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Multi-language ATC Operations
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|Category:||Air Ground Communication|
The default language of international aviation worldwide is English, although local languages are used concurrently for RTF communications, even in busy and complex operational environments. Sometimes this practice is ‘justified’ on a local level by the reasoning that it avoids possible misunderstandings when addressing local specifics and facilitates the speed of the communication process with the native flight crews. However, controllers using both English for communication with international flights and the country’s native language for communication with the local crews potentially prevent both crews from achieving the desired level of situational awareness with respect of the other traffic.
In the context of the operational environment, the use of the English standard phraseology reduces the risk that a message will be misunderstood.
Use of Standard Aviation English phraseology is a major contribution to the reduction of ambiguity in aircraft/ATC communications and supports a common understanding among speakers of both:
- Different native languages and
- The same native language, but who use, pronounce or understand words differently.
English standard phraseology should be used in all communications (transmissions and receptions). When used properly, the information and instructions transmitted are of vital importance in assisting in the safe and expeditious operation of aircraft. However native language is still used locally, exceptionally for particular information or to describe unusual situations, or in case of an emergency. Incidents and accidents have occurred in which a contributing factor has been the poor situational awareness caused by the use of different languages on a single ATC frequency.
This subject was raised at the 40th Session of the Safety Regulation Commission (SRC) by the UK SRC representative, introducing a Working Paper SRC40.09 on the “Use of more than one language at airports in EUROCONTROL Member States” with the aim of drawing attention to this significant aviation safety issue and to seek support for the launch of an SRC-led initiative to standardise language use at major international airports within EUROCONTROL Member States. At SRC41 an update on the results of the consultation on the subject was provided. SRC tasked a coordination group to continue discussions on the issue of the use of more than one language at airports in EUROCONTROL Member States.
As result, the following Recommendation was presented to the members of the provisional council (4-5 December 2012): States to progress their considerations regarding extending the use of English at airports and relevant surrounding airspace sectors with international traffic of more than 50.000 commercial IFR movements a year, with a view to improving safety in this field.
Accidents and Incidents involving use of different languages
The following events include "Multiple Language use on Frequency" as a contributory factor:
- A343, Bogotá Colombia, 2017 (2) (On 19 August 2017, an Airbus A340-300 encountered significant unforecast windshear on rotation for a maximum weight rated-thrust night takeoff from Bogotá and was unable to begin its climb for a further 800 metres during which angle of attack flight envelope protection was briefly activated. The Investigation noted the absence of a windshear detection system and any data on the prevalence of windshear at the airport as well as the failure of ATC to relay in English reports of conditions from departing aircraft received in Spanish. The aircraft operator subsequently elected to restrict maximum permitted takeoff weights from the airport.)
- A320 / B738, en-route, near Córdoba Spain, 2014 (On 30 October 2014, a descending Airbus A320 came close to a Boeing 737-800 at around FL 220 after the A320 crew significantly exceeded a previously-instructed 2,000 fpm maximum rate of descent assuming it no longer applied when not reiterated during re-clearance to a lower altitude. Their response to a TCAS RA requiring descent at not above 1,000 fpm was to further increase it from 3,200 fpm. Lack of notification delayed the start of an independent Investigation but it eventually found that although the A320 TCAS equipment had been serviceable, its crew denied failing to correctly follow their initial RA.)
- SH33 / MD83, Paris CDG France, 2000 (On the 25th of May, 2000 a UK-operated Shorts SD330 waiting for take-off at Paris CDG in normal visibility at night on a taxiway angled in the take-off direction due to its primary function as an exit for opposite direction landings was given a conditional line up clearance by a controller who had erroneously assumed without checking that it was at the runway threshold. After an aircraft which had just landed had passed, the SD330 began to line up unaware that an MD83 had just been cleared in French to take off from the full length and a collision occurred.)
- B738, Alicante Spain, 2018 (On 7 June 2018, a Boeing 737-800 operated by a non-Spanish speaking crew was given takeoff clearance at Alicante after the same supervised student controller had previously cleared two vehicles to begin a full-length opposite-direction runway inspection in Spanish. The controller error was only recognised when the vehicles were able to transmit that they were still on the runway, the aircraft crew being unaware of the conflict until then was told to reject the takeoff. The maximum speed reached by the aircraft was 88 knots and minimum separation between the aircraft and the closest vehicle was never less than 1000 metres.)
- GLEX/F2TH, vicinity Ibiza Spain, 2012 (On 21 September 2012, two aircraft came into conflict in Class 'A' airspace whilst under radar control at night and loss of separation was resolved by TCAS RA responses by both aircraft. Investigation found that one of the aircraft had passed a procedurally-documented clearance limit without ATC clearance or intervention and that situational awareness of its crew had been diminished by communications with the conflicting aircraft being conducted in Spanish rather than English. A Safety Recommendation on resolving the "persistent problem" of such language issues was made, noting that a similar recommendation had been made 11 years earlier.)
- ^ (SRC) undertakes EUROCONTROL's work in the field of ATM safety regulation across the whole ECAC area and is composed of senior executives from within organisations responsible for ATM safety regulation at national level. SRC is responsible for the development and uniform implementation of harmonised safety regulatory objectives and requirements for the European Air Traffic Management (ATM) and ensuring their effectiveness through measurement of safety performance.
- CAP 413 Radiotelephony Manual, UK CAA, 23rd edition, effective 17 August 2020