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Authority Gradients

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Category: Human Behaviour Human Behaviour
Content source: SKYbrary About SKYbrary
Content control: SKYbrary About SKYbrary


Authority Gradient

Authority Gradient refers to the established, and/or perceived, command and decision-making power hierarchy in a Team, Crew or Group situation, and also how balanced the distribution of this power is experienced within the Team, Crew or Group. Concentration of power in one person leads to a steep gradient, while more democratic and inclusive involvement of others results in a shallow gradient.

Authority

Authority is not always associated with the competence to use such authority effectively, and it may be denoted by Rank, defined by Role, adopted through Ability and/or appropriated by force of character. In terms of responsibility for decision-making, authority may also be thrust reluctantly onto another person (knowingly or unknowingly) by colleagues who shirk responsibility or feel under-confident.

(Extreme) Steep Authority Gradient

When a team leader has an overbearing, dominant and dictatorial style of management, the team members will experience a steep authority gradient. Team members will view such leaders as overly opinionated, stubborn, and aggressive. When such conditions exist, expressing concerns, questioning decisions, or even simply clarifying instructions will require considerable determination as any comments will often be met with criticism. Team members may then perceive their input as devalued or unwelcome and cease to offer anything; and, in extreme cases, cease to participate completely.

Steep Authority gradients act as barriers to team involvement, reducing the flow of feedback, halting cooperation, and preventing creative ideas for threat analyses and problem solving. Only the most assertive, confident, and sometimes equally dominant team members will feel able to challenge authority. Authoritarian leaders are likely to consider any type of feedback as a challenge and respond aggressively; thereby reinforcing or steepening the gradient further.

Authoritarian leaders are often described as “goal orientated” at the expense of “people orientation”. They may themselves consider that this is the case, but by denying themselves the resources available (skills, knowledge and motivational support of other team members) their actions are self-defeating and goals are less likely to be attained.

(Extreme) Shallow Authority Gradient

A “paternalistic” leader who only pursues a course of action that has been democratically agreed, following equal opportunity for each and every team member to give input, will have reduced the authority gradient to zero. Decision-making will be extremely slow, and by giving equal opportunities to all, irrespective of experience levels, some of those decisions will be wrong. This in itself can undermine the leader’s authority in the eyes of more experienced team members and possibly lead to their disengagement.

Such circumstances, and subsequent breakdown of communication, may also result in some team members acting independently of the leader. Responsibilities may become blurred.

Confusion over Authority Gradient

In some situations a shallow authority gradient may exist solely through the composition of the team and/or the type of task being conducted, rather than through an overly democratic leadership style.

Aircraft captains often fly with other captains. Flying trainers and examiners will fly with fully qualified pilots; sometimes, these trainers will be under observation themselves from another trainer. Safety auditors may be observing crew behaviours, yet be senior pilots themselves. Parallel situations also exist in air traffic control, maintenance and airport operations – where experienced personnel fulfill tasks for which they are over-qualified and supervisors, instructors, auditors and examiners may be observing or playing and active role. Similarly, a generally inexperienced team member may be highly valued for a specific skill, and even employed solely for this reason; other team members can then easily over-estimate this person’s capabilities through generalisation and association.

Whenever there is a lack of clarity in roles, responsibilities and capabilities, it is likely that decisions and actions will not be taken effectively; some team members may not participate when expected, and other team members may act independently towards different goals.

Conformity

Conformity is a word often used to describe certain situations in which team members who could have contributed useful safety information, at the time, failed to do so. Authority gradients can play a key role in facilitating attitudes of conformity amongst team members.

  • Obedience – this is often in response to a perceived authority, or in reaction to an authoritarian leader (steep gradient).
  • Majority Rule – going along with others’ views rather than voicing one’s own. This may be in response to an overly democratic style of leadership (shallow gradient) or because it’s easier than speaking up (steep gradient).
  • Desire to please – or, perhaps more terrifying is the fear of being ridiculed, shamed or even ostracised from the team. This can occur in both steep and shallow authority gradient environments.

Cultural Differences

Modern globally accepted CRM, TRM and Human Factors training programmes provide leaders with the tools to invite feedback, ideas and challenges to their own decisions and performance - without becoming defensive and critical. These same programmes encourage junior team members to challenge others with confidence, including senior members, openly, assertively and early to help reduce risk.

Both of these aspects may run counterintuitively to various cultural norms - national, racial, religious, tribal etc. In many cultures deference is often given to age, rank, seniority, role, caste etc and, if brought into the workplace, this can create ineffective use of team, crew and group resources. It is therefore important for safety critical workers to undertake cultural diversity awareness training, and for organisations to adopt effective strategies to reduce associated risks.

Balance and Flexibility

Most teams require some degree of authority gradient, otherwise roles will become blurred and decisions will not be made in a timely fashion. The most effective leaders are those that consciously establish a command hierarchy, which is appropriate to the task at hand, and the qualification and experience levels of team members. There is no one-size-fits-all solution. Shallow gradients are good for team-building and generating solutions when either the nature of the problem is unclear or where the remedy is neither routine nor obvious. Steep gradients may be appropriate in a crisis, where immediate action is required, despite the risk to team harmony.

Reducing the Risks

Reducing the risks that arise from inappropriate authority gradients is a matter of raising awareness, learning some simple skills, practicing those skills whilst under training and applying those skills during routine and emergency operations. It is also essential, after each of these stages, to openly discuss any issues that have arisen and to feed these back into the training programme.

Team leaders must be capable of creating a working climate where junior team members are confident enough to raise concerns, question decisions and also offer solutions. This requires the development of a flexible and professional leadership style based on clear communication and encouragement.

Junior team members need to learn assertiveness techniques to provide them with the confidence to question authority and play a full part in the team task.

Appropriate and comprehensive pre-task briefings are essential to clarify roles, responsibilities, capabilities, limitations and boundaries, both in normal and abnormal conditions. These may need to be reinforced during situational briefings such as pre-take-off and top of descent.

Accidents and Incidents

Events in the SKYbrary database which include Authority Gradient as a contributory factor:

  • DH8A, Rouyn-Noranda QC Canada, 2019 (On 23 January 2019, a Bombardier DHC8-100 failed to complete its intended night takeoff from Rouyn-Noranda after it had not been commenced on or correctly aligned parallel to the (obscured) centreline and the steadily increasing deviation had not been recognised until a runway excursion was imminent. The Investigation attributed this to the failure of the crew to pay sufficient attention to the external perspective provided by the clearly-visible runway edge lighting whilst also noting the Captain’s likely underestimation of the consequences of a significant flight deck authority gradient and a failure to fully follow relevant applicable operating procedures.)
  • B733, Aqaba Jordan, 2017 (On 17 September 2017, a Boeing 737-300 requested and was approved for a visual approach to Aqaba which involved a significant tailwind component and, after approaching at excessive speed, it touched down late and overran the 3000 metre runway onto sandy ground. The Investigation found that despite EGPWS Alerts relating to both the high rate of descent and late configuration, the Captain had instructed the First Officer to continue what was clearly an unstabilised approach and when touchdown had still not occurred with around 1000 metres of runway left, the Captain took over but was unable to prevent an overrun.)
  • B738 / E110, Brasilia Brazil, 2018 (On 10 April 2018, a Boeing 737-800 crew making a night takeoff from Brasilia did not see a small aircraft which had just landed on the same runway until it appeared in the landing lights with rotation imminent. After immediately setting maximum thrust and rotating abruptly, the 737 just cleared the other aircraft, an Embraer 110 whose occupants were aware of a large aircraft passing very low overhead whilst their aircraft was still on the runway. The Investigation attributed the conflict primarily to controller use of non-standard phraseology and the absence of unobstructed runway visibility from the TWR.)
  • B734, vicinity Lyon France, 2010 (On 7 September 2010, a Turkish operated Boeing 737-400 flew a non precision approach at Lyon Saint-Exupéry in IMC significantly below the procedure vertical profile throughout and only made a go around when instructed to do so by ATC following an MSAW activation. The minimum recorded radio height was 250 feet at 1.4nm from the runway threshold.)
  • DC91 / B722, Detroit MI USA, 1990 (On 3 December 1990 a Douglas DC9-10 flight crew taxiing for departure at Detroit in thick fog got lost and ended up stopped to one side of an active runway where, shortly after reporting their position, their aircraft was hit by a departing Boeing 727-200 and destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire. The Investigation concluded that the DC9 crew had failed to communicate positional uncertainty quickly enough but that their difficulties had been compounded by deficiencies in both the standard of air traffic service and airport surface markings, signage and lighting undetected by safety regulator oversight.)

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