| Summary
|
| On 5 July 2007, in daylight and good visibility, a Comair CRJ100 on an outbound scheduled service flight was cleared by a GND Controller to taxi across active runway 22 on which a Delta AL Boeing 737-800 also operating a scheduled service flight had already been cleared to land by the (TWR) local controller. The crossing to be made did not allow the CRJ100 crew to see up the runway towards the landing threshold until they had almost completed the crossing. When they did see the by then landed B738 coming towards them, they immediately increased thrust on the single operating engine to accelerate clear.
|
| Event Details
|
| When
|
July 2007
|
Actual or Potential
Event Type
|
Human Factors, Runway Incursion
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| Day/Night
|
Day
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| Flight Conditions
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On Ground - Normal Visibility
|
| General
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| Tag(s)
|
ATC Training,
Aircraft-aircraft near miss
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| HF
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| Tag(s)
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Ineffective Monitoring,
ATC Unit Co-ordination,
ATC clearance error
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| RI
|
| Tag(s)
|
ATC error,
Incursion after Landing,
Runway Crossing,
Near Miss
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| Safety Net Mitigations
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| Malfunction of Relevant Safety Net
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No
|
| A-SMGCS
|
Partially effective
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| Outcome
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| Damage or injury
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No
|
| Aircraft damage
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None"None" is not in the list (Minor, Major, Hull loss) of allowed values for the "Aircraft damage" property.
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| Injuries
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None"None" is not in the list (Few occupants, Many occupants, Most or all occupants) of allowed values for the "Injuries" property.
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| Fatalities
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None"None" is not in the list (Few occupants, Many occupants, Most or all occupants) of allowed values for the "Fatalities" property. ()
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| Causal Factor Group(s)
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| Group(s)
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Air Traffic Management
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| Safety Recommendation(s)
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| Group(s)
|
None Made
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| Investigation Type
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| Type
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Independent
|
Description
On 5 July 2007, in daylight and good visibility, a Comair CRJ100 on an outbound scheduled service flight was cleared by a GND Controller to taxi across active runway 22 on which a Delta AL Boeing 737-800 also operating a scheduled service flight had already been cleared to land by the (TWR) local controller. The crossing to be made did not allow the CRJ100 crew to see up the runway towards the landing threshold until they had almost completed the crossing. When they did see the by then landed B738 coming towards them, they immediately increased thrust on the single operating engine to accelerate clear.
The Investigation
An Investigation was carried out by the National Transportation Safety Board (USA) (NTSB). Their Investigation found that the minimum separation recorded between the two aircraft had been 600 feet and that the B738 had crossed the runway threshold some 6 seconds before the CRJ 100 entered the same runway to begin the crossing.
It also established that the Ground Controller involved had been under training with a qualified ground controller and had been authorised by the (TWR) local controller “via a conditional clearance, to taxi another aircraft across runway 22 after the aircraft in front of (the Delta B738) had passed taxiway F (the crossing taxiway being used by the Comair CRJ100) on the landing rollout. The (TWR) local controller then coordinated with the TWR Supervisor for the aircraft following the (Delta B738 to be removed from) the landing sequence because of insufficient separation. The ground controller mistakenly believed that (it was the Delta B738 which) was being taken out of the landing sequence and authorised (the CRJ100) to cross runway 22 without coordinating with the TWR local controller as required.”
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Further Reading
