Wrong Runway Use
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- 1 Description
- 2 Two Fundamentals
- 3 Some Specific Risk Factors
- 3.1 Night
- 3.2 Low Visibility Operations
- 3.3 Lack of precision in RTF communications
- 3.4 Intersection Departures
- 3.5 Work in progress
- 3.6 Parallel Taxiway Use
- 3.7 Late issue or amendment of departure clearances (take off only)
- 3.8 Delayed flights (take off only)
- 3.9 Use of Runways as taxi routes (take off only)
- 3.10 Short Taxi Distances between Terminal and Runway (take off only)
- 4 A Focus for Safe Operations
- 5 Related articles
- 6 Further Reading
This review is designed to aid awareness of those factors which appear to have historically been conducive to aircraft taking off from, or landing on, the wrong runway so that Aircraft Operators, Airport Authorities and ANSPs, as well as individual flight crew and air traffic controllers, can consider their defences against this risk.
- Flight Crew and ATC Procedures: Loss of Situational Awareness, specifically positional awareness, sometimes but not always aided by complacency, is the most common reason for wrong runway use. Whilst there is currently considerable focus on technical safety nets, a high level of overall procedural rigour and safety culture in both ATS Units and Aircraft Operators provides the tactical foundation for risk mitigation.
- Airport Design: It is important to recognise that some airports are designed in such a way that the possibility of incorrect use of runways is heightened by identifiable ‘opportunities for error’. Whilst isolated wrong runway accidents and serious incidents can occur anywhere, many have occurred at a relatively small number of airports. Anchorage Airport, Alaska USA recorded 3 events of this type between 2002 and 2005. Minor changes to the design, signage or to traffic movement procedures at such airports have been shown to significantly reduce the risk of recurrence. Equally, the proactive identification of relatively high-risk airports, by both aircraft operators and ATS authorities, can aid both take actions to mitigate risk. Such actions include alerting flight crew and controllers at high risk airports. A recent study carried out in the USA showed that the whilst many airports recording above average rates of wrong runway use were busy ones with complex designs, neither factor was a requirement for occurrences. The ‘top four’ airports identified for US Part 121 carrier events in this study (see Further Reading below) were Cleveland, Houston, Salt Lake City and Miami, which are by no means the busiest or most complex US Airports.
Some Specific Risk Factors
Whilst some accidents and serious incidents have had a predominant circumstantial aspect, the most serious accidents have often involved multiple contributory causes. The fatal accident to a Bombardier CRJ1 at Lexington KT in 2006 was an example of this.
The final opportunity to prevent a wrong runway event is often a positive check by the flight crew of aircraft orientation by reference to the aircraft compass versus the designation of the runway about to be used. However, a significant minority of events involve use of runways or taxiways closely parallel to those cleared for use by ATC.
In the list of circumstantial factors below, some examples which were directly related to them (although not necessarily exclusively) are given where a published official report is available. Some examples are listed under more than one factor.
Statistics tend to show that more errors of this type occur during the hours of darkness. A review of both night RTF procedures and of the installation of use of lighting systems can reduce the risk of runway misuse
None on SKYbrary
Low Visibility Operations
The special procedures which ATS Units apply during low visibility conditions (Low Visibility Procedures (LVP)) and which must be in place for operators to be able to conduct approaches to a DH below that applicable to ILS Cat 1, already bring increased safety margins, but in the case of airports which are identified as of special complexity in relation to this risk (permanently or temporarily due to work in progress), a specific review of risk management by both aircraft operators and ATS Units is likely to be useful.
Lack of precision in RTF communications
Very high standards of situational awareness for both ATC and Flight crew and the corresponding use of appropriate and specific RTF clearances which are closely monitored for correct read back by ATC are essential.
A single runway, especially a long one, where intersection departures are used has sometimes led to flight crew turning onto the runway in the wrong direction and taking off in the reciprocal to the cleared direction.
Work in progress
A lack of flight crew awareness of closed runways or taxiways has sometimes contributed to wrong runway use as has airport authority failure to carry out prior risk assessment of intended work and implement measures which maintain normal safety standards.
- A343, Rio de Janeiro Galeão Brazil, 2011 (On 8 December 2011, an Airbus A340-300 did not become airborne until it had passed the end of the takeoff runway at Rio de Janeiro Galeão, which was reduced in length due to maintenance. The crew were unaware of this fact nor the consequent approach lighting, ILS antennae and aircraft damage, and completed their intercontinental flight. The Investigation found that the crew had failed to use the full available runway length despite relevant ATIS and NOTAM information and that even using rated thrust from where they began their takeoff, they would not have become airborne before the end of the runway.)
- B773, Auckland Airport New Zealand, 2007 (On 22 March 2007, an Emirates Boeing 777-300ER, started its take-off on runway 05 Right at Auckland International Airport bound for Sydney. The pilots misunderstood that the runway length had been reduced during a period of runway works and started their take-off with less engine thrust and flap than were required. During the take-off they saw work vehicles in the distance on the runway and, realising something was amiss, immediately applied full engine thrust and got airborne within the available runway length and cleared the work vehicles by about 28 metres.)
- A343, Bogota Colombia, 2017 (On 11 March 2017, contrary to crew expectations based on their pre-flight takeoff performance calculation, an Airbus 340-300 taking off from the 3,800 metre-long at Bogata only became airborne just before the end of the runway. The Investigation found that the immediate reason for this was the inadequate rate of rotation achieved by the Training Captain performing the takeoff. However, it was also found that the operator’s average A340-300 rotation rate was less than would be achieved using handling recommendations which themselves would not achieve the expected performance produced by the Airbus takeoff performance software that reflected type certification findings.)
- A345, Melbourne Australia, 2009 (On 20 March 2009 an Airbus A340-500, operated by Emirates, commenced a take-off roll for a normal reduced-thrust take-off on runway 16 at Melbourne Airport. The attempt to get the aircraft airborne resulted in a tail strike and an overrun because insufficient thrust had been set based upon an incorrect flight crew data entry.)
- FA20, Durham Tees Valley UK, 2012 (On 9 August 2012, a serviceable Cobham Leasing Fan Jet Falcon overran the 2291 metre long runway at Durham Tees Valley after beginning rejecting take off from above V1 because of a suspected bird strike. The crew believed there was a possibility of airframe damage from a single medium sized bird sighted ahead which might have been hit by the main landing gear. It was found that the overrun distance had been increased by low friction on the stopway and noted that the regulatory exemption issued for operation without FDR and CVR was no longer appropriate.)
Parallel Taxiway Use
Absence of positional awareness on the part of a complete flight crew has led to both take off and landing on parallel taxiways
Late issue or amendment of departure clearances (take off only)
The requirements for flight crew briefing or re-briefing and the requirements for Flight Management System navigation set up both mean that late changes to the initial departure expectation (to the runway and/or the post take off routing) offered by ATC in a well-meaning attempt to expedite a take off time or departure routing may lead to errors including wrong runway use. The unexpected addition to flight crew workload can be sufficient to cause standards of completion to drop and/or aircraft ground navigation to be temporarily neglected as both flight crew work ‘heads down’.
Delayed flights (take off only)
Late flight departure and a self-imposed pressure to get airborne as soon as possible has sometimes led to either active or passive loss of positional awareness en route to the runway. Investigations into many near-miss events and some actual incidents include the finding that flight crew were rushing to complete their checklists because of a desire to recover lost time by taking every opportunity to be ready for an opportunity for a quick take off.
Use of Runways as taxi routes (take off only)
When cleared to taxi to a departure runway via another runway, flight crew have sometimes departed from that taxiway instead of turning onto the correct runway, when their take off clearance has been given whilst taxiing on that other runway.
Short Taxi Distances between Terminal and Runway (take off only)
The likelihood of errors in following an ATC ground clearance can be increased when gate to runway distances are relatively short because required flight crew checks must be completed in less time with relatively more heads-down and a consequently greater opportunity for loss of situational awareness.
A Focus for Safe Operations
One of the most effective non technical ways of raising awareness of risks and finding mitigations has been shown to be the introduction of the Local Runway Safety Teams (LRST) (called Runway Safety Action Teams in the USA) which brings together the ANSP and Operators at individual airports.
- Incorrect Airport Surface Approaches and Landings, SIB No. 2018-06, Feb 2018
- ‘Wrong Runway Departures’ FAA Study 2007
- SAFO 17010: Incorrect Airport Surface Approaches and Landings, 2017
Flight Safety Foundation