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Atlanta/Hartsfield-Jackson International

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Name Atlanta/Hartsfield-Jackson International
Region North America
Territory United States US.gif
Location Atlanta, Georgia
Serving Atlanta
Elevation 312.725 m
1,026 ft
1,026 ft312.725 m
Coordinates 33° 38' 25.16" N, 84° 25' 37.97" W
Designator Length Width Surface ROPS
08L/26R 2743 m8,999.344 ft
46 m150.919 ft
CON yes/yes
08R/26L 3048 m10,000 ft
46 m150.919 ft
CON yes/yes
09L/27R 3624 m11,889.764 ft
46 m150.919 ft
CON yes/yes
09R/27L 2744 m9,002.625 ft
46 m150.919 ft
CON yes/yes
10/28 2743 m8,999.344 ft
46 m150.919 ft
CON yes/yes

Observation KATL 180252Z VRB03KT 10SM BKN070 21/20 A2983 RMK AO2 SLP093 60000 T02110200 50009
Station Atlanta, Hartsfield - Jackson Atlanta International Airport
Date/Time 18 September 2020 02:52:00
Wind direction °
Wind speed 03 kts
Lowest cloud amount broken clouds
Temperature 21.1°C
Dew point 20°C
Humidity 93%
Weather condition n/a

Tag(s) Parallel Runway Operation
Tag(s) Cumulonimbus
Tropical Revolving Storm

Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport



International airport serving Atlanta, Georgia.


Humid “subtropical” climate (Köppen climate classification Cfa) - characterized by hot, humid summers and cool winters. Significant amounts of precipitation occur in all seasons in most areas. Winter rainfall (and sometimes snowfall) is associated with large storms that the westerlies steer from west to east. Most summer rainfall occurs during thunderstorms and occasional tropical storms (hurricanes).



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Airport Layout

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Accidents & Serious Incidents at or in vicinity of KATL

  • B722 / BE10, Atlanta GA USA, 1990 (On 18 January 1990, a Boeing 727-200 landing at Atlanta at night and in good visibility in accordance with an unconditional clearance failed to see that a Beechcraft King Air, which had landed ahead of it, had yet to clear the runway. The 727 was unable to avoid a collision after a late sighting. The 727 sustained substantial damage and the King Air was destroyed. The Investigation attributed the collision to a combination of the failure of the runway controller to detect the lack of separation resulting from their issue of multiple landing clearances and the inadequacy of relevant ATC procedures.)
  • B752, vicinity Atlanta GA USA, 2011 (On 11 March 2011, a Delta AL Boeing 757 departed Atlanta GA with no secondary radar indication visible to ATC and also failed to make contact with departure radar after accepting the frequency transfer instruction. During the eight minutes out of radio contact, it successively lost separation against two light aircraft and another passenger aircraft as it followed the cleared RNAV departure routing for eight minutes until the crew queried further climb on the TWR frequency and were invited to select their transponder on and contact the correct frequency.)
  • B763, Atlanta GA, USA 2009 (On 19 October 2009, a Boeing 767-300 being operated by Delta Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight from Rio de Janeiro to Atlanta inadvertently made a landing at destination in night VMC on parallel taxiway ‘M’ instead of the intended and ATC-cleared landing runway 27R. None of the 194 occupants were injured and there was no damage to the aircraft or conflict with other traffic or vehicles. The third rostered crew member had become incapacitated en route with the consequence that neither of the other pilots had been able to take any in flight rest.)
  • E75S, vicinity Atlanta GA USA, 2016 (On 6 November 2019, the crew of an Embraer E175LR which had just taken off from Atlanta experienced difficulty in maintaining pitch control after an apparent pitch trim runaway and an emergency was declared. Control was subsequently regained and a return to land was made without further problems. The Investigation is continuing but has identified the root cause as wiring damage arising from incorrect installation, noted that potentially related corrective action was not mandated and determined that the operator’s QRH drill for the situation encountered had significantly contained only one memory action rather the two in the aircraft manufacturer’s version.)