing 747-400ERF crew making a night rolling takeoff at Maastricht-Aachen lost aircraft directional control after an outer engine suddenly failed at low speed and a veer-off onto soft ground adjacent to the runway followed. The Investigation found that rather than immediately reject the takeoff when the engine failed, the crew had attempted to maintain directional control without thrust reduction to the point where an excursion became unavoidable. The effect of ‘startle’, the Captain’s use of a noise cancelling headset and poor alerting to the engine failure by the First Officer were considered contributory.)
  • SF34, Stornoway UK, 2015 (On 2 January 2015, the commander of a Saab 340 suddenly lost directional control during a within-limits crosswind take off and the aircraft left the runway onto grass at approximately 80 knots. No call to reject the take off was made and no action was taken to shut down the engines until the aircraft had come to a stop in the soft ground with a collapsed nose gear and substantial damage to the propellers and lower forward fuselage. The Investigation concluded that the most likely explanation for the excursion was the absence of any rudder input as the aircraft accelerated.)

Events by A&I Tag

Excessive Airspeed

  • B737, Fort Nelson BC Canada, 2012 (On 9 January 2012, an Enerjet Boeing 737-700 overran the landing runway 03 at Fort Nelson by approximately 70 metres after the newly promoted Captain continued an unstabilised approach to a mis-managed late-touchdown landing. The subsequent Investigation attributed the accident to poor crew performance in the presence of a fatigued aircraft commander.)
  • A320, Sylt Germany, 2017 (On 30 September 2017, an Airbus A320 touched down late after an ILS approach to runway 32 at Sylt with a significant tailwind component being reported and failed to stop before overrunning the end of the runway and subsequently stopped on grass 80 metres beyond it. The Investigation noted that the calculated required landing distance was close to the landing distance available, the actual approach speed was 20 knots above the calculated one and that the aircraft had floated in the flare above a wet runway. It was concluded that the runway excursion was attributable to non-performance of a go-around.)
  • GLF4, Teterboro NJ USA, 2010 (On 1 October 2010, a Gulfstream G-IV being operated by General Aviation Flying Service as ‘Meridian Air Charter’ on a corporate flight from Toronto International to Teterboro made a deep landing on 1833m-long runway 06 at destination in normal day visibility and overran the end of the runway at a speed of 40 to 50 knots before coming to a stop 30m into a 122m long EMAS installation.)
  • B722, Moncton Canada, 2010 (On 24 March 2010, a Boeing 727-200 being operated by Canadian company Cargojet AW on a scheduled cargo flight from Hamilton Ontario to Moncton New Brunswick failed to stop after a night landing on 1875 metre long runway 06 at destination in normal ground visibility and eventually stopped in deep mud approximately 100 metres beyond the runway end and approximately 40 metres past the end of the paved runway end strip. The three operating flight crew, who were the only occupants, were uninjured and the aircraft received only minor damage.)
  • A333, Hong Kong China, 2010 (On 13 April 2010, a Cathay Pacific Airbus A330-300 en route from Surabaya to Hong Kong experienced difficulty in controlling engine thrust. As these problems worsened, one engine became unusable and a PAN and then a MAYDAY were declared prior to a successful landing at destination with excessive speed after control of thrust from the remaining engine became impossible. Emergency evacuation followed after reports of a landing gear fire. Salt water contamination of the hydrant fuel system at Surabaya after alterations during airport construction work was found to have led to the appearance of a polymer contaminant in uplifted fuel.)

RTO decision after V1

  • JS32, Münster/Osnabrück Germany, 2019 (On 8 October 2019, a BAe Jetstream 32 departing Münster/Osnabrück couldn’t be rotated and after beginning rejected takeoff from well above V1, the aircraft departed the side of the runway passing close to another aircraft at high speed before regaining the runway for the remainder of its deceleration. The Investigation noted that the flight was the first supervised line training sector for the very inexperienced First Officer but attributed the whole event to the Training Captain’s poor performance which had, apart many from other matters, led indirectly to the inability to rotate and to the subsequent directional control problem.)
  • FA20, Durham Tees Valley UK, 2012 (On 9 August 2012, a serviceable Cobham Leasing Fan Jet Falcon overran the 2291 metre long runway at Durham Tees Valley after beginning rejecting take off from above V1 because of a suspected bird strike. The crew believed there was a possibility of airframe damage from a single medium sized bird sighted ahead which might have been hit by the main landing gear. It was found that the overrun distance had been increased by low friction on the stopway and noted that the regulatory exemption issued for operation without FDR and CVR was no longer appropriate.)
  • B742, Brussels Belgium, 2008 (On 25 May 2008 a Kalitta Air B747-200F, which was departing Brussels on a cargo flight to Bahrain, overran Runway 20 at Brussels Airport, Belgium during a rejected take-off. The aircraft came to a stop 300m beyond the end of runway 20 and broke into three parts. The crew of four and one passenger safely evacuated from the aircraft and suffered only minor injuries.)
  • MD88, Groningen Netherlands, 2003 (On 17 June 2003, a crew of a Boeing MD-88, belonging to Onur Air, executed a high speed rejected take-off at a late stage which resulted in overrun of the runway and serious damage to the aircraft.)
  • DH8B, Nuuk Greenland, 2019 (On 30 May 2019, a DHC8-200 departing from Nuuk could not be rotated at the calculated speed even using full aft back pressure and the takeoff was rejected with the aircraft coming to a stop with 50 metres of the 950 metre long dry runway remaining. The initial Investigation focus was on a potential airworthiness cause associated with the flight control system but it was eventually found that the actual weights of both passengers and cabin baggage exceeded standard weight assumptions with the excess also resulting in the aircraft centre of gravity being outside the range certified for safe flight.)

High Speed RTO (V above 80 but no above V1)

Unable to rotate at VR

  • JS32, Münster/Osnabrück Germany, 2019 (On 8 October 2019, a BAe Jetstream 32 departing Münster/Osnabrück couldn’t be rotated and after beginning rejected takeoff from well above V1, the aircraft departed the side of the runway passing close to another aircraft at high speed before regaining the runway for the remainder of its deceleration. The Investigation noted that the flight was the first supervised line training sector for the very inexperienced First Officer but attributed the whole event to the Training Captain’s poor performance which had, apart many from other matters, led indirectly to the inability to rotate and to the subsequent directional control problem.)
  • MD83, Ypsilanti MI USA, 2017 (On 8 March 2017, a Boeing MD83 departing Ypsilanti could not be rotated and the takeoff had to be rejected from above V1. The high speed overrun which followed substantially damaged the aircraft but evacuation was successful. The Investigation found that the right elevator had been locked in a trailing-edge-down position as a result of damage caused to the aircraft by high winds whilst it was parked unoccupied for two days prior to the takeoff. It was noted that on an aircraft with control tab initiated elevator movement, this condition was undetectable during prevailing pre flight system inspection or checks.)
  • A345, Melbourne Australia, 2009 (On 20 March 2009 an Airbus A340-500, operated by Emirates, commenced a take-off roll for a normal reduced-thrust take-off on runway 16 at Melbourne Airport. The attempt to get the aircraft airborne resulted in a tail strike and an overrun because insufficient thrust had been set based upon an incorrect flight crew data entry.)
  • DH8A, Ottawa Canada, 2003 (On 04 November 2003, the crew of a de Havilland DHC-8-100 which had been de/anti iced detected a pitch control restriction as rotation was attempted during take off from Ottawa and successfully rejected the take off from above V1. The Investigation concluded that the restriction was likely to have been the result of a remnant of clear ice migrating into the gap between one of the elevators and its shroud when the elevator was moved trailing edge up during control checks and observed that detection of such clear ice remnants on a critical surface wet with de-icing fluid was difficult.)
  • A332, Montego Bay Jamaica, 2008 (On 28 October 2008, an Airbus A330-200 could not be rotated for liftoff whist making a night takeoff from Montego Bay until the Captain had increased the reduced thrust set to TOGA, after which the aircraft became airborne prior to the end of the runway and climbed away normally. The Investigation found that the takeoff performance data used had been calculated for the flight by Company Despatch and the fact that it had been based on a takeoff weight which was 90 tonnes below the actual take off weight had not been noticed by any of the flight crew.)

Collision Avoidance Action

  • E135, George South Africa, 2009 (On 7 December 2009, an South African Airlink Embraer 135 overran the recently refurbished wet landing runway at George after braking was ineffective and exited the aerodrome perimeter to end up on a public road. There was no fire and all occupants were able to evacuate the aircraft. The subsequent investigation attributed the overrun principally to inadequate wet runway friction following the surface maintenance activities and noted various significant non-compliances with ICAO Annex 14.)
  • B733 / DH8D, Fort McMurray Canada, 2014 (On 4 August 2014, a Boeing 737-300 making a day visual approach at Fort McMurray after receiving an ILS/DME clearance lined up on a recently-constructed parallel taxiway and its crew were only alerted to their error shortly before touchdown by the crew of a DHC8-400 which was taxiing along the same taxiway in the opposite direction. This resulted in a go around being commenced from 46 feet agl. The Investigation noted that both pilots had been looking out during the final stages of the approach and had ignored important SOPs including that for a mandatory go around from an unstable approach.)
  • B733, Aqaba Jordan, 2017 (On 17 September 2017, a Boeing 737-300 requested and was approved for a visual approach to Aqaba which involved a significant tailwind component and, after approaching at excessive speed, it touched down late and overran the 3000 metre runway onto sandy ground. The Investigation found that despite EGPWS Alerts relating to both the high rate of descent and late configuration, the Captain had instructed the First Officer to continue what was clearly an unstabilised approach and when touchdown had still not occurred with around 1000 metres of runway left, the Captain took over but was unable to prevent an overrun.)

Parallel Approach Operations

Late Touchdown

  • GLF4, Teterboro NJ USA, 2010 (On 1 October 2010, a Gulfstream G-IV being operated by General Aviation Flying Service as ‘Meridian Air Charter’ on a corporate flight from Toronto International to Teterboro made a deep landing on 1833m-long runway 06 at destination in normal day visibility and overran the end of the runway at a speed of 40 to 50 knots before coming to a stop 30m into a 122m long EMAS installation.)
  • B738, Sochi Russia, 2018 (On 1 September 2018, a Boeing 737-800, making its second night approach to Sochi beneath a large convective storm with low level windshear reported, floated almost halfway along the wet runway before overrunning it by approximately 400 metres and breaching the perimeter fence before stopping. A small fire did not prevent all occupants from safely evacuating. The Investigation attributed the accident to crew disregard of a number of windshear warnings and a subsequent encounter with horizontal windshear resulting in a late touchdown and noted that the first approach had meant that the crew had been poorly prepared for the second.)
  • B733, Yogyakarta Indonesia, 2011 (On 20 December 2011, the experienced Captain of a Sriwijaya Air Boeing 737-300 flew an unstabilised non-precision approach to a touchdown at Yogyakarta at excessive speed whilst accompanied by a very inexperienced First Officer. The aircraft overran the end of the 2200 metre-long wet runway by 75 metres . During the approach, the Captain 'noticed' several GPWS PULL UP Warnings but no action was taken. The Investigation attributed the accident entirely to the actions of the flight crew and found that there had been no alert calls from the First Officer in respect of the way the approach was flown.)
  • E190, Kupang Indonesia, 2015 (On 21 December 2015, an Embraer 195 crew continued a significantly unstable approach which included prolonged repetition of 'High Speed' and a series of EGPWS Alerts which were both ignored and which culminated in a high speed late touchdown which ended in a 200 metre overrun. The Investigation attributed the event to poor flight management and noted the systemic lack of any effective oversight of pilot operating standards compounded in the investigated event by the effects of a steep flight deck authority gradient and the failure to detect anomalies in the normal operating behaviour of both the pilots involved.)
  • A320, Surat India, 2017 (On 4 October 2017, an Airbus A320 slightly overran the end of runway 22 at Surat during an early morning daylight landing. A temporarily displaced landing threshold meant the runway length was only 1,905 metres rather than the 2,905 metre full length. The aircraft remained on a paved surface and was undamaged. Its crew did not report the excursion which was only discovered when broken runway lighting was subsequently discovered. The Investigation found that the non-precision approach made was unstable and that a prolonged float in the subsequent flare meant that only 600 metres of runway remained ahead at touchdown.)

Significant Tailwind Component

  • B737, Chicago Midway USA, 2005 (On 8 December 2005, a delay in deploying the thrust reversers after a Boeing 737-700 touchdown at night on the slippery surface of the 1176 metre-long runway at Chicago Midway with a significant tailwind component led to it running off the end, subsequently departing the airport perimeter and hitting a car before coming to a stop. The Investigation concluded that pilots’ lack of familiarity with the autobrake system on the new 737 variant had distracted them from promptly deploying the reversers and that inadequate pilot training provision and the ATC failure to provide adequate braking action information had contributed.)
  • DHC6, Jomson Nepal, 2013 (On 16 May 2013, a DHC6-300 on a domestic passenger flight made a tailwind touchdown at excessive speed in the opposite direction of the of 740 metre-long runway to the notified direction in use and, after departing the runway to one side during deceleration, re-entered the runway and attempted to take off. This failed and the aircraft breached the perimeter fence and fell into a river. The Investigation identified inappropriate actions of the aircraft commander in respect of both the initial landing and his response to the subsequent runway excursion and also cited the absence of effective CRM.)
  • AT72, Mumbai India, 2009 (On 10 November 2010, a Kingfisher Airlines ATR 72-200 made an excessively steep and unstabilised tailwind approach in light rain to runway 27 at Mumbai in visual daylight conditions. After touching down late, the aircraft was steered off the side of the runway when it became obvious that an overrun would otherwise occur. The Investigation found that ATC had failed to advise of water patches on the runway and aquaplaning had occurred. It also found that without aquaplaning, the available distance from the actual touchdown point would have been sufficient to stop the aircraft in.)
  • B738, Kingston Jamaica, 2009 (On 22 December 2009, the flight crew of an American Airlines’ Boeing 737-800 made a long landing at Kingston at night in heavy rain and with a significant tailwind component and their aircraft overran the end of the runway at speed and was destroyed beyond repair. There was no post-crash fire and no fatalities, but serious injuries were sustained by 14 of the 154 occupants. The accident was attributed almost entirely to various actions and inactions of the crew. Damage to the aircraft after the overrun was exacerbated by the absence of a RESA.)
  • BN2P, Montserrat (British Overseas Territory), 2011 (On 22 May 2011 a Britten-Norman BN2A Islander being operated by Bermudian domiciled carrier Montserrat AW on a scheduled passenger flight from Antigua to Montserrat was considered at risk of an overrun after visual positioning to a day landing on runway 28 at destination in normal ground visibility. The pilot intentionally steered the aircraft off one side of the runway to decrease the degree of potential hazard and the aircraft came to a stop beside the runway and 46 metres from its end without injuries to any of the 8 occupants or damage to the aircraft.)

Significant Crosswind Component

  • F50, Isle of Man, 2009 (On 15 January 2009 a VLM Fokker 50 left the side of the runway at the Isle of Man during the daylight landing roll. It was concluded that directional control had been lost on the wet runway because the crew had attempted rudder steering whilst also applying reverse pitch, an action which was contrary to SOPSs.)
  • B735, Denver USA, 2008 (Runway Side Excursion During Attempted Take-off in Strong and Gusty Crosswind Conditions.)
  • DC10, Tahiti French Polynesia, 2000 (On 24 December 2000, a Hawaiian Airlines DC10 overran the runway at Tahiti after landing long on a wet runway having encountered crosswinds and turbulence on approach in thunderstorms.)
  • SF34, Izumo Japan, 2007 (On 10 December, 2007 a SAAB 340B being operated by Japan Air Commuter on a scheduled passenger flight left the runway at Izumo Airport during the daylight landing roll in normal visibility and continued further while veering to the right before coming to a stop on the airport apron.)
  • B738, Sochi Russia, 2018 (On 1 September 2018, a Boeing 737-800, making its second night approach to Sochi beneath a large convective storm with low level windshear reported, floated almost halfway along the wet runway before overrunning it by approximately 400 metres and breaching the perimeter fence before stopping. A small fire did not prevent all occupants from safely evacuating. The Investigation attributed the accident to crew disregard of a number of windshear warnings and a subsequent encounter with horizontal windshear resulting in a late touchdown and noted that the first approach had meant that the crew had been poorly prepared for the second.)

Thrust Reversers not fitted

  • B462, Stord Norway, 2006 (On 10 October 2006, a BAE Systems 146-200 being operated by Danish airline Atlantic Airways on a passenger flight from Sola to Stord overran the end of runway 33 at destination at a slow speed in normal visibility at dawn (but just prior to the accepted definition of daylight) before plunging down a steep slope sustaining severe damage and catching fire immediately it had come to rest. The rapid spread of the fire and difficulties in evacuation resulted in the death of four of the 16 occupants and serious injury to six others. The aircraft was completely destroyed.)
  • E145, Hannover Germany, 2005 (On 14 August 2005, a British Airways Regional Embraer 145 overran Runway 27L at Hannover by 160 metes after flying a stable approach in daylight but then making a soft and late touchdown on a water covered runway. Dynamic aquaplaning began and this was followed by reverted rubber aquaplaning towards the end of the paved surface when the emergency brake was applied. The aircraft suffered only minor damage and only one of the 49 occupants was slightly injured.)
  • E135, George South Africa, 2009 (On 7 December 2009, an South African Airlink Embraer 135 overran the recently refurbished wet landing runway at George after braking was ineffective and exited the aerodrome perimeter to end up on a public road. There was no fire and all occupants were able to evacuate the aircraft. The subsequent investigation attributed the overrun principally to inadequate wet runway friction following the surface maintenance activities and noted various significant non-compliances with ICAO Annex 14.)

Landing Performance Assessment

  • LJ25, Northolt London UK,1996 (On 13 August 1996, a Bombardier Learjet 25B being operated by a Spanish Air Taxi Operator on a private charter flight from Palma de Mallorca Spain to Northolt made a high speed overrun of the end of the landing runway after an approach in day VMC and collided with traffic on a busy main road after exiting the airport perimeter. All three occupants - the two pilots and one passenger - suffered minor injuries as did the driver of a vehicle hit by the aircraft. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces but there was no fire.)
  • BE9L, Zurich Switzerland, 2007 (On 27 September 2007, a Beech 90 King Air being operated single pilot by a small UK air taxi operator on a day cargo flight from Southend UK to Zurich left the runway after unintentionally touching down at destination without the landing gear extended following an approach in day VMC. The pilot, the only occupant, was uninjured but the aircraft was declared a hull loss because of substantial damage.)
  • A310, Khartoum Sudan, 2008 (On 10 June 2008, a Sudan Airways Airbus A310 made a late night touchdown at Khartoum and the actions of the experienced crew were subsequently unable to stop the aircraft, which was in service with one thrust reverser inoperative and locked out, on the wet runway. The aircraft stopped essentially intact some 215 metres beyond the runway end after overrunning on smooth ground but a fuel-fed fire then took hold which impeded evacuation and eventually destroyed the aircraft.)
  • ATP, Vilhelmina Sweden, 2016 (On 6 April 2016, a BAe ATP partly left the side of the runway soon after touchdown, regaining it after 155 metres before completing its landing roll. It sustained damage rendering it unfit to continue flying but this was not noticed until five further flights had been made. Investigation attributed the excursion to lack of pilot response to unexpected beta range power and the continued flying to the aircraft Captain's failure to ensure proper event recording, accurate operator notification or a post-excursion engineering inspection of the aircraft. Systemic inadequacy in safety management and culture at the operator was identified.)
  • B738, Mumbai India, 2018 (On 10 July 2018, a Boeing 737-800 marginally overran the wet landing runway at Mumbai after the no 1 engine thrust reverser failed to deploy when full reverse was selected after a late touchdown following a stabilised ILS approach. The Investigation found that the overrun was the result of touchdown with almost 40% of the runway behind the aircraft followed by the failure of normal thrust reverser deployment when attempted due to a failed actuator in one of the reversers. The prevailing moderate rain and the likelihood that dynamic aquaplaning had occurred were identified as contributory.)

Off side of Runway

  • B773, Munich Germany, 2011 (On 3 November 2011, a Boeing 777-300ER crew lost directional control of their aircraft soon after touchdown and after veering off one side of runway 08R, it then crossed to the other side of it before stopping. The Investigation found that during the final stages of an intended autoland in CAT 1 conditions, an ILS LLZ signal disturbance caused by a departing aircraft had led a flight path deviation just before touchdown and, after delaying a pre-briefed automatic go-around until this was inhibited by main gear runway contact, the crew failed to either set thrust manually or disconnect the autopilot.)
  • A333, Kathmandu Nepal, 2015 (On 4 March 2015, the crew of a Turkish Airlines A333 continued an automatic non precision RNAV approach below the prescribed minimum descent altitude without having obtained any element of visual reference and when this was acquired a few seconds before the attempted landing, the aircraft was not aligned with the runway centreline and during a 2.7g low-pitch landing, the left main gear touched down on the grass. The aircraft then left the runway completely before stopping with a collapsed nose gear and sufficient damage to be assessed a hull loss. None of 235 occupants sustained serious injury.)
  • MD88, New York La Guardia USA, 2015 (On 5 March 2015 a Boeing MD88 veered off a snow-contaminated runway 13 at New York La Guardia soon after touchdown after the experienced flight crew applied excessive reverse thrust and thus compromised directional control due to rudder blanking, a known phenomenon affecting the aircraft type. The aircraft stopped partly outside the airport perimeter with the forward fuselage over water. In addition to identifying the main cause of the accident, the Investigation found that exposure to rudder blanking risks was still widespread. It also noted that the delayed evacuation was partly attributable to inadequate crew performance and related Company procedures.)
  • A333, Montréal QC Canada, 2014 (On 7 October 2014, an Airbus A330-300 failed to maintain the runway centreline as it touched down at Montréal in suddenly reduced forward visibility and part of the left main gear departed the runway edge, paralleling it briefly before returning to it and regaining the centreline as the landing roll was completed. The Investigation attributed the excursion to a delay in corrective action when a sudden change in wind velocity occurred at the same time as degraded visual reference. It was found that the runway should not have been in use in such poor visibility without serviceable lighting.)
  • A320, Tehran Mehrabad Iran, 2016 (On 13 August 2016, an Airbus A320 departed the side of the runway at low speed during takeoff from Tehran Mehrabad and became immobilised in soft ground. The Investigation found that the Captain had not ensured that both engines were simultaneously stabilised before completing the setting of takeoff thrust and that his subsequent response to the resulting directional control difficulties had been inappropriate and decision to reject the takeoff too late to prevent the excursion. Poor CRM on the flight deck was identified as including but not limited to the First Officer’s early call to reject the takeoff being ignored.)

Taxiway Take Off/Landing

  • B733, Amsterdam Netherlands, 2010 (On 10 February 2010 a KLM Boeing 737-300 unintentionally made a night take off from Amsterdam in good visibility from the taxiway parallel to the runway for which take off clearance had been given. Because of the available distance and the absence of obstructions, the take off was otherwise uneventful. The Investigation noted the familiarity of the crew with the airport and identified apparent complacency.)
  • A320, Oslo Norway, 2010 (On 25 February 2010, an Aeroflot Airbus A320-200 unintentionally made a daylight take off from Oslo in good visibility from the taxiway parallel to the runway for which take off clearance had been given. Because of the available distance and the absence of obstructions, the take off was otherwise uneventful. The Investigation identified contributory factors attributable to the airline, the airport and the ANSP.)
  • B738, Oslo Gardermoen Norway, 2005 (On a 23 October, 2005 a Boeing 737-800 operated by Pegasus Airlines, during night time, commenced a take-off roll on a parallel taxiway at Oslo Airport Gardermoen. The aircraft was observed by ATC and stop instruction was issued resulting in moderate speed rejected take-off (RTO).)
  • B733 / DH8D, Fort McMurray Canada, 2014 (On 4 August 2014, a Boeing 737-300 making a day visual approach at Fort McMurray after receiving an ILS/DME clearance lined up on a recently-constructed parallel taxiway and its crew were only alerted to their error shortly before touchdown by the crew of a DHC8-400 which was taxiing along the same taxiway in the opposite direction. This resulted in a go around being commenced from 46 feet agl. The Investigation noted that both pilots had been looking out during the final stages of the approach and had ignored important SOPs including that for a mandatory go around from an unstable approach.)
  • B734, Palembang Indonesia, 2008 (On 2 October 2008, a Boeing 737-400 being used for flight crew command upgrade line training unintentionally landed off a non precision approach at Palembang in daylight on a taxiway parallel to the landing runway. Neither pilot realised their error until the aircraft was already on the ground when they saw a barrier ahead and were able to brake hard to stop only 700 metres from touchdown. It was found that the taxiway involved had served as a temporary runway five years earlier and that previously obliterated markings from that use had become visible.)

Runway Length Temporarily Reduced

  • A306, Yerevan Armenia, 2015 (On 17 May 2015, an Airbus A300-600 crew descended their aircraft below the correct vertical profile on a visual daytime approach at Yerevan and then landed on a closed section of the runway near the displaced runway threshold. The Investigation found that the crew had failed to review relevant AIS information prior to departing from Tehran and had not been expecting anything but a normal approach and landing. The performance of the Dispatcher in respect of briefing and the First Officer in respect of failure to adequately monitor the Captain's flawed conduct of the approach was highlighted.)
  • B738, Djalaluddin Indonesia, 2013 (On 6 August 2013, a Boeing 737-800 encountered cows ahead on the runway after landing normally in daylight following an uneventful approach and was unable to avoid colliding with them at high speed and as a result departed the runway to the left. Parts of the airport perimeter fencing were found to have been either missing or inadequately maintained for a significant period prior to the accident despite the existence of an airport bird and animal hazard management plan. Corrective action was taken following the accident.)
  • SB20, Werneuchen Germany, 2002 (On 10 July 2002, a Saab 2000 being operated by Swiss Air Lines on a scheduled public transport service from Basel to Hamburg encountered extensive thunderstorms affecting both the intended destination and the standard alternates and due to a shortage of fuel completed the flight with a landing in day VMC at an unmanned general aviation airstrip where the aircraft collided with an unseen obstruction. After the aircraft came to a stop with the landing gear torn off, the two cabin crew conducted the passenger evacuation on their own initiative. There was no fire and only one of the 20 occupants was injured. The aircraft was declared a hull loss due to the damage sustained relative to the location.)
  • AT72, Mumbai India, 2009 (On 10 November 2010, a Kingfisher Airlines ATR 72-200 made an excessively steep and unstabilised tailwind approach in light rain to runway 27 at Mumbai in visual daylight conditions. After touching down late, the aircraft was steered off the side of the runway when it became obvious that an overrun would otherwise occur. The Investigation found that ATC had failed to advise of water patches on the runway and aquaplaning had occurred. It also found that without aquaplaning, the available distance from the actual touchdown point would have been sufficient to stop the aircraft in.)
  • GLEX, Montréal St Hubert Canada, 2017 (On 15 May 2017, a Bombardier Global Express crew failed to land on the restricted runway width available at Montréal St Hubert where there was a long-term construction project which had required reductions in both width and length of the main runway. The Investigation found that relevant NOTAM information including a requirement to pre-notify intended arrival had been ignored and that during arrival the crew had failed to respond to a range of cues that their landing would not be on the normally-available runway. Deficiencies in the arrangements made for continued use of part of the runway were also identified.)

Intentional Premature Rotation

  • B763, Manchester UK, 2008 (On 13 December 2008, a Thomsonfly Boeing 767-300 departing from Manchester for Montego Bay Jamaica was considered to be accelerating at an abnormally slow rate during the take off roll on Runway 23L. The aircraft commander, who was the pilot not flying, consequently delayed the V1 call by about 10 - 15 because he thought the aircraft might be heavier than had been calculated. During the rotation the TAILSKID message illuminated momentarily, indicating that the aircraft had suffered a tail strike during the takeoff. The commander applied full power and shortly afterwards the stick shaker activated briefly. The aircraft continued to climb away and accelerate before the flaps were retracted and the after-takeoff check list completed. The appropriate drills in the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) were subsequently actioned, fuel was dumped and the aircraft returned to Manchester for an overweight landing without further incident.)
  • MD88, Groningen Netherlands, 2003 (On 17 June 2003, a crew of a Boeing MD-88, belonging to Onur Air, executed a high speed rejected take-off at a late stage which resulted in overrun of the runway and serious damage to the aircraft.)
  • B773, London Heathrow UK, 2016 (On 30 August 2016, a Boeing 777-300 crew began takeoff from London Heathrow at an intersection one third of the way along the runway using the reduced thrust calculated for a full-length take off instead of the rated thrust calculated for the intersection takeoff. As a result, the aircraft was only just airborne as it crossed the airport boundary and an adjacent public road. The Investigation attributed the data input error to crew failure to respond appropriately on finding that they had provisionally computed performance data based on different assumptions and concluded that the relevant Operator procedures were insufficiently robust.)

Incorrect Aircraft Configuration

  • AT75, Port Vila Vanuatu, 2018 (On 28 July 2018, a right engine compressor stall on an ATR72-500 bound for Port Vila followed by smoke in the passenger cabin led to a MAYDAY declaration and shutdown of the malfunctioning engine. The subsequent single engine landing at destination ended in a veer-off and collision with two unoccupied parked aircraft. The Investigation noted the disorganised manner in which abnormal/emergency and normal checklists had been actioned and found that the ‘Before Landing’ Checklist had not been run which resulted in the rudder limiter being left in high speed mode making single engine directional control on the ground effectively impossible.)
  • E190, Kupang Indonesia, 2015 (On 21 December 2015, an Embraer 195 crew continued a significantly unstable approach which included prolonged repetition of 'High Speed' and a series of EGPWS Alerts which were both ignored and which culminated in a high speed late touchdown which ended in a 200 metre overrun. The Investigation attributed the event to poor flight management and noted the systemic lack of any effective oversight of pilot operating standards compounded in the investigated event by the effects of a steep flight deck authority gradient and the failure to detect anomalies in the normal operating behaviour of both the pilots involved.)
  • GLF4, Le Castellet France, 2012 (On 13 July 2012, a Gulfstream G-IV left the side of the runway at high speed during the landing roll at Le Castellet following a positioning flight after ineffective deceleration after the flight crew had forgotten to arm the ground spoilers. The Investigation found that pilot response to this situation had been followed by a loss of directional control, collision with obstructions and rapid onset of an intense fire. Contributory factors identified included poor procedural compliance by the pilots, their lack of training on a relevant new QRH procedure which Gulfstream had ineffectively communicated and ineffective FAA oversight of the operation.)
  • E145, Bristol UK, 2017 (On 22 December 2017, an Embraer 145 departed the side of the runway shortly after touching down at Bristol and finally stopped 120 metres from the runway edge. The Investigation found that the aircraft had landed after the emergency/parking brake had been inadvertently selected on during the approach when the intention had been to deploy the speed brakes. It was noted that the Captain designated as Pilot Flying had been new to both the aircraft type and the Operator and had been flying under supervision as part of the associated type conversion requirement for line training.)
  • B733, Aqaba Jordan, 2017 (On 17 September 2017, a Boeing 737-300 requested and was approved for a visual approach to Aqaba which involved a significant tailwind component and, after approaching at excessive speed, it touched down late and overran the 3000 metre runway onto sandy ground. The Investigation found that despite EGPWS Alerts relating to both the high rate of descent and late configuration, the Captain had instructed the First Officer to continue what was clearly an unstabilised approach and when touchdown had still not occurred with around 1000 metres of runway left, the Captain took over but was unable to prevent an overrun.)

Reduced Thrust Take Off

  • A345, Melbourne Australia, 2009 (On 20 March 2009 an Airbus A340-500, operated by Emirates, commenced a take-off roll for a normal reduced-thrust take-off on runway 16 at Melbourne Airport. The attempt to get the aircraft airborne resulted in a tail strike and an overrun because insufficient thrust had been set based upon an incorrect flight crew data entry.)
  • B748, Tokyo Narita Japan, 2017 (On 15 July 2017, a Boeing 747-8F close to its maximum takeoff weight only became airborne just before the end of the 2,500 metre-long north runway at Narita after the reduced thrust applicable to the much longer south runway was used for the takeoff. The aircraft cleared the upwind runway threshold by only 16 feet. The Investigation found that the Captain and the First Officer had both failed to follow elements of the applicable takeoff performance change procedures after the departure runway anticipated during pre-start flight preparations prior to ATC clearance delivery had changed.)
  • B742, Halifax Canada, 2004 (On 14 October 2004, a B742 crashed on take off from Halifax International Airport, Canada, and was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire. The crew had calculated incorrect V speeds and thrust setting using an EFB.)
  • B773, Auckland Airport New Zealand, 2007 (On 22 March 2007, an Emirates Boeing 777-300ER, started its take-off on runway 05 Right at Auckland International Airport bound for Sydney. The pilots misunderstood that the runway length had been reduced during a period of runway works and started their take-off with less engine thrust and flap than were required. During the take-off they saw work vehicles in the distance on the runway and, realising something was amiss, immediately applied full engine thrust and got airborne within the available runway length and cleared the work vehicles by about 28 metres.)
  • A320, Lisbon Portugal, 2019 (On 16 September 2019, an Airbus A320 departing Lisbon only became airborne 110 metres before the end of runway 21 and had a high speed rejected takeoff been required, it was likely to have overrun the runway. The Investigation found that both pilots had inadvertently calculated reduced thrust takeoff performance using the full 3705 metre runway length and then failed to identify their error before FMS entry. They also did not increase the thrust to TOGA on realising that the runway end was fast approaching. This was the operator’s third almost identical event at Lisbon in less than five months.)

Fixed Obstructions in Runway Strip

  • B738, Manila Philippines, 2018 (On 16 August 2018, a Boeing 737-800 made a stabilised approach to Manila during a thunderstorm with intermittent heavy rain but the crew lost adequate visual reference as they arrived over the runway. After a drift sideways across the 60 metre-wide landing runway, a veer off occurred and was immediately followed by a damaging collision with obstructions not compliant with prevailing airport safety standards. The Investigation found that the Captain had ignored go around calls from the First Officer and determined that the corresponding aircraft operator procedures were inadequate as well as faulting significant omissions in the Captain’s approach brief.)
  • E55P, Blackbushe UK, 2015 (On 31 July 2015 a Saudi-operated Embraer Phenom on a private flight continued an unstabilised day visual approach to Blackbushe in benign weather conditions. The aircraft touched down with excess speed with almost 70% of the available landing distance behind the aircraft. It overran and was destroyed by impact damage and fire and all occupants died. The Investigation concluded that the combination of factors which created a very high workload for the pilot "may have saturated his mental capacity, impeding his ability to handle new information and adapt his mental model" leading to his continuation of a highly unstable approach.)
  • A30B, Bratislava Slovakia, 2012 (On 16 November 2012, an Air Contractors Airbus A300 departed the left the side of the landing runway at Bratislava after an abnormal response to directional control inputs. Investigation found that incorrect and undetected re-assembly of the nose gear torque links had led to the excursion and that absence of clear instructions in maintenance manuals, since rectified, had facilitated this. It was also considered that the absence of any regulation requiring equipment in the vicinity of the runway to be designed to minimise potential damage to aircraft departing the paved surface had contributed to the damage caused by the accident.)
  • DH8D, Hubli India, 2015 (On 8 March 2015, directional control of a Bombardier DHC 8-400 which had just completed a normal approach and landing was lost and the aircraft departed the side of the runway following the collapse of both the left main and nose landing gear assemblies. The Investigation found that after being allowed to drift to the side of the runway without corrective action, the previously airworthy aircraft had hit a non-frangible edge light and the left main gear and then the nose landing gear had collapsed with a complete loss of directional control. The aircraft had then exited the side of the runway sustaining further damage.)

Ineffective Use of Retardation Methods

  • GL6T, Liverpool UK, 2019 (On 11 December 2019, a Bombardier BD700 Global 6000 making a night landing at Liverpool suffered a nose wheel steering failure shortly after touchdown. The crew were unable to prevent the aircraft departing the side of the runway into a grassed area where it stopped, undamaged, in mud. The Investigation found that the crew response was contrary to that needed for continued directional control but also that no pilot training or QRH procedure covered such a failure occurring at high speed nor was adequate guidance available on mitigating the risk of inadvertent opposite brake application during significant rudder deflection.)
  • GLF4, Le Castellet France, 2012 (On 13 July 2012, a Gulfstream G-IV left the side of the runway at high speed during the landing roll at Le Castellet following a positioning flight after ineffective deceleration after the flight crew had forgotten to arm the ground spoilers. The Investigation found that pilot response to this situation had been followed by a loss of directional control, collision with obstructions and rapid onset of an intense fire. Contributory factors identified included poor procedural compliance by the pilots, their lack of training on a relevant new QRH procedure which Gulfstream had ineffectively communicated and ineffective FAA oversight of the operation.)
  • F28, Gällivare Sweden, 2016 (On 6 April 2016, a Romanian-operated Fokker F28 overran the runway at Gällivare after a bounced night landing. There were no occupant injuries and only slight aircraft damage. The Investigation concluded that after a stabilised approach, the handling of the aircraft just prior and after touchdown, which included late and inappropriate deployment of the thrust reversers, was not compatible with a safe landing in the prevailing conditions, that the crew briefing for the landing had been inadequate and that the reported runway friction coefficients were "probably unreliable". Safety Recommendations were made for a generic 'Safe Landing' concept to be developed.)
  • MD88, New York La Guardia USA, 2015 (On 5 March 2015 a Boeing MD88 veered off a snow-contaminated runway 13 at New York La Guardia soon after touchdown after the experienced flight crew applied excessive reverse thrust and thus compromised directional control due to rudder blanking, a known phenomenon affecting the aircraft type. The aircraft stopped partly outside the airport perimeter with the forward fuselage over water. In addition to identifying the main cause of the accident, the Investigation found that exposure to rudder blanking risks was still widespread. It also noted that the delayed evacuation was partly attributable to inadequate crew performance and related Company procedures.)
  • GLF4, Abuja Nigeria, 2018 (On 12 September 2018, a Gulfstream G-IV overran the runway at Abuja after the air/ground status system failed to transition to ground on touchdown and the crew were slow to recognise that as a result neither spoilers nor thrust reversers had deployed. In the absence of recorded flight data, it was not possible to establish why the air/ground sensing system did not transition normally but no fault was found. The aircraft operator’s procedures in the event of such circumstances were found to be inadequate and regulatory oversight of the operator to have been comprehensively deficient over an extended period.)

Continued Take Off

  • DHC6, Jomson Nepal, 2013 (On 16 May 2013, a DHC6-300 on a domestic passenger flight made a tailwind touchdown at excessive speed in the opposite direction of the of 740 metre-long runway to the notified direction in use and, after departing the runway to one side during deceleration, re-entered the runway and attempted to take off. This failed and the aircraft breached the perimeter fence and fell into a river. The Investigation identified inappropriate actions of the aircraft commander in respect of both the initial landing and his response to the subsequent runway excursion and also cited the absence of effective CRM.)
  • A318/B738, Nantes France, 2010 (On 25 May 2010 an Air France Airbus A318 making an automatic landing off an ILS Cat 2 approach at Nantes experienced interference with the ILS LOC signal caused by a Boeing 737-800 which was departing from the same runway but early disconnection of the AP removed any risk of un-correctable directional control problems during the landing roll. Both aircraft were operating in accordance with their ATC clearances. Investigation attributed the conflict to the decision of TWR not to instruct the A318 to go around and because of diminished situational awareness.)
  • DH8D, Saarbrucken Germany, 2015 (On 30 September 2015, the First Officer on an in-service airline-operated Bombardier DHC-8 400 selected the gear up without warning as the Captain was in the process of rotating the aircraft for take-off. The aircraft settled back on the runway wheels up and eventually stopped near the end of the 1,990 metre-long runway having sustained severe damage. The Investigation noted that a factor contributing to the First Officer's unintended action may have been her "reduced concentration level" but also highlighted the fact that the landing gear control design logic allowed retraction with the nose landing gear airborne.)
  • B734, Aberdeen UK, 2005 (Significant damage was caused to the tailplane and elevator of a Boeing 737-400 after the pavement beneath them broke up when take off thrust was applied for a standing start from the full length of the runway at Aberdeen. Although in this case neither outcome applied, the Investigation noted that control difficulties consequent upon such damage could lead to an overrun following a high speed rejected takeoff or to compromised flight path control airborne. Safety Recommendations on appropriate regulatory guidance for marking and construction of blast pads and on aircraft performance, rolling take offs and lead-on line marking were made.)
  • B738, Lyon France, 2009 (On 29 August 2009, an Air Algérie Boeing B737-800 departed the side of the runway during take off but then regained the paved surface after sustaining damage from obstructions, completed the take off without further event and continued to destination. Damage to one of the engines, to tyres and to two lights was discovered at the destination. ATC remained unaware of the excursion until the Operator asked its representative at Lyon to ask the airport to carry out a runway inspection.)

Continued Landing Roll

  • B738, Mangalore India, 2012 (On 14 August 2012, a Boeing 737-800 crew continued a previously stable ILS Cat 1 approach below the prescribed MDA without having acquired the prescribed visual reference. The aircraft was then damaged by a high rate of descent at the initial touchdown in the undershoot in fog. The occurrence was not reported by either the crew or the attending licensed engineer who discovered consequent damage to the aircraft. Dense fog had prevented ATC visual awareness. The Investigation attributed the undershoot to violation of minima and to both pilots looking out for visual reference leaving the flight instruments unmonitored.)
  • A333, Kathmandu Nepal, 2015 (On 4 March 2015, the crew of a Turkish Airlines A333 continued an automatic non precision RNAV approach below the prescribed minimum descent altitude without having obtained any element of visual reference and when this was acquired a few seconds before the attempted landing, the aircraft was not aligned with the runway centreline and during a 2.7g low-pitch landing, the left main gear touched down on the grass. The aircraft then left the runway completely before stopping with a collapsed nose gear and sufficient damage to be assessed a hull loss. None of 235 occupants sustained serious injury.)
  • A318/B738, Nantes France, 2010 (On 25 May 2010 an Air France Airbus A318 making an automatic landing off an ILS Cat 2 approach at Nantes experienced interference with the ILS LOC signal caused by a Boeing 737-800 which was departing from the same runway but early disconnection of the AP removed any risk of un-correctable directional control problems during the landing roll. Both aircraft were operating in accordance with their ATC clearances. Investigation attributed the conflict to the decision of TWR not to instruct the A318 to go around and because of diminished situational awareness.)
  • E55P, Blackbushe UK, 2015 (On 31 July 2015 a Saudi-operated Embraer Phenom on a private flight continued an unstabilised day visual approach to Blackbushe in benign weather conditions. The aircraft touched down with excess speed with almost 70% of the available landing distance behind the aircraft. It overran and was destroyed by impact damage and fire and all occupants died. The Investigation concluded that the combination of factors which created a very high workload for the pilot "may have saturated his mental capacity, impeding his ability to handle new information and adapt his mental model" leading to his continuation of a highly unstable approach.)
  • E190, Kupang Indonesia, 2015 (On 21 December 2015, an Embraer 195 crew continued a significantly unstable approach which included prolonged repetition of 'High Speed' and a series of EGPWS Alerts which were both ignored and which culminated in a high speed late touchdown which ended in a 200 metre overrun. The Investigation attributed the event to poor flight management and noted the systemic lack of any effective oversight of pilot operating standards compounded in the investigated event by the effects of a steep flight deck authority gradient and the failure to detect anomalies in the normal operating behaviour of both the pilots involved.)

Excessive Exit to Taxiway Speed

  • JS32, Torsby Sweden, 2014 (On 31 January 2014, an Estonian-operated BAE Jetstream 32 being used under wet lease to fulfil a government-funded Swedish domestic air service requirement landed long at night and overran the end of the runway. The Investigation concluded that an unstabilised approach had been followed by a late touchdown at excessive speed and that the systemic context for the occurrence had been a complete failure of the aircraft operator to address operational safety at anything like the level appropriate to a commercial operation. Failure of the responsible State Safety Regulator to detect and act on this situation was also noted.)

Frozen Deposits on Runway

  • B763, Halifax NS Canada, 2019 (On 4 March 2019, a Boeing 767-300 crew lost directional control of their aircraft as speed reduced following their touchdown at Halifax and were unable to prevent it being rotated 180° on the icy surface before coming to a stop facing the runway landing threshold. The Investigation found that the management of the runway safety risk by the airport authority had been systemically inadequate and that the communication of what was known by ATC about the runway surface condition had been incomplete. A number of subsequent corrective actions taken by the airport authority were noted.)
  • CRJX, Madrid Spain, 2015 (On 1 February 2015, a Bombardier CRJ 1000 departed from Pamplona with slush likely to have been in excess of the regulatory maximum depth on the runway. On landing at Madrid, the normal operation of the brake units was compromised by ice and one tyre burst damaging surrounding components and leaving debris on the runway, and the other tyre was slow to spin up and sustained a serious flat spot. The Investigation concluded that the Pamplona apron, taxiway and runway had not been properly cleared of frozen deposits and that the flight crew had not followed procedures appropriate for the prevailing conditions.)

Excessive Water Depth

  • A320, Sylt Germany, 2017 (On 30 September 2017, an Airbus A320 touched down late after an ILS approach to runway 32 at Sylt with a significant tailwind component being reported and failed to stop before overrunning the end of the runway and subsequently stopped on grass 80 metres beyond it. The Investigation noted that the calculated required landing distance was close to the landing distance available, the actual approach speed was 20 knots above the calculated one and that the aircraft had floated in the flare above a wet runway. It was concluded that the runway excursion was attributable to non-performance of a go-around.)
  • B738, Mumbai India, 2018 (On 10 July 2018, a Boeing 737-800 marginally overran the wet landing runway at Mumbai after the no 1 engine thrust reverser failed to deploy when full reverse was selected after a late touchdown following a stabilised ILS approach. The Investigation found that the overrun was the result of touchdown with almost 40% of the runway behind the aircraft followed by the failure of normal thrust reverser deployment when attempted due to a failed actuator in one of the reversers. The prevailing moderate rain and the likelihood that dynamic aquaplaning had occurred were identified as contributory.)

Intentional Veer Off Runway

  • C402, Virgin Gorda British Virgin Islands, 2017 (On 11 February 2017, a Cessna 402 failed to stop on the runway when landing at Virgin Gorda and was extensively damaged. The Investigation noted that the landing distance required was very close to that available with no safety margin so that although touchdown was normal, when the brakes failed to function properly, there was no possibility of safely rejecting the landing or stopping normally on the runway. Debris in the brake fluid was identified as causing brake system failure. The context was considered as the Operator’s inadequate maintenance practices and a likely similar deficiency in operational procedures and processes.)
  • AN72, Sao Tome, Sao Tome & Principe, 2017 (On 29 July 2017, an Antonov AN-74 crew sighted several previously unseen large “eagles” rising from the long grass next to the runway as they accelerated for takeoff at Sao Tome and, concerned about the risk of ingestion, made a high speed rejected takeoff but were unable to stop on the runway and entered a deep ravine just beyond it which destroyed the aircraft. The Investigation found that the reject had been unnecessarily delayed until above V1, that the crew forgot to deploy the spoilers which would have significantly increased the stopping distance and that relevant crew training was inadequate.)

Misaligned take off

  • AT72, Cologne-Bonn Germany, 2020 (On 27 April 2020, an ATR 72-200 freighter crew attempted a night takeoff in good visibility aligned with the edge of runway 06 and did not begin rejecting it until within 20 knots of the applicable V1 despite hearing persistent regular noises which they did not recognise as edge light impacts and so completed the rejection on the same alignment. The Investigation noted both pilots’ familiarity with the airport and their regular work together and attributed their error to their low attention level and a minor distraction during the turnround after backtracking.)
  • E120, Amsterdam Netherlands, 2016 (On 18 January 2016, an Embraer 120 crew made a night takeoff from Amsterdam Runway 24 unaware that the aircraft was aligned with the right side runway edge lights. After completion of an uneventful flight, holes in the right side fuselage and damage to the right side propeller blades, the latter including wire embedded in a blade leading edge, were found. The Investigation concluded that poor visual cues guiding aircraft onto the runway at the intersection concerned were conducive to pilot error and noted that despite ATS awareness of intersection takeoff risks, no corresponding risk mitigation had been undertaken.)
  • DH8A, Rouyn-Noranda QC Canada, 2019 (On 23 January 2019, a Bombardier DHC8-100 failed to complete its intended night takeoff from Rouyn-Noranda after it had not been commenced on or correctly aligned parallel to the (obscured) centreline and the steadily increasing deviation had not been recognised until a runway excursion was imminent. The Investigation attributed this to the failure of the crew to pay sufficient attention to the external perspective provided by the clearly-visible runway edge lighting whilst also noting the Captain’s likely underestimation of the consequences of a significant flight deck authority gradient and a failure to fully follow relevant applicable operating procedures.)
  • AT72, Karup Denmark, 2016 (On 25 January 2016, an ATR 72-200 crew departing from and very familiar with Karup aligned their aircraft with the runway edge lights instead of the lit runway centreline and began take-off, only realising their error when they collided with part of the arrester wire installation at the side of the runway after which the take-off was rejected. The Investigation attributed the error primarily to the failure of the pilots to give sufficient priority to ensuring adequate positional awareness and given the familiarity of both pilots with the aerodrome noted that complacency had probably been a contributor factor.)

Runway Condition not as reported

  • B763, Halifax NS Canada, 2019 (On 4 March 2019, a Boeing 767-300 crew lost directional control of their aircraft as speed reduced following their touchdown at Halifax and were unable to prevent it being rotated 180° on the icy surface before coming to a stop facing the runway landing threshold. The Investigation found that the management of the runway safety risk by the airport authority had been systemically inadequate and that the communication of what was known by ATC about the runway surface condition had been incomplete. A number of subsequent corrective actions taken by the airport authority were noted.)
  • CRJ9, Turku Finland, 2017 (On 25 October 2017, a Bombardier CRJ-900 crew lost directional control after touchdown at Turku in the presence of a tailwind component on a contaminated runway at night whilst heavy snow was falling. After entering a skid the aircraft completed a 180° turn before finally stopping 160 metres from the end of the 2500 metre-long runway. The Investigation found that skidding began immediately after touchdown with the aircraft significantly above the aquaplaning threshold and that the crew did not follow the thrust reverser reset procedure after premature deployment or use brake applications and aileron inputs appropriate to the challenging conditions.)
  • B738, Sochi Russia, 2018 (On 1 September 2018, a Boeing 737-800, making its second night approach to Sochi beneath a large convective storm with low level windshear reported, floated almost halfway along the wet runway before overrunning it by approximately 400 metres and breaching the perimeter fence before stopping. A small fire did not prevent all occupants from safely evacuating. The Investigation attributed the accident to crew disregard of a number of windshear warnings and a subsequent encounter with horizontal windshear resulting in a late touchdown and noted that the first approach had meant that the crew had been poorly prepared for the second.)

Related Articles

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