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FAIRCHILD DORNIER 328

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D328
Aircraft
Name 328
Manufacturer FAIRCHILD DORNIER
Body Narrow
Wing Fixed Wing
Position High wing
Tail T-tail
WTC Medium
APC B
Type code L2T
Engine Turboprop
Engine count Multi
Position (Front) Wing leading mounted
Landing gear Tricycle retractable
Mass group 3


Manufacturered as:

DORNIER 328
FAIRCHILD DORNIER 328


FAIRCHILD DORNIER 328

FAIRCHILD DORNIER 328

Description

High speed, short range commuter airliner. In service since 1993. Turboprop regional airliner development in the 30 seat class. DORNIER 328 variants:

  • 328-100 initial standard production,
  • The 328-110 is heavier with greater range,
  • The 328-120/130 has an improved short field performance and the
  • 323-200 has an increased airspeed.
  • Jet powered derivative 328JET.

Technical Data

Wing span 20.98 m68.832 ft
Length 21.11 m69.259 ft
Height 7.24 m23.753 ft
Powerplant 2 x 1.815 SHP or 2 x 2.180 SHP take-off rated for short field P&W PW119A turboprops with 6 blade propellers.
Engine model Pratt & Whitney Canada PW100

Performance Data

Take-Off Initial Climb
(to 5000 ft)
Initial Climb
(to FL150)
Initial Climb
(to FL240)
MACH Climb Cruise Initial Descent
(to FL240)
Descent
(to FL100)
Descent (FL100
& below)
Approach
V2 (IAS) 110 kts IAS 140 kts IAS 220 kts IAS 220 kts MACH TAS 310 kts MACH IAS 280 kts IAS kts Vapp (IAS) 110 kts
Distance 1000 m ROC 2000 ft/min ROC 1500 ft/min ROC 1000 ft/min ROC ft/min MACH 0.54 ROD 1000 ft/min ROD 1500 ft/min MCS 160 kts Distance 1200 m
MTOW 1399013,990 kg
13.99 tonnes
kg
Ceiling FL310 ROD ft/min APC B
WTC M Range 10001,000 nm
1,852,000 m
1,852 km
6,076,115.49 ft
NM

Accidents & Serious Incidents involving D328

  • D328 / R44, Bern Switzerland, 2012 (On 2 June 2012, a Dornier 328 and a commercially-operated Robinson R44 helicopter came into close proximity within the airport perimeter whilst both were departing from Bern in VMC as cleared. The Investigation attributed the conflict to inappropriate issue of clearances by the controller in a context of an absence of both a defined final approach and take off area and fixed departure routes to the three designated departure points.)
  • D328 / SB20, London City UK, 1999 (On 15 April 1999, a Dornier 328 crossed the holding point while a Saab 2000 was decelerating after landing on the same runway and the separation between the two aircraft was reduced to 10 meters as the landing aircraft passed. The runway incursion was subsequently attributed to distraction.)
  • D328, Isle of Man, 2005 (On 28 November 2005, a Dornier 328 departing from Isle of Man was unable to rotate at the speed calculated as applicable but the crew were able to complete a successful rejected take off. The Investigation found that the crew had failed to use the increased tale off speeds which were required for the aircraft type involved after the aircraft had been de/anti iced prior to taxiing for takeoff.)
  • D328, Mannheim Germany, 2008 (On 19 March 2008, a Cirrus AL Dornier 328 overran runway 27 at Mannheim after a late touchdown, change of controlling pilot in the flare and continued failure to control the aircraft so as to safely complete a landing. The Investigation attributed the late touchdown and subsequent overrun to an initial failure to reject the landing when the TDZ was overflown and the subsequent failure to control the engines properly. The extent of damage to the aircraft was attributed to the inadequate RESA and extensive contextual safety deficiencies were identified in respect of both the aircraft and airport operators.)
  • D328, Norwich UK, 2012 (On 22 March 2012, a Scot Airways Dornier 328 left the side of the runway shortly after touchdown following an unstable visual sequel to a non precision approach at Norwich and then carried out a go around without further event. The aircraft was undamaged by the excursion but a runway edge light was broken. The subsequent Investigation noted the gross violation of Operator SOPs in respect of the way the initial approach had been conducted, the absence of necessary crew procedures following a serious incident and the absence of any OFDM programme.)
  • D328, Sumburgh Shetland Islands UK, 2017 (On 26 January 2017, an EASA Test Pilot carrying out certification test flying to extend the Dornier 328's maximum demonstrated crosswind was unable to retain control during an intended full stop landing on runway 09 at Sumburgh and it departed the side of the runway onto soft ground and stopped abruptly. The Investigation noted the Test Pilot's total type experience was the three circuits immediately prior to the excursion and attributed it to inappropriate flight control inputs and power lever movements. Intervention on the power levers by the aircraft commander had not been enough to prevent the excursion.)
  • D328, Sumburgh UK, 2006 (On 11 June 2006, a Dornier 328 operated by City Star Airlines whilst positioning in marginal visibility for a day approach at Sumburgh, Shetland Isles UK, and having incorrectly responded to TAWS Class A warnings/alerts by not gaining safe altitude, came to close proximity with terrain . The approach was continued and a safe landing was made at the airport.)
  • D328, vicinity Manchester UK, 2006 (On 18 January 2006, a Dornier 328 on descent into Manchester UK, avoided CFIT only by response to EGPWS following failure to capture the ILS Glideslope and a high rate of descent in IMC.)
  • E190 / D328, Basel Mulhouse France, 2016 (On 7 March 2016, an Embraer 190 entered the departure runway at an intersection contrary to an ATC instruction to remain clear after neither a trainee controller nor their supervisor noticed the completely incorrect readback. An aircraft taking off in the opposite direction was able to rotate and fly over it before either controller noticed the conflict. The Investigation was told that the crew of the incursion aircraft had only looked towards the left before lining up and concluded that the event had highlighted the weakness of safety barriers based solely on the communications and vigilance of pilots and controllers.)