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On 16 January 2013, an Augusta 109E helicopter positioning by day on an implied (due to adverse weather conditions) SVFR clearance collided with a crane attached to a tall building under construction. It and associated debris fell to street level and the pilot and a pedestrian were killed and several others on the ground injured. It was concluded that the pilot had not seen the crane or seen it too late to avoid whilst flying by visual reference in conditions which had become increasingly challenging. The Investigation recommended improvements in the regulatory context in which the accident had occurred.  +
On 20 April 2010, the left wing of an Antonov Design Bureau An124-100 which was taxiing in to park after a night landing at Zaragoza under marshalling guidance was in collision with two successive lighting towers on the apron. Both towers and the left wingtip of the aircraft were damaged. The subsequent investigation attributed the collision to allocation of an unsuitable stand and lack of appropriate guidance markings.  +
On 5 June 2014, an AW139 about to depart from its Ottawa home base on a positioning flight exceeded its clearance limit and began to hover taxi towards the main runway as an A300 was about to touch down on it. The TWR controller immediately instructed the helicopter to stop which it did, just clear of the runway. The A300 reached taxi speed just prior to the intersection. The Investigation attributed the error to a combination of distraction and expectancy and noted that the AW139 pilot had not checked actual or imminent runway occupancy prior to passing his clearance limit.  +
On 3 July 2010, an AW139 helicopter was climbing through 350 feet over Victoria Harbour Hong Kong just after takeoff when the tail rotor detached. A transition to autorotation was accomplished and a controlled ditching followed. All occupants were rescued but some sustained minor injuries. The failure was attributed entirely to manufacturing defects but no corrective manufacturer or regulatory action was taken until two similar accidents had occurred in Qatar (non-fatal) and Brazil (fatal) the following year and two interim Safety Recommendations were issued from this Investigation after which a comprehensive review of the manufacturing process led to numerous changes.  +
On 10 August 2014, one of the engines of an Antonov 140-100 departing Tehran Mehrabad ran down after V1 and prior to rotation. The takeoff was continued but the crew were unable to keep control and the aircraft stalled and crashed into terrain near the airport. The Investigation found that a faulty engine control unit had temporarily malfunctioned and that having taken off with an inappropriate flap setting, the crew had attempted an initial climb with a heavy aircraft without the failed engine propeller initially being feathered, with the gear remaining down and with the airspeed below V2.  +
On 27 October 2018, a single pilot Augusta Westland AW169 lifted off from within the Leicester City Football Club Stadium, but after a failure of the tail rotor control system, a loss of yaw control occurred a few hundred feet above ground. The helicopter began to descend with a high rotation rate and soon afterward impacted the ground and almost immediately caught fire, which prevented those onboard surviving. An Investigation is being conducted by the UK AAIB.  +
On 5 April 1996 a significant loss of separation occurred when a B744, taking off from runway 27R at London Heathrow came into conflict to the west of Heathrow Airport with an A306 which had carried out a missed approach from the parallel runway 27L. Both aircraft were following ATC instructions. Both aircraft received and correctly followed TCAS RAs, the B744 to descend and the A306 to adjust vertical speed, which were received at the same time as corrective ATC clearances.  +
On 10 January 2011, an Air Atlanta Icelandic Airbus A300-600 on a scheduled cargo flight made a bounced touchdown at East Midlands and then attempted a go around involving retraction of the thrust reversers after selection out and before they had fully deployed. This prevented one engine from spooling up and, after a tail strike during rotation, the single engine go around was conducted with considerable difficulty at a climb rate only acceptable because of a lack of terrain challenges along the climb out track.  +
On 30 July 1997, an Airbus A300-600 being operated by Emirates Airline was departing on a scheduled passenger flight from Paris Charles de Gaulle in daylight when, as the aircraft was accelerating at 40 kts during the take off roll, it pitched up and its tail touched the ground violently. The crew abandoned the takeoff and returned to the parking area. The tail of the aircraft was damaged due to the impact with the runway when the plane pitched up.  +
On 16 January 2010, an Iran Air Airbus A300-600 veered off the left side of the runway after a left engine failure at low speed whilst taking off at Stockholm. The directional control difficulty was attributed partly to the lack of differential braking but also disclosed wider issues about directional control following sudden asymmetry at low speeds. The Investigation concluded that deficiencies in the type certification process had contributed to the loss of directional control. It was concluded that the engine malfunction was due to the initiation of an engine stall by damage caused by debris from a deficient repair.  +
On 17 May 2015, an Airbus A300-600 crew descended their aircraft below the correct vertical profile on a visual daytime approach at Yerevan and then landed on a closed section of the runway near the displaced runway threshold. The Investigation found that the crew had failed to review relevant AIS information prior to departing from Tehran and had not been expecting anything but a normal approach and landing. The performance of the Dispatcher in respect of briefing and the First Officer in respect of failure to adequately monitor the Captain's flawed conduct of the approach was highlighted.  +
On 14 August 2013, a UPS Airbus A300-600 crashed short of the runway at Birmingham Alabama on a night IMC non-precision approach after the crew failed to go around at 1000ft aal when unstabilised and then continued descent below MDA until terrain impact. The Investigation attributed the accident to the individually poor performance of both pilots, to performance deficiencies previously-exhibited in recurrent training by the Captain and to the First Officer's failure to call in fatigued and unfit to fly after mis-managing her off duty time. A Video was produced by NTSB to further highlight human factors aspects.  +
On 12 January 2011, an Airbus A300-600 being operated by Monarch Airlines on a passenger flight from London Gatwick to Chania, Greece experienced activations of the stall protection system after an unintended configuration change shortly after take off but following recovery, the flight continued as intended without further event. There were no abrupt manoeuvres and no injuries to the 347 occupants.  +
On 26 April 1994, the crew of an Airbus A300-600 lost control of their aircraft on final approach to Nagoya and the aircraft crashed within the airport perimeter. The Investigation found that an inadvertent mode selection error had triggered control difficulties which had been ultimately founded on an apparent lack understanding by both pilots of the full nature of the interaction between the systems controlling thrust and pitch on the aircraft type which were not typical of most other contemporary types. It was also concluded that the Captain's delay in taking control from the First Officer had exacerbated the situation.  +
On 12 November 2001, an Airbus A300-600 encountered mild wake turbulence as it climbed after departing New York JFK to which the First Officer responded with a series of unnecessary and excessive control inputs involving cyclic full-deflection rudder pedal inputs. Within less than 7 seconds, these caused detachment of the vertical stabiliser from the aircraft resulting in loss of control and ground impact with a post crash fire. The Investigation concluded that elements of the company pilot training process and the design of the A300-600 rudder system had contributed to this excessive use of the rudder and its consequences.  +
On 16 November 2012, an Air Contractors Airbus A300 departed the left the side of the landing runway at Bratislava after an abnormal response to directional control inputs. Investigation found that incorrect and undetected re-assembly of the nose gear torque links had led to the excursion and that absence of clear instructions in maintenance manuals, since rectified, had facilitated this. It was also considered that the absence of any regulation requiring equipment in the vicinity of the runway to be designed to minimise potential damage to aircraft departing the paved surface had contributed to the damage caused by the accident.  +
On 27 June 2000 an Airbus A300-600 being operated by American Airlines on a scheduled passenger service from London Heathrow to New York JFK was being flown manually in the day VMC climb and approaching FL220 when a loud bang was heard and there was a simultaneous abrupt disturbance to the flight path. The event appeared to the flight crew to have been a disturbance in yaw with no obvious concurrent lateral motion. Although following the disturbance, the aircraft appeared to behave normally, the aircraft commander decided to return to London Heathrow rather than commence a transatlantic flight following what was suspected to have been an un-commanded flight control input. An uneventful return was made followed by an overweight landing 50 minutes after take off.  +
On 21 February 2001, a level bust 10 nm north of Oslo Airport by a climbing PIA A310 led to loss of separation with an SAS B736 in which response to a TCAS RA by the A310 not being in accordance with its likely activation (descend). The B736 received and correctly actioned a Climb RA.  +
On 16 May 2018, an Airbus A310 and a Cessna 421 being positioned for ILS approaches to adjacent parallel runways at Montréal by different controllers lost separation. One controller incorrectly believed that he had transferred control of the Cessna to the other when the shift supervisor re-opened a sector which had been temporarily combined with his. The Investigation attributed the conflict to multiple deviations from standard procedures, memory lapses relating to controller information exchange of information and a loss of full situational awareness compounded by the shift supervisor also acting as an instructor whilst being distracted by his other duties.  +
On 8 July 2006, S7 Airlines A310 overran the runway on landing at Irkutsk at high speed and was destroyed after the Captain mismanaged the thrust levers whilst attempting to apply reverse only on one engine because the flight was being conducted with one reverser inoperative. The Investigation noted that the aircraft had been despatched on the accident flight with the left engine thrust reverser de-activated as permitted under the MEL but also that the previous two flights had been carried out with a deactivated right engine thrust reverser.  +
On 10 June 2008, a Sudan Airways Airbus A310 made a late night touchdown at Khartoum and the actions of the experienced crew were subsequently unable to stop the aircraft, which was in service with one thrust reverser inoperative and locked out, on the wet runway. The aircraft stopped essentially intact some 215 metres beyond the runway end after overrunning on smooth ground but a fuel-fed fire then took hold which impeded evacuation and eventually destroyed the aircraft.  +
On 2 March 2013, the crew of an Airbus A310 mishandled a night tailwind touchdown at Ponta Delgada after a stabilised ILS approach had been flown and, after an initial bounce, the pitch was increased significantly and the main landing gear was fully compressed during the subsequent touchdown resulting in a tail strike and substantial related structural damage. The mishandling was attributed to deviation from the recommended 'light bounce' recovery technique. The absence of an instrument approach to the reciprocal (into wind) direction of the runway was noted and a recommendation that an RNAV procedure be made available was made.  +
On 12 July 2000, a Hapag Lloyd Airbus A310 was unable to retract the landing gear normally after take off from Chania for Hannover. The flight was continued towards the intended destination but the selection of an en route diversion due to higher fuel burn was misjudged and useable fuel was completely exhausted just prior to an intended landing at Vienna. The aeroplane sustained significant damage as it touched down unpowered inside the aerodrome perimeter but there were no injuries to the occupants and only minor injuries to a small number of them during the subsequent emergency evacuation.  +
On 6 March 2005, an Airbus A310-300 being operated by Canadian airline Air Transat on a passenger charter flight from Varadero Cuba to Quebec City was in the cruise in daylight VMC at FL350 seventeen minutes after departure and overhead the Florida Keys when the flight crew heard a loud bang and felt some vibration. The aircraft entered a Dutch roll which was eventually controlled in manual flight after a height excursion. During descent for a possible en route diversion, the intensity of the Dutch Roll lessened and then stopped and the crew decided to return to Varadero. It was found during landing there that rudder control inputs were not effective and after taxi in and shutdown at the designated parking position, it was discovered that the aircraft rudder was missing. One of the cabin crew sustained a minor back injury during the event but no others from the 271 occupants were injured.  +
On 30 January 2000, an Airbus 310 took off from Abidjan (Ivory Coast) at night bound for Lagos, Nigeria then Nairobi, Kenya. Thirty-three seconds after take-off, the airplane crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, 1.5 nautical miles south of the runway at Abidjan Airport. 169 persons died and 10 were injured in the accident.  +
On 24 November 2006, an A310 descended significantly below cleared altitude during a radar vectored approach positioning, as a result of the flight crew's failure to set the QNH, which was unusually low.  +
On 29 June 2009, an Airbus A310-300 making a dark-night visual circling approach to Moroni crashed into the sea and was destroyed. The Investigation found that the final impact had occurred with the aircraft stalled and in the absence of appropriate prior recovery actions and that this had been immediately preceded by two separate GWPS 'PULL UP' events. It was concluded that the attempted circling procedure had been highly unstable with the crew's inappropriate actions and inactions probably attributable to their becoming progressively overwhelmed by successive warnings and alerts caused by their poor management of the aircraft's flight path.  +
On 24 September 1994, lack of understanding of automatic flight control modes, by the crew of an Airbus A-310, led to a full stall. The aircraft was recovered and subsequently landed without further event at Paris Orly.  +
On 5 March 2008, an Air Transat A310-300 was unintentionally mishandled by the flight crew during and shortly after departure from Quebec and effective control of the aircraft was temporarily lost. Whilst it was concluded that the origin of the initial difficulties in control were a result of confusion which began on the take off roll and led to a take off at excessive speed followed by subsequent mismanagement and overload, the inappropriate steep descent that followed was attributed to the effect of somatogravic illusion in respect of aircraft attitude control in conjunction with a singular focus on airspeed.  +
On 8 June 2009, an Airbus A318-100 being operated by Air France on a scheduled passenger flight from Belgrade, Serbia to Paris CDG in day VMC came into conflict with a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Ryanair on a scheduled passenger flight from Nottingham East Midlands UK to Bergamo Italy. The conflict was resolved mainly by TCAS RA response and there were no injuries to any occupants during the avoidance manoeuvres carried out by both aircraft.  +
On 25 May 2010 an Air France Airbus A318 making an automatic landing off an ILS Cat 2 approach at Nantes experienced interference with the ILS LOC signal caused by a Boeing 737-800 which was departing from the same runway but early disconnection of the AP removed any risk of un-correctable directional control problems during the landing roll. Both aircraft were operating in accordance with their ATC clearances. Investigation attributed the conflict to the decision of TWR not to instruct the A318 to go around and because of diminished situational awareness.  +
On 6 December 2007 an Airbus A318 being operated by Air France on a scheduled passenger flight from Lyon to Amsterdam carried out missed approach from runway 18C at destination and lost separation in night VMC against a Boeing 737-900 being operated by KLM on a scheduled passenger flight from Amsterdam to London Heathrow which had just departed from runway 24. The conflict was resolved by correct responses to the respective coordinated TCAS RAs after which the A318 passed close behind the 737. There were no abrupt manoeuvres and none of the 104 and 195 occupants respectively on board were injured.  +
On 5 July 2012, an Airbus A319 entered its departure runway at Naha without clearance ahead of an A320 already cleared to land on the same runway. The A320 was sent around. The Investigation concluded that the A319 crew - three pilots including one with sole responsibility for radio communications and a commander supervising a trainee Captain occupying the left seat - had misunderstood their clearance and their incorrect readback had not been detected by the TWR controller. It was concluded that the controller's non-use of a headset had contributed to failure to detect the incorrect readback.  +
On 25 November 2014, the crew of an Airbus A320 taking off from Paris CDG and in the vicinity of V1 saw an A319 crossing the runway ahead of them and determined that the safest conflict resolution was to continue the takeoff. The A320 subsequently overflew the A319 as it passed an estimated 100 feet agl. The Investigation concluded that use of inappropriate phraseology by the TWR controller when issuing an instruction to the A319 crew had led to a breach of the intended clearance limit. It was also noted that an automated conflict alert had activated too late to intervene.  +
On 6 August 2011 an Easyjet Airbus A319 on which First Officer Line Training was in progress exceeded its cleared level during the climb after a different level to that correctly read back was set on the FMS. As a result, it came into conflict with an Alitalia A321 and this was resolved by responses to coordinated TCAS RAs. STCA alerts did not enable ATC resolution of the conflict and it was concluded that a lack of ATC capability to receive Mode S EHS DAPs - since rectified - was a contributory factor to the outcome.  +
On 27 June 2016, an Airbus A319 narrowly avoided a mid-air collision with an AS532 Cougar helicopter whose single transponder had failed earlier whilst conducting a local pre-delivery test flight whilst both were positioning visually as cleared to land at Marseille and after the helicopter had also temporarily disappeared from primary radar. Neither aircraft crew had detected the other prior to their tracks crossing at a similar altitude. The Investigation attributed the conflict to an inappropriate ATC response to the temporary loss of radar contact with the helicopter aggravated by inaccurate position reports and non-compliance with the aerodrome circuit altitude by the helicopter crew.  +
On 7 September 2012, the crew of an Air France Airbus A319 failed to follow their arrival clearance at destination and turned directly towards the ILS FAF and thereby into conflict with a Boeing 737-500 on an ILS approach. When instructed to turn left (and clear of the ILS) by the controller, the crew replied that they were "following standard arrival" which was not the case. As the separation between the two aircraft reduced, the controller repeated the instruction to the A319 to turn left and this was acknowledged. Minimum lateral separation was 1.7nm, sufficient to activate STCA.  +
On 23 November 2002, an A319, landing on Rwy16 at Zurich Switzerland, narrowly missed collision with a B737-600 cleared for take off on an intersecting runway.  +
On 26 May 2013, an A319 in Swiss Class 'C' airspace received a TCAS 'Level Off' RA against a 737 above after being inadvertently given an incorrect climb clearance by ATC. The opposing higher-altitude 737 began a coordinated RA climb from level flight and this triggered a second conflict with another 737 also in the cruise 1000 feet above which resulted in coordinated TCAS RAs for both these aircraft. Correct response to all RAs resulted in resolution of both conflicts after prescribed minimum separations had been breached to as low as 1.5nm when 675 feet apart vertically.  +
On 10 January 2008, an Air Canada Airbus A319 en route over the north western USA encountered unexpected sudden wake vortex turbulence from an in trail Boeing 747-400 nearly 11nm ahead to which the pilots who then responded with potentially hazardous flight control inputs which led to reversion to Alternate Control Law and aggravated the external /disturbance to the aircraft trajectory with roll up to 55° and an unintended descent of 1400 feet which with cabin service in progress and sea belt signs off led to cabin service carts hitting the cabin ceiling and several passenger injuries, some serious.  +
On 10 June 2011 an ATC error put a German Wings A319 and a Hahn Air Raytheon 390 on conflicting tracks over Switzerland and a co-ordinated TCAS RA followed. The aircraft subsequently passed in very close proximity without either sighting the other after the Hahn Air crew, contrary to Company procedures, followed an ATC descent clearance issued during their TCAS ‘Climb’ RA rather than continuing to fly the RA. The Investigation could find no explanation for this action by the experienced crew - both Hahn Air management pilots. The recorded CPA was 0.6 nm horizontally at 50 feet vertically.  +
On 5 February 2011, an Airbus A319-100 being operated by Air Berlin on a passenger flight departing Stockholm inadvertently proceeded beyond the given clearance limit for runway 19R and although it subsequently stopped before runway entry had occurred, it was by then closer to high speed departing traffic than it should have been. There was no abrupt stop and none of the 103 occupants were injured.  +
On 26 June 2017, an Airbus A319 which had just taken off from Stuttgart came into conflict in Class ‘D’ airspace with a VFR light aircraft crossing its track and when, at 1,200 feet agl, the TCAS RA to descend which resulted was followed, an EGPWS Mode 3 Alert was generated. Clear of Conflict was annunciated after 10 seconds and climb resumed. The Investigation concluded that the light aircraft pilot had failed to follow the clearance which had been accepted and had caused the flight path conflict which was resolved by the response of the A319 to the TCAS RA.  +
On 6 January 2011 an Easyjet Airbus A319 experienced the sudden onset of thick "smoke" in the cabin as the aircraft cleared the runway after landing. The aircraft was stopped and an evacuation was carried out during which one of the 52 occupants received a minor injury. The subsequent investigation attributed the occurrence to the continued use of reverse idle thrust after clearing the runway onto a little used taxiway where the quantity of de-ice fluid residue was much greater than on the runway.  +
On 8 August 2011 an Air France Airbus A319 crew failed to correctly identify the runway on which they were cleared to land off a visual approach at Casablanca and instead landed on the parallel runway. ATC, who had already cleared another aircraft to cross the same runway, did not notice until this other aircraft crew, who had noticed the apparently abnormal position of the approaching aircraft and remained clear of the runway as a precaution, advised what had happened. Investigation was hindered by the stated perception of the Air France PIC that the occurrence was not a Serious Incident.  +
On 21 September 2012, an SAS A319 which had just landed normally under the control of an experienced pilot left the paved surface when attempting to make a turn off the RET at a taxi speed greater than appropriate. The pilot was familiar with the airport layout and the misjudgement was attributed in part to the fact that the pilot involved had recently converted to their first Airbus type after a long period operating the DC9/MD80/90 series which had a different pilot eye height and was fitted with steel rather than the more modern carbon brakes.  +
On 3 August 2018, smoke appeared and began to intensify in the passenger cabin but not the flight deck of an Airbus A319 taxiing for departure at Helsinki. Cabin crew notified the Captain who stopped the aircraft and sanctioned an emergency evacuation. This then commenced whilst the engines were still running and inadequate instructions to passengers resulted in a completely disorderly evacuation. The Investigation attributed this to inadequate crew procedures which only envisaged an evacuation ordered by the Captain for reasons they were directly aware of and not a situation where the evacuation need was only obvious in the cabin.  +
On 19 June 2016, an Airbus A320 failed to follow the clearly-specified and ground-marked self-positioning exit from a regularly used gate at Ibiza and its right wing tip collided with the airbridge, damaging both it and the aircraft. The Investigation found that the crew had attempted the necessary left turn using the Operator’s ‘One Engine Taxi Departure’ procedure using the left engine but then failed to follow the marked taxi guideline by a significant margin. It was noted that there had been no other such difficulties with the same departure in the previous four years it had been in use.  +
On 30 January 2006 the Captain of an Airbus A319 inadvertently lined up and commenced a night rolling take off from Las Vegas on the runway shoulder instead of the runway centreline despite the existence of an illuminated lead on line to the centre of the runway from the taxiway access used. The aircraft was realigned at speed and the take off was completed. ATC were not advised and broken edge light debris presented a potential hazard to other aircraft until eventually found. The Investigation found that other similar events on the same runway had not been reported at all.  +
On 12 February 2007, an Airbus A319-100 being operated by British Airways on a scheduled passenger flight into London Heathrow made unintended contact in normal daylight visibility with the stationary airbridge at the arrival gate. This followed an emergency stop made after seeing hand signals from ground staff whilst following SEGS indications which appeared to suggest that there was a further 5 metres to run to the correct parking position. There was no damage to the aircraft, only minimal damage to the airbridge and there were no injuries to the aircraft occupants or any other person  +
On 15 March 2009, an Airbus A319-100 being operated by British Airways on a scheduled passenger flight from London Heathrow to Edinburgh experienced an electrical malfunction which blanked the EFIS displays following engine start with some electrical fumes but no smoke. The engines were shut down, a PAN was declared to ATC and the aircraft was towed back onto the gate where passengers disembarked normally via the airbridge.  +
On 24 May 2013 the fan cowl doors on both engines of an Airbus A319 detached as it took off from London Heathrow. Their un-latched status after a routine maintenance input had gone undetected. Extensive structural and system damage resulted and a fire which could not be extinguished until the aircraft was back on the ground began in one engine. Many previously-recorded cases of fan cowl door loss were noted but none involving such significant collateral damage. Safety Recommendations were made on aircraft type certification in general, A320-family aircraft modification, maintenance fatigue risk management and aircrew procedures and training.  +
On 14 February 2011, an Easyjet Airbus A319 being flown by a trainee Captain under supervision initiated a go around from below 50 feet agl after a previously stabilised approach at Luton and a very hard three point landing followed before the go around climb could be established. The investigation found that the Training Captain involved, although experienced, had only limited aircraft type experience and that, had he taken control before making a corrective sidestick input opposite to that of the trainee, it would have had the full instead of a summed effect and may have prevented hard runway contact.  +
On 10 May 2014 the crew of an Airbus A319 failed to manage their daylight non-precision approach at destination effectively and it culminated in a very hard touchdown which exceeded landing gear design criteria. The Investigation concluded that the comprehensively poor performance of both pilots during the preparation for and execution of the approach could be attributed to both their repeated failure to follow SOPs and retain adequate situational awareness and to a failure of the aircraft operator to fully deliver effective training even though both this training and its SMS met relevant regulatory requirements and guidance.  +
On 12 April 2013, an Airbus A319 landed without clearance on a runway temporarily closed for routine inspection after failing to check in with TWR following acceptance of the corresponding frequency change. Two vehicles on the runway saw the aircraft approaching on short final and successfully vacated. The Investigation concluded that the communication failure was attributable entirely to the Check Captain who was in command of the flight involved and was acting as 'Pilot Monitoring'. It was considered that the error was probably attributable to the effects of operating through the early hours during which human alertness is usually reduced.  +
On 3 July 2017, an Airbus A319 sustained significant landing gear damage during the First Officer’s manual landing at Munich which recorded a vertical acceleration exceeding the threshold for a mandatory airworthiness inspection. That inspection found damage to nose and one main landing gear legs and, following Airbus advice, all three were replaced before release to service. The Investigation was unable to explain why neither pilot detected the incorrect pitch attitude and excessive rate of descent in time to take corrective action and noted that a reversion to manual flight during intermediate approach had been due to a technical malfunction.  +
On 29 August 2019, an Airbus A319 crew used more runway than expected during a reduced thrust takeoff from Nice, although not enough to justify increasing thrust. It was subsequently found that an identical error made by both pilots when independently calculating takeoff performance data for the most limiting runway intersection had resulted in use of data for a less limiting intersection than the one eventually used. The Investigation concluded that the only guaranteed way to avoid such an error would be an automatic cross check, a system upgrade which was not possible on the particular aircraft involved.  +
On 19 July 2017, an Airbus A319 crew ignored the prescribed non-precision approach procedure for which they were cleared at Rio de Janeiro Galeão in favour of an unstabilised “dive and drive” technique in which descent was then continued for almost 200 feet below the applicable MDA and led to an EGPWS terrain proximity warning as a go around was finally commenced in IMC with a minimum recorded terrain clearance of 162 feet. The Investigation noted the comprehensive fight crew non-compliance with a series of applicable SOPs and an operational context which was conducive to this although not explicitly causal.  +
On 10 October 2016, an Airbus 319 was cleared to divert to its first alternate after failing to land off its Cat II ILS approach at Porto and obliged to land at its second alternate with less than final reserve fuel after the first alternate declined acceptance due to lack of parking capacity. The Investigation concluded that adjacent ATC Unit coordination in respect of multiple diversions was inadequate and also found that the crew had failed to adequately appraise ATC of their fuel status. It also noted that the unsuccessful approach at the intended destination had violated approach ban visibility conditions.  +
On 7 September 2008 a South African Airways Airbus A319 en route from Cape Town to Johannesburg at FL370 received an ECAM warning of the failure of the No 1 engine bleed system. The crew then closed the No. 1 engine bleed with the applicable press button on the overhead panel. The cabin altitude started to increase dramatically and the cockpit crew advised ATC of the pressurisation problem and requested an emergency descent to a lower level. During the emergency descent to 11000 ft amsl, the cabin altitude warning sounded at 33000ft and the flight crew activated the cabin oxygen masks. The APU was started and pressurisation was re-established at 15000ft amsl. The crew completed the flight to the planned destination without any further event. The crew and passengers sustained no injuries and no damage was caused to the aircraft.  +
On 15 September 2006, an Easyjet Airbus A319, despatched under MEL provision with one engine generator inoperative and the corresponding electrical power supplied by the Auxiliary Power Unit generator, suffered a further en route electrical failure which included power loss to all COM radio equipment which could not then be re-instated. The flight was completed as flight planned using the remaining flight instruments with the one remaining transponder selected to the standard emergency code. The incident began near Nantes, France.  +
On 27 May 2008 an Airbus A319-100 being operated by Germanwings on a scheduled passenger flight from Dublin to Cologne was 30nm east of Dublin and passing FL100 in the climb in unrecorded daylight flight conditions when the Purser advised the flight crew by intercom that “something was wrong”, that almost all the passengers had fallen asleep, and that at least one of the cabin crew seated nearby was “unresponsive”. Following a review of this information and a check of the ECAM pressurisation page which showed no warnings or failures, a decision was taken to don oxygen masks and the aircraft returned uneventfully to Dublin without any further adverse effects on the 125 occupants. A MAYDAY was declared during the diversion.  +
On 22 October 2005, a British Airways Airbus A319 climbing en route to destination over south east England at night in VMC experienced a major but temporary electrical failure. Most services were re-instated within a short time and the flight was continued. However, during the subsequent Investigation, which took over two years, a series of significant deficiencies were identified in the design of the A320 series electrical system and the manufacturer-recommended responses to failures in it and in response, Airbus developed solutions to most of them.  +
On 30 September 2018, an Airbus A319 Captain had to complete a flight into Glasgow on his own when the First Officer left the flight deck after suffering a flying-related anxiety attack. After declaring a ‘PAN’ to ATC advising that the aircraft was being operated by only one pilot, the flight was completed without further event. The Investigation found that the First Officer had been “frightened” after the same Captain had been obliged to take control during his attempted landing the previous day and had “felt increasingly nervous” during his first ‘Pilot Flying’ task since the event the previous day.  +
On 12 March 2014, an Airbus A319 left engine stopped without any apparent cause on approach to Paris CDG. The crew then started the APU which also stopped. The Investigation found that the cause was engine and APU fuel starvation caused by non-identification of a recurring intermittent malfunction in the fuel quantity indicating system because of a combination of factors including crew failure to record fuel status in line with clear instructions and an inadequate maintenance troubleshooting manual. An inadequately-written abnormal crew drill and the crew’s inadequate fuel system knowledge then resulted in the fuel crossfeed valve not being opened.  +
On 24 March 2012, an Air France Airbus A319 Captain continued descent towards destination Tunis at high speed with the landing runway in sight well beyond the point where a stabilised approach was possible. With 5nm to go, airspeed was over 100 KIAS above the applicable VApp and the aircraft was descending at over 4000fpm with flaps zero. EGPWS activations for Sink Rate, PULL UP and Too Low Terrain apparently went unnoticed but at 400 feet agl, ATC granted a crew request for a 360° turn. The subsequent approach/landing was without further event. Investigation attributed the event to “sloppy CRM”.  +
On 14 September 2010, the crew of a Sichuan Airlines Airbus A319 continued an ILS approach into Wuxi despite awareness of adverse convective weather conditions at the airport. Their inattention to automation management then led to a low energy warning and the inappropriate response to this led to the activation of flight envelope protection quickly followed by a stall warning. Inappropriate response to this was followed by loss of control and a full stall and high rate of descent from which recovery was finally achieved less than 900 feet agl.  +
On 17 October 2014, two recently type-qualified Airbus A319 pilots responded in a disorganised way after a sudden malfunction soon after take-off from Zurich required one engine to be shutdown. The return to land was flown manually and visually at an excessive airspeed and rate of descent with idle thrust on the remaining engine all the way to a touchdown which occurred without a landing clearance. The Investigation concluded that the poor performance of the pilots had been founded on a lack of prior analysis of the situation, poor CRM and non-compliance with system management and operational requirements.  +
On 29 June 2010, an Easyjet Switzerland Airbus A319 inbound to Basle-Mulhouse and an Air France Airbus A319 outbound from Basle-Mulhouse lost separation after an error made by a trainee APP controller under OJTI supervision during procedural service. The outcome was made worse by the excessive rate of climb of the Air France aircraft approaching its cleared level and both an inappropriate response to an initial preventive TCAS RA and a change of track during the ensuing short sequence of RAs by the Training Captain in command of and flying the Easyjet aircraft attributed by him to his situational ‘anxiety’.  +
On 8 February 2012, a TCAS RA occurred between an Airbus A330 and an Airbus A319 both under ATC control for landing on runway 25R at Barcelona as a result of an inappropriate plan to change the sequence. The opposite direction aircraft both followed their respective RAs and minimum separation was 1.4 nm horizontally and 400 feet vertically. The Investigation noted that the use of Spanish to communicate with one aircraft and English to communicate with the other had compromised situational awareness of the crew of the latter who had also not had visual contact with the other aircraft.  +
On 8 July 2010 an Easyjet Airbus A319 on which line training was being conducted mis-set a descent level despite correctly reading it back and, after subsequently failing to notice an ATC re-iteration of the same cleared level, continued descent to 1000 feet below it in day VMC and into conflict with crossing traffic at that level, a Boeing 737. The 737 received and actioned a TCAS RA ‘CLIMB’ and the A319, which received only a TCAS TA, was given an emergency turn by ATC. The recorded CPA was 2.2 nm and 125 feet.  +
On 27 May 2018, four losses of separation on final approach during use of dependent parallel landing runways occurred within 30 minutes at Madrid following a non-scheduled weather-induced runway configuration change. This continuing situation was then resolved by reverting to a single landing runway. The Investigation attributed these events to “the complex operational situation” which had prevailed following a delayed decision to change runway configuration after seven consecutive go-arounds in 10 minutes using the previous standard runway configuration. The absence of sufficient present weather information for the wider Madrid area to adequately inform ATC tactical strategy was assessed as contributory.  +
On 29 May 2012, a British Airways Airbus A320 departing Zürich and in accordance with its SID in a climbing turn received and promptly and correctly actioned a TCAS RA 'CLIMB'. The conflict which caused this was with an AW 139 also departing Zürich IFR in accordance with a SID but, as this aircraft was only equipped with a TAS to TCAS 1 standard, the crew independently determined from their TA that they should descend and did so. The conflict, in Class 'C' airspace, was attributed to inappropriate clearance issue by the TWR controller and their inappropriate separation monitoring thereafter.  +
On 15 March 2011 two Swiss International Airlines’ Airbus A320 aircraft were cleared for simultaneous take off on intersecting runways at Zurich by the same controller. As both approached the intersection at high speed, the Captain of one saw the other and immediately rejected take off from 130 knots, stopping just at the edge of the intersection shortly after the other aircraft had flown low overhead unaware of the conflict. The Investigation noted a long history of similar incidents at Zurich and concluded that systemic failure of risk management had not been addressed by the air traffic control agency involved.  +
On 25 July 2016, an Airbus A320 and an Airbus A321 both departing Barcelona and following their ATC instructions came into conflict and the collision risk was removed by the TCAS RA CLIMB response of the A320. Minimum separation was 1.2 nm laterally and 200 feet vertically with visual acquisition of the other traffic by both aircraft. The Investigation found that the controller involved had become preoccupied with an inbound traffic de-confliction task elsewhere in their sector and, after overlooking the likely effect of the different rates of climb of the aircraft, had not regarded monitoring their separation as necessary.  +
On 18 January 2012, ATC error resulted in two aircraft on procedural clearances in oceanic airspace crossing the same waypoint within an estimated 2 minutes of each other without the prescribed 1000 feet vertical separation when the prescribed minimum separation was 15 minutes unless that vertical separation existed. By the time ATC identified the loss of separation and sent a CPDLC message to the A340 to descend in order to restore separation, the crew advised that such action was already being taken. The Investigation identified various organisational deficiencies relating to the provision of procedural service by the ANSP concerned.  +
On 18 September 2017, a departing Airbus A320 was instructed to line up and wait at Yangon but not given takeoff clearance until an ATR72 was less than a minute from touchdown and the prevailing runway traffic separation standard was consequently breached. The Investigation found that the TWR controller had been a temporarily unsupervised trainee who, despite good daylight visibility, had instructed the A320 to line up and wait and then forgotten about it. When the A320 crew, aware of the approaching ATR72, reminded her, she “did not know what to do” and the trainee APP controller had to intervene.  +
On 27 May 2012, an Airbus A320 departing Barcelona was cleared by GND to taxi across an active runway on which a Boeing 737-800 was about to land. Whilst still moving but before entering the runway, the A320 crew, aware of the aircraft on approach, queried their crossing clearance but the instruction to stop was given too late to stop before crossing the unlit stop bar. The 737 was instructed to go around and there was no actual risk of collision. The Investigation attributed the controller error to lack of familiarisation with the routine runway configuration change in progress.  +
On 30 October 2014, a descending Airbus A320 came close to a Boeing 737-800 at around FL 220 after the A320 crew significantly exceeded a previously-instructed 2,000 fpm maximum rate of descent assuming it no longer applied when not reiterated during re-clearance to a lower altitude. Their response to a TCAS RA requiring descent at not above 1,000 fpm was to further increase it from 3,200 fpm. Lack of notification delayed the start of an independent Investigation but it eventually found that although the A320 TCAS equipment had been serviceable, its crew denied failing to correctly follow their initial RA.  +
On 4 June 2016, a Boeing 737-800 instructed to climb from FL340 to FL380 by the controller of one sector in Bulgarian upper airspace came into sufficiently close proximity to an Airbus A320 under the control of a different sector controller to trigger co-ordinated TCAS RAs. Separation was eventually restored after the 737 followed its RA despite the A320, which had already deviated from its clearance on the basis of a prior TCAS TA without informing ATC, ignoring their RA. The Investigation found that the root cause of the conflict had been inadequate coordination between two vertically separated ATC sectors.  +
On 6 July 2018, a Boeing 737-800 being positioned to join the intermediate approach sequence in the Barcelona CTR was obliged to take lateral avoiding action against an Airbus A320 ahead. The Investigation found that although both aircraft were in the same sector at the time, the controller had overlooked the presence of the A320 which had been transferred to the next sector before entering it prior to the controller involved routinely taking over the position. An on-screen alert to the developing conflict had not been seen by the controller. Minimum separation was 1.1nm laterally and 200 feet vertically.  +
On 30 January 2016, an Airbus A320 crew cleared for an ILS approach to runway 11 at Delhi reported established on the runway 11 LLZ but were actually on the runway 09 LLZ in error and continued on that ILS finally crossing in front of a Boeing 737-800 on the ILS for runway 10. The Investigation found that the A320 crew had not noticed they had the wrong ILS frequency set and that conflict with the 737 occurred because Approach transferred the A320 to TWR whilst a conflict alert was active and without confirming it was complying with its clearance.  +
On 22 April 2012, an Airbus A320 and a Boeing 737 came into close proximity near Dubai whilst on the same ATC frequency and correctly following their ATC clearances shortly after they had departed at night from Sharjah and Dubai respectively. The Investigation found that correct response by both aircraft to coordinated TCAS RAs eliminated any risk of collision. The fact that the controller involved had only just taken over the radar position involved and was only working the two aircraft in conflict was noted, as was the absence of STCA at the unit due to set up difficulties.  +
On 1 May 2008 an Airbus A320-200 being operated by JetStar on a scheduled passenger flight from Melbourne to Launceston, Tasmania was making a missed approach from runway 32L when it came into close proximity in night VMC with a Boeing 737-800 being operated by Virgin Blue and also inbound to Launceston from Melbourne which was manoeuvring about 5nm north west of the airport after carrying out a similar missed approach. Minimum separation was 3 nm at the same altitude and the situation was fully resolved by the A320 climbing to 4000 feet.  +
On 20 November 2013, an A320 misunderstood its taxi out clearance at Yogyakarta and began to enter the same runway on which a Boeing 737, which had a valid landing clearance but was not on TWR frequency, was about to touch down from an approach in the other direction of use. On seeing the A320, which had stopped with the nose of the aircraft protruding onto the runway, the 737 applied maximum manual braking and stopped just before reaching the A320. The Investigation faulted ATC and airport procedures as well as the A320 crew for contributing to the risk created.  +
On 7 July 2017 the crew of an Airbus A320, cleared for an approach and landing on runway 28R at San Francisco in night VMC, lined up for the visual approach for which it had been cleared on the occupied parallel taxiway instead of the runway extended centreline and only commenced a go-around at the very last minute, having descended to about 60 feet agl whilst flying over two of the four aircraft on the taxiway. The Investigation determined that the sole direct cause of the event was the poor performance of the A320 flight crew.  +
On 17 August 2012, a Swiss A320 being positioned under radar vectors for arrival at Geneva was inadvertently vectored into conflict with a Cessna Citation already established on the ILS LOC for runway 23 at Geneva. Controller training was in progress and the Instructor had just taken control because of concerns at the actions of the Trainee. An error by the Instructor was recognised and de-confliction instructions were given but a co-ordinated TCAS RA still subsequently occurred. STCA was activated but constraints on access to both visual and aural modes of the system served to diminish its value.  +
On 10 July 2014, the crew of a Bombardier CRJ200 on a visual go around from an approach to runway 26 at Port Elizabeth took visual avoiding action overhead of the aerodrome to ensure safe separation from an Airbus A320 which had just taken off. Both aircraft also received TCAS RAs. Minimum achieved separation from radar was 370 metres laterally and 263 feet vertically. The Investigation noted that the go around resulted from the TWR controller, who was supervising a student controller, clearing the A320 to enter the runway and take off when the CRJ200 was on short final to land.  +
On 13 April 2007 in day VMC, an Air France A320 departing Sofia lined up contrary to an ATC Instruction to remain at the holding point and be ready immediate. The controller did not immediately notice and after subsequently giving a landing clearance for the same runway, was obliged to cancel it send the approaching aircraft around. An Investigation attributed the incursion to both the incorrect terminology used by TWR and the failure to challenge the incomplete clearance read back by the A320 crew.  +
On 27 September 2019, an Airbus A320 and an Embraer 145 both inbound to Barcelona and being positioned for the same Transition for runway 25R lost separation and received and followed coordinated TCAS RAs after which the closest point of approach was 0.8nm laterally when 200 feet vertically apart. The Investigation found that the experienced controller involved had initially created the conflict whilst seeking to resolve another potential conflict between one of the aircraft and a third aircraft inbound for the same Transition and having identified it had then implemented a faulty recovery plan and executed it improperly.  +
On 23 February 2018, an Embraer 195LR and an Airbus A320 on SIDs departing Brussels lost separation after the 195 was given a radar heading to resolve a perceived third aircraft conflict which led to loss of separation between the two departing aircraft. STCA and coordinated TCAS RA activations followed but only one TCAS RA was followed and the estimated minimum separation was 400 feet vertically when 1.36 nm apart. The Investigation found that conflict followed an error by an OJTI-supervised trainee controller receiving extended revalidation training despite gaining his licence and having almost 10 years similar experience in Latvia.  +
On 17 August 2016, a Fokker F50 crossed an active runway at Adelaide ahead of an A320 which was about to land after both its pilots and the controller involved had made assumptions about the content of radio transmissions they were aware they had not fully heard. The Investigation found that the A320 crew had responded promptly to the potential conflict by initiating a low go around over the other aircraft and noted that stop bars were not installed at Adelaide. In addition, aircraft taxiing across active runways were not required to obtain their crossing clearances on the runway control frequency.  +
On 6 April 2015, the crew of an A320 under radar control in Class E airspace and approaching 4000 feet made a very late sighting of a glider being flown by a student pilot which appeared ahead at a similar altitude. The glider pilot reported having seen a 'cone of light' coming towards him. Both aircraft took avoiding action as practicable and passed within a recorded 450 metres with the A320 passing an estimated 250 feet over the glider. The glider was not fitted with a transponder and was not required to be, and the controller had only secondary radar.  +
On 12 February 2019, an Airbus A320 under the command of a Captain reportedly undergoing line training supervised by a Training Captain occupying the supernumerary crew seat was slow to follow ATC instructions after breaking off from an unstabilised approach at London Stansted caused by the First Officer’s mismanagement of the approach and lost separation at night as it crossed approximately 600 feet above a Saab 340B climbing after takeoff. The Investigation found that flight crew workload had been exacerbated after the Captain under supervision unnecessarily delayed taking over control and had then not done so in the prescribed way.  +
On 2 December 2016, the crew of an Airbus A320 passing 100 knots on takeoff at Calgary saw another aircraft crossing an intersection ahead but continued because they considered that, as the other aircraft was already more than half way across, it would be clear before they reached that point. The Investigation found that the GND Controller had cleared the other aircraft to cross after forgetting that the runway was active and under TWR control. It was concluded that the response of the ANSP SMS process to a history of identical controller errors and related reports had been inadequate.  +
On 3 February 2018, a runway inspection vehicle was cleared onto the active runway at London Gatwick ahead of an aircraft which had just touched down and driven towards it having been cleared to do so because the aircraft crew’s confirmation that they would clear the runway before reaching the vehicle was considered by the controller as a clearance limit. The Investigation found that the associated runway inspection procedure had not been adequately risk-assessed and noted that many issues raised by it had still not been addressed by the time it was completed eighteen months later.  +
On 27 October 2017, an Airbus A320 returned to Auckland after advice from ATC that the right engine may have been affected by ingestion of FOD during engine start - a clipboard and paper left just inside the right hand engine by an employee of the airline’s ground handling contractor acting as the aircraft loading supervisor. The subsequent inspection found paper throughout the engine and minor damage to an engine fan blade and the fan case attrition liner. The Dispatcher overseeing the departure said she had seen the clipboard inside the engine but assumed it would be retrieved before departure.  +
On 29 March 2006, an Eirjet Airbus 320 was operating a scheduled passenger flight from Liverpool to Londonderry Airport in Northern Ireland for Ryanair in daylight. At 8nm from LDY, the operating crew reported that they were having problems with the ILS glideslope on approach to Runway 26. They judged that they were too high to carry out a safe landing from the ILS approach and requested permission from ATC to carry out a visual approach. The aircraft, with the commander as PF, then flew a right hand descending orbit followed by a visual circuit from which it landed. Upon landing, the crew were advised by Londonderry ATC, who had had the aircraft in sight when it called Finals and had then cleared it to land that they had, in fact, landed at Ballykelly airfield, a military helicopter base 5nm to the east-north-east of Londonderry.  +
On 6 October 2014, an A320 crew requested, accepted and commenced an intersection takeoff at Basel using reduced thrust performance data based on the originally anticipated full length takeoff which would have given 65% more TODA. Recognition of the error and application of TOGA allowed the aircraft to get airborne just before the runway end but the Investigation found that a rejected take off from high speed would have resulted in an overrun and noted that despite changes to crew procedures after a similar event involving the same operator a year earlier, the relevant procedures were still conducive to error.  +
On 7th February 2001, an Iberia A320 was about to make a night touch down at Bilbao in light winds when it experienced unexpected windshear. The attempt to counter the effect of this by initiation of a go around failed because the automatic activation of AOA protection in accordance with design criteria which opposed the crew pitch input. The aircraft then hit the runway so hard that a go around was no longer possible. Severe airframe structural damage and evacuation injuries to some of the occupants followed. A mandatory modification to the software involved was subsequently introduced.  +
On 8 April 2015, an Airbus A320 crew lost their previously-acquired and required visual reference for the intended landing runway at Brasilia but continued descent in heavy rain and delayed beginning a go around until the aircraft was only 40 feet above the runway threshold but had not reached it. A premature touchdown prior to the runway then occurred and the aircraft travelled over 30 metres on the ground before becoming airborne again. The Investigation was unable to establish any explanation for the failure to begin a go around once sufficient visual reference was no longer available.  +
On 23 March 2019, the crew of a fully-loaded Airbus A320 about to depart Bristol detected an abnormal noise from the nose landing gear as a towbarless tug was being attached. Inspection found that the aircraft nose gear had been impact-damaged rendering the aircraft no longer airworthy and the passengers were disembarked. The Investigation noted that tug driver training had been in progress and that the tug had not been correctly aligned with the nose wheels, possibly due to a momentary lapse in concentration causing the tug being aligned with the nose leg rather than the nose wheels.  +
On 7 July 2014, an Airbus A320 landing at Brunei departed the side of the runway almost immediately after touchdown and continued to gradually diverge from the runway axis until stopping after a ground run of approximately 1,050 metres. The Investigation concluded that the aircraft commander, having taken over control from the First Officer when the latter lost their previously-acquired prescribed visual reference below Decision Altitude due to a sudden-onset intense rain shower ahead, had then continued the approach without recognising that the only lights still visible to him were those at the right hand edge of the runway.  +
On 20 June 2019, an Airbus A320 about to touchdown at night at Calicut drifted to the right once over the runway when the rain intensity suddenly increased and briefly left the runway before regaining it and completing the landing and taxi in. Runway edge lighting and the two main gear tyres were damaged. The Investigation attributed the excursion to loss of enough visual reference to maintain the centreline until touchdown followed by late recognition of the deviation and delayed response to it. The visibility reduction was considered to have created circumstances in which a go-around would have been advisable.  +
On 29 August 2011, an Airbus A320 which had up to that point made a stabilised auto ILS approach at destination deviated from the runway centreline below 200 feet aal but continued to a night touchdown which occurred on the edge of the 3400 metre runway and was followed by exit from the side onto soft ground before eventually coming to a stop adjacent to the runway about a third of the way along it. The subsequent investigation attributed the event to poor crew performance in reduced visibility  +
On 27 September 2017, an Airbus A320 being manoeuvred off the departure gate at Dublin by tug was being pulled forward when the tow bar shear pin broke and the tug driver lost control. The tug then collided with the right engine causing significant damage. The tug driver and assisting ground crew were not injured. The Investigation concluded that although the shear pin failure was not attributable to any particular cause, the relative severity of the outcome was probably increased by the wet surface, a forward slope on the ramp and fact that an engine start was in progress.  +
On 18 December 2017, an A320 crew found that only one thrust reverser deployed when the reversers were selected shortly after touchdown but were able to retain directional control. The Investigation found that the aircraft had been released to service in Adelaide with the affected engine reverser lockout pin in place. This error was found to have occurred in a context of multiple failures to follow required procedures during the line maintenance intervention involved for which no mitigating factors of any significance could be identified. A corrective action after a previous similar event at the same maintenance facility was also found not to have been fully implemented.  +
On 29 March 2015, an Airbus A320 crew mismanaged the descent during a night non-precision approach at Halifax and continued below MDA without the mandatory autopilot disconnection until, with inadequate visual reference, the aircraft impacted terrain and obstructions 225 metres short of the runway. The aircraft was destroyed but there were no fatalities. The Investigation found that the crew did not monitor their descent against the required vertical profile, as there was no SOP requiring them to do so, and did not recognise in time that a go around was appropriate.  +
On 1 March 2008 an Airbus A320 being operated by Lufthansa on a scheduled passenger flight from Munich to Hamburg experienced high and variable wind velocity on short finals in good daylight visibility and during the attempt at landing on runway 23 with a strong crosswind component from the right, a bounced contact of the left main landing gear with the runway was followed by a left wing down attitude which resulted in the left wing tip touching the ground. A rejected landing was then flown and after radar vectoring, a second approach to runway 33 was made to a successful landing. No aircraft occupants were injured but the aircraft left wing tip was found to have been damaged by the runway contact. The track of the aircraft and spot wind velocities given by ATC at key points are shown on the illustration below.  +
On 25 November 2004, a MyTravel Airways Airbus A320 departed the side of the runway at Harstad, Norway at a low speed after loss of directional control when thrust was applied for a night take off on a runway with below normal surface friction characteristics. It was found that the crew had failed to follow an SOP designed to ensure that any accumulated fan ice was shed prior to take off and also failed to apply take off thrust as prescribed, thus delaying their appreciation of the uneven thrust produced.  +
On 14 April 2015, a night RNAV(GNSS) approach to Hiroshima by an Airbus A320 was continued below minima without the prescribed visual reference and subsequently touched down 325 metres before the runway after failing to transition to a go around initiated from a very low height. The aircraft hit a permitted ground installation, then slid onto the runway before veering off it and stopping. The aircraft sustained extensive damage and an emergency evacuation followed with 28 of the 81 occupants sustaining minor injuries. The Investigation noted the unchallenged gross violation of minima by the Captain.  +
On 5 January 2014, an Airbus A320 was unable to land at Delhi due to visibility below crew minima and during subsequent diversion to Jaipur, visibility there began to deteriorate rapidly. A Cat I ILS approach was continued below minima without any visual reference because there were no other alternates within the then-prevailing fuel endurance. The landing which followed was made in almost zero visibility and the aircraft sustained substantial damage after touching down to the left of the runway. The Investigation found that the other possible alternate on departure from Delhi had materially better weather but had been ignored.  +
On 11 March 2005, an Airbus A321-200 operated by British Mediterranean Airways, executed two unstable approaches below applicable minima in a dust storm to land in Khartoum Airport, Sudan. The crew were attempting a third approach when they received information from ATC that visibility was below the minimum required for the approach and they decided to divert to Port Sudan where the A320 landed without further incident.  +
On 19 May 2015, an Airbus A319 crew attempted to taxi into a nose-in parking position at Lisbon despite the fact that the APIS, although switched on, was clearly malfunctioning whilst not displaying an unequivocal ‘STOP’. The aircraft continued 6 metres past the applicable apron ground marking by which time it had hit the airbridge. The marshaller in attendance to oversee the arrival did not signal the aircraft or manually select the APIS ‘STOP’ instruction. The APIS had failed to detect the dark-liveried aircraft and the non-display of a steady ‘STOP’ indication was independently attributed to a pre-existing system fault.  +
On 16 September 2019, an Airbus A320 departing Lisbon only became airborne 110 metres before the end of runway 21 and had a high speed rejected takeoff been required, it was likely to have overrun the runway. The Investigation found that both pilots had inadvertently calculated reduced thrust takeoff performance using the full 3705 metre runway length and then failed to identify their error before FMS entry. They also did not increase the thrust to TOGA on realising that the runway end was fast approaching. This was the operator’s third almost identical event at Lisbon in less than five months.  +
On 26 June 2006, after an uneventful pre-flight pushback of a British Airways Airbus A320-200 at London Heathrow Airport, the aircraft started moving under its own power and, shortly afterwards, collided with the tractor that had just performed the pushback, damaging both the right engine and the tractor.  +
On 1 March 2019, an Airbus A320 left engine suffered a contained failure soon after takeoff thrust was set for a night departure from London Stansted but despite the absence of an instruction to cabin crew to begin an evacuation, they did so anyway just before the aircraft was going to be taxied clear of the runway with the Captain only aware when passengers were seen outside the aircraft. The Investigation found that an evacuation had been ordered by the senior member of the cabin crew after she was “overwhelmed” by the situation and believed her team members were “scared”.  +
On 21 September 2005, an Airbus A320 operated by Jet Blue Airways made a successful emergency landing at Los Angeles Airport, California, with the nose wheels cocked 90 degrees to the fore-aft position after an earlier fault on gear retraction.  +
On 28 August 2018, an Airbus A320 bounced touchdown in apparently benign conditions resulted in nose gear damage and debris ingestion into both engines, in one case sufficient to significantly reduce thrust. The gear could not be raised at go around and height loss with EGPWS and STALL warnings occurred when the malfunctioning engine was briefly set to idle. Recovery was followed by a MAYDAY diversion to Shenzen and an emergency evacuation. The Investigation attributed the initial hard touchdown to un-forecast severe very low level wind shear and most of the damage to the negative pitch attitude during the second post-bounce touchdown.  +
On 12 November 2018, an Airbus A320 took off from Macau in good daylight visibility whilst a same-direction runway inspection was in progress but became airborne well before reaching it. The conflict was not recognised until an aural conflict alert was activated, at which point the ATC Assistant took the microphone and instructed the vehicle to clear the runway. The Investigation found that the TWR Controller had forgotten that the vehicle was still on the runway until alerted by the audible alarm and had not checked either the flight progress board or the surface radar before issuing the takeoff clearance.  +
On 7 September 2018, an Airbus A320 was inadvertently landed on an under- construction runway at Malé in daylight VMC but met no significant obstructions and sustained only minor damage. The Investigation attributed the error to confusion generated by a combination of pilot inattention to clearly relevant notification, controller distraction, the failure of the airport operator to follow required procedures and the failure of the safety regulator to ensure that sufficient arrangements to ensure safety were in place and complied with.  +
On 25 February 2010, an Aeroflot Airbus A320-200 unintentionally made a daylight take off from Oslo in good visibility from the taxiway parallel to the runway for which take off clearance had been given. Because of the available distance and the absence of obstructions, the take off was otherwise uneventful. The Investigation identified contributory factors attributable to the airline, the airport and the ANSP.  +
On 12 March 2013, a Tunis Air Airbus A320 landed on runway 08 at Paris Orly and, having slowed to just over 40 knots, were expecting, despite the covering of dry snow and some slush pre-notified and found on the runway, to vacate it without difficulty at the mid point. ATC then requested that the aircraft roll to the end of the runway before clearing. However, after a slight increase in speed, the crew were unable to subsequently slow the aircraft as the runway end approached and it overran at a low groundspeed before coming to a stop 4 seconds later.  +
On 14 August 2018, an Airbus A320 departed Perth without full removal of its main landing gear ground locks and the unsecured components fell unseen from the aircraft during taxi and takeoff, only being recovered after runway FOD reports. The Investigation identified multiple contributory factors including an inadequately-overseen recent transfer of despatch responsibilities, the absence of adequate ground lock use procedures, the absence of required metal lanyards linking the locking components not attached directly to each gear leg flag (as also found on other company aircraft) and pilot failure to confirm that all components were in the flight deck stowage.  +
On 28 August 2002, an America West Airbus A320 operating under an ADD for an inoperative left engine thrust reverser veered off the side of the runway during the landing roll at Phoenix AZ after the Captain mismanaged the thrust levers and lost directional control as a consequence of applying asymmetric thrust. Substantial damage occurred to the aircraft but most occupants were uninjured.  +
On 1 October 2013, an Airbus A320 took off from a runway intersection at Porto which provided 1900 metres TORA using take off thrust that had been calculated for the full runway length of 3480 metres TORA. It became airborne 350 metres prior to the end of the runway but the subsequent Investigation concluded that it would not have been able to safely reject the take-off or continue it, had an engine failed at high speed. The event was attributed to distraction and the inappropriate formulation of the operating airline's procedures for the pre take-off phase of flight.  +
On 1 December 2017, an Airbus A320 made an unintentional - and unrecognised - hard landing at Pristina. As the automated system for alerting outside-limits hard landings was only partially configured and output from the sole available channel was not available, the aircraft continued in service for a further eight sectors before an exceedance was confirmed and the aircraft grounded. The Investigation noted that whilst the aircraft Captain is responsible for recording potential hard landings, the aircraft operator involved should ensure that at least one of the available automated alerting channels is always functional in support of crew subjective judgement.  +
On 14 December 2016, an Airbus A320 made a 2.5g initial runway contact when landing at Raipur after the trainee First Officer failed to flare the aircraft adequately and the Training Captain took over too late to prevent a bounce followed by a 3.2g final touchdown. The Investigation found that despite the Training Captain’s diligent coaching, the First Officer had failed to respond during the final stages of the approach and that the takeover of control should have occurred earlier so that the mishandled final stage of the approach could have been discontinued and go around flown.  +
On 16 October 2015, the unlatched fan cowl doors of the left engine on an A320 fell from the aircraft during and soon after takeoff. The one which remained on the runway was not recovered for nearly an hour afterwards despite ATC awareness of engine panel loss during takeoff and as the runway remained in use, by the time it was recovered it had been reduced to small pieces. The Investigation attributed the failure to latch the cowls shut to line maintenance and the failure to detect the condition to inadequate inspection by both maintenance personnel and flight crew.  +
On 4 October 2017, an Airbus A320 slightly overran the end of runway 22 at Surat during an early morning daylight landing. A temporarily displaced landing threshold meant the runway length was only 1,905 metres rather than the 2,905 metre full length. The aircraft remained on a paved surface and was undamaged. Its crew did not report the excursion which was only discovered when broken runway lighting was subsequently discovered. The Investigation found that the non-precision approach made was unstable and that a prolonged float in the subsequent flare meant that only 600 metres of runway remained ahead at touchdown.  +
On 30 September 2017, an Airbus A320 touched down late after an ILS approach to runway 32 at Sylt with a significant tailwind component being reported and failed to stop before overrunning the end of the runway and subsequently stopped on grass 80 metres beyond it. The Investigation noted that the calculated required landing distance was close to the landing distance available, the actual approach speed was 20 knots above the calculated one and that the aircraft had floated in the flare above a wet runway. It was concluded that the runway excursion was attributable to non-performance of a go-around.  +
On 17 July 2007, the commander of a TAM Airlines Airbus A320 being operated with one thrust reverser locked out was unable to stop the aircraft leaving the landing runway at Congonhas at speed and it hit buildings and was destroyed by the impact and fire which followed killing all on board and others on the ground. The investigation attributed the accident to pilot failure to realise that the thrust lever of the engine with the locked out reverser was above idle, which by design then prevented both the deployment of ground spoilers and the activation of the pre-selected autobrake.  +
On 13 August 2016, an Airbus A320 departed the side of the runway at low speed during takeoff from Tehran Mehrabad and became immobilised in soft ground. The Investigation found that the Captain had not ensured that both engines were simultaneously stabilised before completing the setting of takeoff thrust and that his subsequent response to the resulting directional control difficulties had been inappropriate and decision to reject the takeoff too late to prevent the excursion. Poor CRM on the flight deck was identified as including but not limited to the First Officer’s early call to reject the takeoff being ignored.  +
On 13 September 2000, an Airbus A320-200 being operated by Canadian airline Skyservice on a domestic passenger charter flight from Toronto to Edmonton was departing in day VMC when, after a “loud bang and shudder” during rotation, evidence of left engine malfunction occurred during initial climb and the flight crew declared an emergency and returned for an immediate overweight landing on the departure runway which necessitated navigation around several pieces of debris, later confirmed as the fan cowlings of the left engine. There were no injuries to the occupants.  +
On 25 February 2017, an Airbus A320 left the side of the landing runway at Toronto when, for undetermined reasons, the Captain, as Pilot Flying, set up a drift to the right just before touchdown. This was then followed by a lateral runway excursion into wet grass in rain-reduced visibility which continued for 1,650 metres before the aircraft regained the runway and stopped. The Investigation noted that both the absence of runway centreline lighting and the aircraft operator’s policy of not activating the aircraft rain repellent system or applying the alternative hydrophobic windshield coating may have increased the excursion risk.  +
On 31 January 2010, an Airbus A320-200 being operated by the Canadian Airline Skyservice on a passenger flight from Toronto Canada to Varadero Cuba made a procedural night ILS approach to destination in heavy rain and, soon after touchdown on a flooded runway, drifted off the side and travelled parallel to it for a little over 500 metres before subsequently re-entering it at low speed. There were no injuries to the 186 occupants and the aircraft sustained only minor damage.  +
On 12 September 2013, pressurisation control failed in an A320 after a bleed air fault occurred following dispatch with one of the two pneumatic systems deactivated under MEL provisions. The Investigation found that the cause of the in-flight failure was addressed by an optional SB not yet incorporated. Also, relevant crew response SOPs lacking clarity and a delay in provision of a revised MEL procedure meant that use of the single system had not been optimal and after a necessary progressive descent to FL100 was delayed by inadequate ATC response, and ATC failure to respond to a PAN call required it to be upgraded to MAYDAY.  +
On 24 March 2015, after waiting for the Captain to leave the flight deck and preventing his return, a Germanwings A320 First Officer put his aircraft into a continuous descent from FL380 into terrain killing all 150 occupants. Investigation concluded the motive was suicide, noted a history of mental illness dating from before qualification as a pilot and found that prior to the crash he had been "experiencing mental disorder with psychotic symptoms" which had not been detected through the applicable "process for medical certification of pilots". Conflict between the principles of medical confidentiality and wider public interest was identified.  +
On 28 December 2014, an A320 crew took unapproved action in response to a repeating system caution shortly after levelling at FL320. The unexpected consequences degraded the flight control system and obliged manual control. Gross mishandling followed which led to a stall, descent at a high rate and sea surface impact with a 20º pitch attitude and a 50º angle of attack four minutes later. The Investigation noted the accident origin as a repetitive minor system fault but demonstrated that the subsequent loss of control followed a combination of explicitly inappropriate pilot action and the absence of appropriate pilot action.  +
On 21 October 2009, an Airbus 320-200 being operated by Northwest Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight from San Diego to Minneapolis-St Paul, with the Captain as PF, overflew its destination at cruise level in VMC at night by more than 100 nm, after the two pilots had become distracted in conversation and lost situational awareness. They failed to maintain radio communications with a series of successive ATC units for well over an hour. After a routine inquiry from the cabin crew as to the expected arrival time, the flight crew realised what had happened and re-established ATC contact after which the flight was completed without further incident.  +
On 2 March 2009, communication difficulties and inadequate operator procedures led to an Airbus A320-200 being de-iced inappropriately prior to departure from Vasteras and fumes entered the air conditioning system via the APU. Although steps were then taken before departure in an attempt to clear the contamination, it returned once airborne. The flight crew decided to don their oxygen masks and complete the flight to Poznan. Similar fumes in the passenger cabin led to only temporary effects which were alleviated by the use of therapeutic oxygen. The Investigation concluded that no health risks arose from exposure to the fumes involved.  +
On 28 May 2006, a Vueling Airbus A320 encountered sudden significant turbulence at FL325 and, during a temporary loss of control, was forced down to FL310 before recovery was achieved. Seven occupants sustained minor injuries and there was some internal damage caused by an unrestrained cabin service cart. The origin of the disturbance was found to have been wake vortices from an Airbus A340-300 which was 10nm ahead and 500 feet above on the same airway but the Investigation found that the crew response had been inappropriate and could have served to exacerbate the effects of the external disturbance.  +
On 11 January 2007, an Air New Zealand Airbus A320 which had just departed Sydney Australia for Auckland, New Zealand was observed to have turned onto a heading contrary to the ATC-issued radar heading. When so advised by ATC, the crew checked the aircraft compasses and found that they were reading approximately 40 degrees off the correct heading.  +
On 2 November 2017, the flight crew of an Airbus A320 climbing out of Cork detected a “strong and persistent” burning smell and after declaring a MAYDAY returned to Cork where confusing instructions from the crew resulted in a combination of the intended precautionary rapid disembarkation and an emergency evacuation using escape slides. The Investigation highlighted the necessity of clear and unambiguous communications with passengers which distinguish these two options and in particular noted the limitations in currently mandated pre flight briefings for passengers seated at over wing emergency exits.  +
On 27 August 2018, an Airbus A320 level at FL 300 encountered unanticipated turbulence which caused one of the cabin crew to fall and sustain what was belatedly diagnosed as spinal fracture. The Investigation found that the aircraft had flown through the decaying wake vortex from an almost opposite direction Boeing 747-400F at FL310 which had been observed to cross what was subsequently found to be 13.8 nm ahead of the A320 prior to the latter crossing its track 1 minute 40 seconds later that coincided with a very brief period in which vertical acceleration varied between +0.19g and +1.39g.  +
On 17 November 2017, an Airbus A320 flight crew were both partially incapacitated by the effect of fumes described as acrid and stinging which they detected when following another smaller aircraft to the holding point at Geneva and then waiting in line behind it before taking off, the effect of which rapidly worsened en-route and necessitated a precautionary diversion to Marseilles. The very thorough subsequent Investigation was unable to determine the origin or nature of the fumes encountered but circumstantial evidence pointed tentatively towards ingestion of engine exhaust from the aircraft ahead in one or both A320 engines.  +
On 7 September 2012, the crew of an Aer Lingus Airbus A320-200 mis-set their descent clearance. When discovering this as the actual cleared level was being approached, the AP was disconnected and the unduly abrupt control input made led to an injury to one of the cabin crew. The original error was attributed to ineffective flight deck monitoring and the inappropriate corrective control input to insufficient appreciation of the aerodynamic handling aspects of flight at high altitude. A Safety Recommendation to the Operator to review relevant aspects of its flight crew training was made.  +
On 5 March 2011, a Finnair Airbus A320 was westbound in the cruise in southern Swedish airspace after despatch with Engine 1 bleed air system inoperative when the Engine 2 bleed air system failed and an emergency descent was necessary. The Investigation found that the Engine 2 system had shut down due to overheating and that access to proactive and reactive procedures related to operations with only a single bleed air system available were deficient. The crew failure to make use of APU air to help sustain cabin pressurisation during flight completion was noted.  +
On 21 February 2017, an Airbus A320 despatched with the APU inoperative experienced successive failures of both air conditioning and pressurisation systems, the second of which occurred at FL300 and prompted the declaration of a MAYDAY and an emergency descent followed by an uneventful diversion to Alicante. The Investigation found that the cause of the dual failure was likely to have been the undetectable and undetected degradation of the aircraft bleed air regulation system and whilst noting a possibly contributory maintenance error recommended that a new scheduled maintenance task to check components in the aircraft type bleed system be established.  +
On 5 March 2018, the crew of an Airbus A320 in descent towards Karachi observed a slow but continuous drop in cabin pressure which eventually triggered an excessive cabin altitude warning which led them to don oxygen masks, commence an emergency descent and declare a PAN to ATC until the situation had been normalised. The Investigation found that the cause was the processing of internally corrupted data in the active cabin pressure controller which had used a landing field elevation of over 10,000 feet. It noted that Airbus is developing a modified controller that will prevent erroneous data calculations occurring.  +
On 16 November 2012, Captain of an A320 positioning for approach to Abu Dhabi at night became incapacitated due to a stroke. The First Officer took over control and declared a MAYDAY to ATC. The subsequent approach and landing were uneventful but since the First Officer was not authorised to taxi the aircraft, it was towed to the gate for passenger disembarkation. The investigation found that the Captain had an undiagnosed medical condition which predisposed him towards the formation of blood clots in arteries and veins.  +
On 31 March 2003, an A320, operated by British Mediterranean AW, narrowly missed colliding with terrain during a non-precision approach to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  +
On 20 June 2012, the right V2500 engine compressor of an Airbus A320 suddenly stalled on final approach. The crew reduced the right engine thrust to flight idle and completed the planned landing uneventfully. Extensive engine damage was subsequently discovered and the investigation conducted attributed this to continued use of the engine in accordance with required maintenance procedures following bird ingestion during the previous sector. No changes to procedures for deferral of a post bird strike boroscope inspection for one further flight in normal service were proposed but it was noted that awareness of operations under temporary alleviations was important.  +
On 23 August 2000, a Gulf Air Airbus A320 flew at speed into the sea during an intended dark night go around at Bahrain and all 143 occupants were killed. It was subsequently concluded that, although a number of factors created the scenario in which the accident could occur, the most plausible explanation for both the descent and the failure to recover from it was the focus on the airspeed indication at the expense of the ADI and the effect of somatogravic illusion on the recently promoted Captain which went unchallenged by his low-experience First Officer.  +
On 26 August 2019, an Airbus A320 attempted two autopilot-engaged non-precision approaches at Birmingham in good weather before a third one was successful. Both were commenced late and continued when unstable prior to eventual go-arounds, for one of which the aircraft was mis-configured causing an ‘Alpha Floor’ protection activation. A third non-precision approach was then completed without further event. The Investigation noted an almost identical event involving the same operator four months later, observing that all three discontinued approaches appeared to have originated in confusion arising from a slight difference between the procedures of the aircraft operator and AIP plates.  +
On 21 June 2017, an Airbus A320 number 2 engine began vibrating during the takeoff roll at Delhi after a bird strike. After continuing the takeoff, the Captain subsequently shut down the serviceable engine and set the malfunctioning one to TO/GA and it was several minutes before the error was recognised. After an attempted number 1 engine restart failed because an incorrect procedure was followed, a second attempt succeeded. By this time inattention to airspeed loss had led to ALPHA floor protection activation. Eventual recovery was followed by a return to land with the malfunctioning engine at flight idle.  +
On 3 October 2015, an Airbus A320 which had just taken off from Dublin experienced fumes from the air conditioning system in both flight deck and cabin. A 'PAN' was declared and the aircraft returned with both pilots making precautionary use of their oxygen masks. The Investigation found that routine engine pressure washes carried out prior to departure have been incorrectly performed and a contaminant was introduced into the bleed air supply to the air conditioning system as a result. The context for the error was found to be the absence of any engine wash procedure training for the Operator's engineers.  +
On 21 March 2001 an Airbus A320-200, operated by Lufthansa, experienced a flight controls malfunctions shortly after take-off which resulted in loss of control and subsequent near terrain impact. The uncontrolled roll, due to the malfunction of the pilot flying's sidestick, was recovered by the other pilot and the aircraft safely returned to land in Frankfurt without further incident.  +
An Airbus A322 being operated by British Airways on a scheduled passenger flight from London Heathrow to Glasgow was being radar vectored in day IMC towards an ILS approach to runway 23 at destination when an EGPWS Mode 2 Hard Warning was received and the prescribed response promptly initiated by the flight crew with a climb to MSA.  +
On 27 February 2016, an Airbus A320 making an into-sun visual approach to Jaipur in hazy conditions lined up on a road parallel to the intended landing runway and continued descent until an EGPWS ‘TOO LOW TERRAIN’ Alert occurred at 200 feet agl upon which a go-around was initiated. The Investigation found that although the First Officer had gained visual reference with both road and runway at 500 feet agl, the Captain had seen only the road and continued asking the First Officer to continue descent towards it despite the First Officer’s attempts to alert him to his error.  +
On 22 May 2020, an Airbus A320 made an extremely high speed unstabilised ILS approach to runway 25L at Karachi and did not extend the landing gear for touchdown. It continued along the runway resting on both engines before getting airborne again with the crew announcing their intention to make another approach. Unfortunately, both engines failed due to the damage sustained and the aircraft crashed in a residential area near the airport and was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire. 97 of the 99 occupants died and four persons on the ground were injured with one subsequently dying.  +
On 15 January 2009, a United Airlines Airbus A320-200 approaching 3000 feet agl in day VMC following take-off from New York La Guardia experienced an almost complete loss of thrust in both engines after encountering a flock of Canada Geese . In the absence of viable alternatives, the aircraft was successfully ditched in the Hudson River about. Of the 150 occupants, one flight attendant and four passengers were seriously injured and the aircraft was substantially damaged. The subsequent investigation led to the issue of 35 Safety Recommendations mainly relating to ditching, bird strike and low level dual engine failure.  +
On 24 June 2018, the Captain of an Airbus A320 which had just departed Liverpool inadvertently selected flaps/slats up when “gear up” was called. The error was quickly recognised and corrective action taken but the Investigation was unable to determine why the error occurred or identify circumstances directly conducive to it. It noted that they had previously investigated four similar events to the same operator’s A320s which had occurred over a period of less than 18 months with the operator introducing a requirement for a “pause” before gear or flap selection to allow time for positive checking before selector movement.  +
On 23 September 2019, the flight crew of an Airbus A320 on approach to London Heathrow detected strong acrid fumes on the flight deck and after donning oxygen masks completed the approach and landing, exited the runway and shut down on a taxiway. After removing their masks, one pilot became incapacitated and the other unwell and both were taken to hospital. The other occupants, all unaffected, were disembarked to buses. The very comprehensive investigation was unable to establish the origin of the fumes but did identify a number of circumstantial factors which corresponded to those identified in previous similar events.  +
On 11 April 2012, a Hermes Airlines A320 commanded by a Training Captain who was also in charge of Air Operations for the airline was supervising a trainee Captain on a night passenger flight. The aircraft failed to establish on the Lyons ILS and, in IMC, descended sufficiently to activate both MSAW and EGPWS 'PULL UP' warnings which eventually prompted recovery. The Investigation concluded that application of both normal and emergency procedures had been inadequate and had led to highly degraded situational awareness for both pilots. The context for this was assessed as poor operational management at the airline.  +
On 21 July 2007, an Airbus A320-232 being operated by Australian Operator Jetstar Airways and on final approach to Melbourne after a passenger flight from Christchurch, New Zealand intended to make a go around after the required visual reference at Decision Altitude was not available, but the intended action was mis-managed such that safe control of the aircraft was temporarily lost. Recovery was achieved and there were no further abnormalities of flight during a second missed approach at Melbourne or the subsequent diversion to Avalon.  +
On 28 April 2014, an Airbus A320 making a precision radar approach at Naha in IMC began descent from 1,000 feet QNH at 6nm from touchdown with the autopilot engaged and continued it until successive EGPWS 'PULL UP' Warnings occurred soon after the radar controller had advised four miles from touchdown. Minimum recorded radio height was 242 feet with neither the sea nor the runway in sight. The Investigation noted ineffective alerting by the First Officer, the radar controller's failure to notice the error until just before the EGPWS Warnings and the absence of MSAW annunciations at the controller's position.  +
On 10 February 2007, smoke was observed coming from an overhead locker on an Airbus A320 which had just departed from New York JFK. It was successfully dealt by cabin crew fire extinguisher use whilst an emergency was declared and a precautionary air turn back made with the aircraft back on the ground six minutes later. The subsequent investigation attributed the fire to a short circuit of unexplained origin in one of a number of spare lithium batteries contained in a passenger's camera case, some packaged an some loose which had led to three of then sustaining fire damage.  +
On 19 December 2008, an Aeroflot Airbus A320 descended significantly below its cleared and acknowledged altitude after the crew lost situational awareness at night whilst attempting to establish on the ILS at Oslo from an extreme intercept track after a late runway change and an unchallenged incorrect readback. The Investigation concluded that the response to the EGPWS warning which resulted had been “late and slow” but that the risk of CFIT was “present but not imminent”. The context for the event was considered to have been poor communications between ATC and the aircraft in respect of changes of landing runway.  +
On 27 November 2008, the crew of an XL Airways A320 on an airworthiness function flight following aircraft repainting lost control of the aircraft after fail to take the action necessary to recover from a full stall which had resulted from their continued airspeed reduction during a low speed handling test when Stall Protection System (SPS) activation did nor occur at the likely airspeed because two of the three angle of attack sensors were blocked by ice formed by water ingress during preparation for the repainting. This condition rendered angle of attack protection in normal law inoperative.  +
On 12 September 2015, an Airbus A320 autopilot and autothrust dropped out as it climbed out of Perth and multiple ECAM system messages were presented with intermittent differences in displayed airspeeds. During the subsequent turn back in Alternate Law, a stall warning was disregarded with no actual consequence. The Investigation attributed the problems to intermittently blocked pitot tubes but could not establish how this had occurred. It was also found that the priority for ECAM message display during the flight had been inappropriate and that the key procedure contained misleading information. These ECAM issues were subsequently addressed by the aircraft manufacturer.  +
On 7 July 2016, an Airbus A320 crew cleared for a dusk visual approach to Rapid City mis-identified runway 13 at Ellsworth AFB as runway 14 at their intended destination and landed on it after recognising their error just before touchdown. The Investigation concluded that the crew had failed to use the available instrument approach guidance to ensure their final approach was made on the correct extended centreline and noted that it had only been possible to complete the wrong approach by flying an abnormally steep unstabilised final approach. Neither pilot was familiar with Rapid City Airport.  +
On 3 May 2006, an Airbus 320 crew failed to correctly fly a night IMC go around at Sochi and the aircraft crashed into the sea and was destroyed. The Investigation found that the crew failed to reconfigure the aircraft for the go around and, after having difficulties with the performance of an auto go-around, had disconnected the autopilot. Inappropriate control inputs, including simultaneous (summed) sidestick inputs by both pilots were followed by an EGPWS PULL UP Warning. There was no recovery and about a minute into the go around, a steep descent into the sea at 285 knots occurred.  +
On 28 February 2018, an Airbus A320 would not rotate for a touch-and-go takeoff and flightpath control remained temporarily problematic and the aircraft briefly settled back onto the runway with the gear in transit damaging both engines. A very steep climb was then followed by an equally steep descent to 600 feet agl with an EGPWS ‘PULL UP’ activation before recovery. Pitch control was regained using manual stabiliser trim but after both engines stopped during a MAYDAY turnback, an undershoot touchdown followed. The root cause of loss of primary pitch control was determined as unapproved oil in the stabiliser actuator.  +
On 3 April 2012, the crew of an Air France Airbus A320 came close to loosing control of their aircraft after accepting, inadequately preparing for and comprehensively mismanaging it during an RNAV VISUAL approach at Tel Aviv and during the subsequent attempt at a missed approach. The Investigation identified significant issues with crew understanding of automation - especially in respect of both the use of FMS modes and operations with the AP off but the A/T on - and highlighted the inadequate provision by the aircraft operator of both procedures and pilot training for this type of approach.  +
On 22 December 2016, an Airbus A320 cleared for a night approach to runway 16L at Haneda, which involved circling to the right from an initial VOR approach, instead turned left and began an approach to a closed but partially lit runway. ATC noticed and intervened to require a climb away for repositioning to the correct runway using radar vectors. The Investigation found that the context for the crew’s visual positioning error was their failure to adequately prepare for the approach before commencing it and that the new-on-type First Officer had not challenged the experienced Captain’s inappropriate actions and inactions.  +
On 4 August 2012 an Easyjet Airbus A320 on approach to London Gatwick was given landing clearance in IMC for a runway occupied by a Boeing 737-400 waiting for take off which heard this transmission. Despite normal ground visibility and an unrestricted view of the runway, ATC failed to recognise their error and, after two unsuccessful attempts to advise them of it, the commander of the 737 instructed the A320 to go around which it did. Only upon hearing this did the controller realise what had happened.  +
On 2 September 2013, a B737 crew were not instructed to go around from their approach by ATC as it became increasingly obvious that an A320 departing the same runway would not be airborne in time for a landing clearance to be issued. They initiated a go around over the threshold and then twice came into conflict with the A320 as both climbed on similar tracks without ATC de-confliction, initially below the height where TCAS RAs are functional. Investigation attributed the conflict to ATC but the failure to effectively deal with the consequences jointly to ATC and both aircraft crews.  +
On March 20 2012 a Ural Airlines Airbus A320 failed to taxi as instructed after vacating the landing runway 12L at Dubai and crossed the lit stop bar of an intersection access to runway 12R before stopping just in time to prevent a collision with a Boeing 777-300ER about to pass the intersection at very high speed on take off. Taxi clearance had been correctly given and acknowledged. The aircraft commander had extensive aircraft type experience but the inexperienced First Officer appeared to be undergoing early stage line training with a Safety Pilot present. The Investigation is continuing.  +
On 6 February 2013, ATC mismanagement of an Airbus A320 instructed to go around resulted in loss of separation in IMC against the Embraer 190 ahead which was obliged to initiate a go around when no landing clearance had been issued due to a Boeing 737-800 still on the runway after landing. Further ATC mismanagement then resulted in a second IMC loss of separation between the Embraer 190 and a Boeing 717 which had just take off from the parallel runway. Controller response to the STCA Alerts generated was found to be inadequate and ANSP procedures in need of improvement.  +
On 25 November 2015, an Airbus A321 taxiing for departure at Barcelona was cleared across an active runway in front of an approaching Boeing 737 with landing clearance on the same runway by a Ground Controller unaware that the runway was active. On reaching the lit stop bar protecting the runway, the crew queried their clearance and were told to hold position. Noting that the event had occurred at the time of a routine twice-daily runway configuration change and two previous very similar events in 2012 and 2014, further safety recommendations on risk management of runway configuration change were made.  +
On 21 May 2011, a Monarch Airlines A321 taxiing for departure at Dublin inadvertently taxied onto an active runway after failing to follow its taxi clearance. The incursion was not noticed by ATC but the crew of a Boeing 737 taking off from the same runway did see the other aircraft and initiated a very high speed rejected take off stopping 360 metres from it. The incursion occurred in a complex manoeuvring area to a crew unfamiliar with the airport at a location which was not a designated hot spot. Various mitigations against incursions at this position have since been implemented.  +
On 8 September 2016, an Airbus A321 en route in Bulgarian airspace at FL 350 was given and acknowledged a descent but then climbed and came within 1.2nm of a descending Boeing 737. The Investigation found that the inexperienced A321 First Officer had been temporarily alone when the instruction was given and had insufficient understanding of how to control the aircraft. It was also found that despite an STCA activation of the collision risk, the controller, influenced by a Mode ‘S’ downlink of the correctly-set A321 cleared altitude, had then added to the risk by instructing the 737 to descend.  +
On 15 August 2015, an Airbus A321 on approach to Charlotte commenced a go around but following a temporary loss of control as it did so then struck approach and runway lighting and the undershoot area sustaining a tail strike before climbing away. The Investigation noted that the 2.1g impact caused substantial structural damage to the aircraft and attributed the loss of control to a small microburst and the crew’s failure to follow appropriate and recommended risk mitigations despite clear evidence of risk given by the aircraft when it went around and available visually.  +
On 21 February 2006, an Airbus A321-200 being operated by China Eastern on a scheduled passenger flight from Daegu to Shanghai Pudong failed to follow the marked taxiway centreline when taxiing for departure in normal daylight visibility and a wing tip impacted an adjacent building causing minor damage to both building and aircraft. None of the 166 occupants were injured.  +
On 16 July 2016, an Airbus A321’s unstabilised approach at Fuerteventura during pilot line training was not discontinued and takeover of control and commencement of a go-around had occurred just before a very hard runway contact. The subsequent landing was successful but serious damage to the main landing gear was not rectified before the next flight. The Investigation found that the hard touchdown had been recorded as in excess of 3.3g and that the return flight had been “risky and unsafe” after failure of the Captain and maintenance personnel at the Operator to recognise the seriousness of the hard landing.  +
On 24 November 2019, as an Airbus A321 taking off from the 2665 metre-long runway 05 at Glasgow approached the calculated V1 with the flex thrust they had set, the aircraft was not accelerating as expected and they applied TOGA thrust. This resulted in the aircraft becoming airborne with less than 400 metres of runway remaining. The Investigation confirmed what the crew had subsequently discovered for themselves - that they had both made an identical error in their independent EFB performance calculations which the subsequent standard procedures and checks had not detected. The operator is reviewing its related checking procedures.  +
On 21 January 2002, an Airbus A321-100 being operated by All Nippon Airways on a scheduled passenger flight from Nagoya to Hakodate encountered sudden negative windshear just prior to planned touchdown and the pitch up which followed resulted in the aft fuselage being damaged prior to the initiation of a climb away to position for a further approach which led to a normal landing. Three of the cabin crew sustained minor injuries but the remaining 90 occupants were uninjured.  +
On 28 February 2013, the initial night landing attempt of a Ural Airlines Airbus A321 at Hurghada was mishandled in benign conditions resulting in a tail strike due to over-rotation. The Investigation noted that a stabilised approach had been flown by the First Officer but found that the prescribed recovery from the effects of a misjudged touchdown had not then been followed. It was also concluded that communication between the two pilots had been poor and that the aircraft commander's monitoring role had been ineffective. The possibility of the effects of fatigue was noted.  +
On 16 April 2013, an A321 sustained significant damage during a tail strike during a bounced landing which followed loss of airspeed and an increase in sink rate shortly before touchdown after an otherwise stabilised approach. The Investigation attributed the tail strike to a failure to follow the recommended bounced landing response and noted the inadequate training provided by Asiana for bounced landing recovery.  +
On 18 July 2008, an Airbus A321-200 operated by Thomas Cook Airlines experienced hard landing during night line training with significant aircraft damage not found until several days later. The hard landing was subsequently partially attributed to the inability to directly observe the trainee pitch control inputs on side stick of the A321.  +
On 28 July 2008, the crew flying an Airbus A321-200 departing Manchester UK were unable to raise the landing gear. The fault was caused by damage to the Nose Landing Gear sustained on the previous flight which experienced a heavy landing.  +
On 29 April 2011, an Airbus A321-200 being operated by Thomas Cook Airlines on a passenger service from Manchester UK to Iraklion, Greece took off in day VMC but failed to establish a climb at the expected speed until the aircraft pitch attitude was reduced below that prescribed for the aircraft weight which had been entered into the FMS. No abnormal manoeuvres occurred and none of the 231 occupants were injured.  +
On 23 December 2011, an Austrian Airlines Airbus A321 sustained a tail strike at Manchester as the main landing gear contacted the runway during a night go around initiated at a very low height after handling difficulties in the prevailing wind shear. The remainder of the go around and subsequent approach in similar conditions was uneventful and the earlier tail strike was considered to have been the inevitable consequence of initiating a go around so close to the ground after first reducing thrust to idle. Damage to the aircraft rendered it unfit for further flight until repaired but was relatively minor.  +
A321 experienced minimal braking action during the daylight landing roll in wet snow conditions and normal visibility and an overrun occurred. The aircraft came to a stop positioned sideways in relation to the runway centreline with the right hand main landing gear 2 metres beyond the limit of the paved surface.  +
On 9 June 2006, an Airbus 321-100, operated by Asiana Airlines, encountered a thunderstorm accompanied by Hail around 20 miles southeast of Anyang VOR at an altitude of 11,500 ft, while descending for an approach to Gimpo Airport. The radome was detached and the cockpit windshield was cracked due to impact with Hail.  +
On 24 August 2010, an Airbus A321-200 being operated by British Midland on a scheduled public transport service from Khartoum to Beirut experienced, during cruise at FL360 in night IMC, an electrical malfunction which was accompanied by intermittent loss of the display on both pilots’ EFIS and an uncommanded change to a left wing low attitude. De-selection of the No 1 generator and subsequent return of the rudder trim, which had not previously been intentionally moved, to neutral removed all abnormalities and the planned flight was completed without further event with no damage to the aircraft or injuries to the 49 occupants.  +
On 26th May 2003, a British Midland A321 suffered severe damage from hail en route near Vienna.  +
On 5 November 2014, the crew of an Airbus A321 temporarily lost control of their aircraft in the cruise and were unable to regain it until 4000 feet of altitude had been lost. An investigation into the causes is continuing but it is already known that blockage of more than one AOA probe resulted in unwanted activation of high AOA protection which could not be stopped by normal sidestick inputs until two of the three ADRs had been intentionally deactivated in order to put the flight control system into Alternate Law.  +
On 26 September 2013, an Airbus A321 approaching Deauville in day VMC was advised that only a GNSS instrument approach - for which the crew were not approved - was available for the active runway. During the subsequent visual approach, the crew lost sight of the runway whilst over the sea and descended to almost the same height as the land ahead, eventually triggering an EGPWS ‘PULL UP’ Warning. The approach was subsequently abandoned after an EGPWS ‘SINK RATE’ Alert on short finals and non-standard positioning to the opposite runway direction, followed by a landing in the originally expected direction.  +
On 28 July 2010, the crew of an Airbus A321 lost contact with the runway at Islamabad during a visual circling approach and continued in IMC outside the protected area and flying into terrain after repeatedly ignoring EGPWS Terrain Alerts and PULL UP Warnings. The Investigation concluded that the Captain had pre-planned a non-standard circuit which had been continued into IMC and had then failed to maintain situational awareness, control the aircraft through correct FMU inputs or respond to multiple EGPWS Warnings. The inexperienced First Officer appeared unwilling to take control in the absence of corrective action by the Captain.  +
On 26 February 2020, after difficulty starting an Airbus A321 left engine for the first flight of the day, the same difficulty recurred on the third flight followed by subsequent en-route abnormalities affecting both engines. After no fault was found during post flight maintenance investigation, similar problems occurred starting the left engine and after takeoff from Gatwick, both engines malfunctioned and a MAYDAY return followed. The continuing Investigation has already found that the engine problems were attributable to fuel system contamination following the addition of 37 times the maximum permitted dosage of Kathon biocide during prior scheduled maintenance work.  +
On 27 May 2010 an Airbus A321-200 being operated by Australian operator JetStar on a passenger flight from Darwin to Singapore continued an initial approach at destination in day VMC with the aircraft inappropriately configured before a late go around was commenced which was also flown in a configuration contrary to prescribed SOPs. A subsequent second approach proceeded to an uneventful landing. There were no unusual or sudden manoeuvres during the event and no injuries to the occupants.  +
On 20 September 2013, a loss of separation occurred between two en route Airbus A330s under radar surveillance in controlled airspace near Adelaide. The potential conflict was resolved with TCAS RA action by one of the aircraft involved but the TCAS equipment on board the other aircraft appeared to have malfunctioned and did not display any traffic information or generate an RA. The complex pattern of air routes in the vicinity of the event was identified by the Investigation as a Safety Issue requiring resolution by the ANSP and the response subsequently received was assessed as satisfactory.  +
On 31 March 2012, after the implementation of contingency ATC procedures for a period of 5 hours due to controller shortage, two Garuda A330 aircraft which had been transiting an associated Temporary Restricted Area (TRA) prior to re-entering controlled airspace were separately involved in losses of separation assurance, one when unexpectedly entering adjacent airspace from the TRA, the other when the TRA ceased and controlled airspace was restored. The Investigation did not find that any actual loss of separation had occurred but identified four Safety Issues in relation to the inadequate handling of the TRA activation by ANSP Airservices Australia.  +
On 31 October 2004, a Loss of Separation occurred between an A330-200, on a low go-around from Rwy 14 at Zurich Switzerland, and an Avro RJ100 which had been cleared for take-off on Rwy 10 and was on a convergent flight path.  +
On 17 October 2014, an Airbus A330-200 crew taking off from Madrid at night detected non-runway lights ahead as they accelerated through approximately 90 knots. ATC were unaware what they might be and the lights subsequently disappeared, and the crew continued the takeoff. A reportedly unlit vehicle at the side of the runway was subsequently passed just before rotation. The Investigation found that the driver of an external contractor's vehicle had failed to correctly route to the parallel runway which was closed overnight for maintenance but had not realised this until he saw the lights of an approaching aircraft.  +
On 9 February 2014, the Captain of a military variant of the Airbus A330 suddenly lost control during the cruise on a passenger flight. A violent, initially negative 'g', pitch down occurred which reached 15800 fpm as the speed rose to Mach 0.9. In the absence of any effective crew intervention, recovery was achieved entirely by the aircraft Flight Envelope Protection System. The Investigation found that the upset had occurred when the Captain moved his seat forward causing its left arm rest to contact the personal camera he had placed behind the sidestick, forcing the latter fully forward.  +
On 30 January 2012, an Airbus A330 departing Abu Dhabi at night lined up on the runway edge lights in the prevailing low visibility and attempted to take off. The take off was eventually rejected and the aircraft towed away from the runway. Damage was limited to that resulting from the impact of the aircraft landing gear with runway edge lights and the resultant debris. An Investigation is continuing into the circumstances and causation of the incident.  +
On 13 April 2013, an Air France Airbus A330-200 was damaged during a hard (2.74 G) landing at Caracas after the aircraft commander continued despite the aircraft becoming unstabilised below 500 feet agl with an EGPWS ‘SINK RATE’ activation beginning in the flare. Following a superficial inspection, maintenance personnel determined that no action was required and released the aircraft to service. After take off, it was impossible to retract the landing gear and the aircraft returned. Considerable damage from the earlier landing was then found to both fuselage and landing gear which had rendered the aircraft unfit to fly.  +
On 23 October 2014 an Airbus A330-200 made a sharp brake application to avoid overrunning the turn onto the parking gate at Dubai after flight. A cabin crew member who had left their seat prior to the call from the flight deck to prepare doors, fell and sustained serious neck and back injuries. The investigation found that the sudden braking had led to the fall but concluded that the risk had arisen because required cabin crew procedures had not been followed.  +
On 13 December 2013, an Airbus A330 encountered very heavy rain below 100 feet agl just after the autopilot had been disconnected for landing off an ILS approach at Jakarta. The aircraft Commander, as pilot flying, lost visual reference but the monitoring First Officer did not. A go around was neither called nor flown and after drifting in the flare, the aircraft touched down with the right main landing gear on the grass and continued like this for 500 metres before regaining the runway. The Investigation noted that prevailing SOPs clearly required that a go around should have been flown.  +
On 4 October 2014, the fracture of a hydraulic hose during an A330-200 pushback at night at Karachi was followed by dense fumes in the form of hydraulic fluid mist filling the aircraft cabin and flight deck. After some delay, during which a delay in isolating the APU air bleed exacerbated the ingress of fumes, the aircraft was towed back onto stand and an emergency evacuation completed. During the return to stand, a PBE unit malfunctioned and caught fire when one of the cabin crew attempted to use it which prevented use of the exit adjacent to it for evacuation.  +
On 28 October 2008, an Airbus A330-200 could not be rotated for liftoff whist making a night takeoff from Montego Bay until the Captain had increased the reduced thrust set to TOGA, after which the aircraft became airborne prior to the end of the runway and climbed away normally. The Investigation found that the takeoff performance data used had been calculated for the flight by Company Despatch and the fact that it had been based on a takeoff weight which was 90 tonnes below the actual take off weight had not been noticed by any of the flight crew.  +
On 26 November 2014, an Airbus A330-200 was struck by lightning just after arriving at its allocated stand following a one hour post-landing delay after suspension of ramp operations due to an overhead thunderstorm. Adjacent ground services operatives were subject to electrical discharge from the strike and one who was connected to the aircraft flight deck intercom was rendered unconscious. The Investigation found that the equipment and procedures for mitigation of risk from lightning strikes were not wholly effective and also that perceived operational pressure had contributed to a resumption of ground operations which hindsight indicated had been premature.  +
On 4 July 2009, an Airbus A332 being operated by Jetstar Airways on a scheduled passenger flight from Sydney to Melbourne carried a 750 kg ULD which had been expressly rejected by the aircraft commander during the loading operation without flight crew awareness. There was no reported effect on aircraft handling during the flight.  +
On 1 June 2009, an Airbus A330-200 being operated by Air France on a scheduled passenger flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris CDG as AF447 exited controlled flight and crashed into the sea with the loss of the aircraft and all 228 occupants. It was found that the loss of control followed an inappropriate response by the flight crew to a transient loss of airspeed indications in the cruise which resulted from the vulnerability of the pitot heads to ice crystal icing.  +
On 24 August 2001, an Air Transat Airbus A330-200 eastbound across the North Atlantic at night experienced a double-engine flameout after which Lajes on Terceira Island in the Azores was identified as the best diversion and a successful glide approach and landing there was subsequently achieved. The Investigation found that the flameouts had been the result of fuel exhaustion after a fuel leak from the right engine caused by a pre flight maintenance error. Fuel exhaustion was found to have occurred because the flight crew did not perform the QRH procedure applicable to an in-flight fuel leak.  +
On 6 February 2019, an Airbus A330-200 Captain’s Audio Control Panel (ACP) malfunctioned and began to emit smoke and electrical fumes after coffee was spilt on it. Subsequently, the right side ACP also failed, becoming hot enough to begin melting its plastic. Given the consequent significant communications difficulties, a turnback to Shannon was with both pilots taking turns to go on oxygen. The Investigation found that flight deck drinks were routinely served in unlidded cups with the cup size in use incompatible with the available cup holders. Pending provision of suitably-sized cups, the operator decided to begin providing cup lids.  +
On 2 September 2013, an Airbus A330-200 crossing the ITCZ at FL400 at night encountered sudden severe turbulence unanticipated by the crew resulting in serious injuries to a few cabin crew / passengers and minor injuries to twelve others. An en route diversion to Fortaleza was made. The Investigation found that the origin of the turbulence was severe convective weather and failure to detect it in an area where it had been forecasted indicated that it was probably associated with sub-optimal use of the on-board weather radar with the severity of the encounter possibly aggravated by inappropriate contrary control inputs.  +
On 4 May 2016, an Airbus A330-200 in the cruise in day VMC at FL390 in the vicinity of a highly active thunderstorm cell described by the crew afterwards as ‘cumulus cloud’ encountered a brief episode of severe clear air turbulence which injured 24 passengers and crew, seven of them seriously as well as causing some damage to cabin fittings and equipment. The Investigation was unable to determine how close to the cloud the aircraft had been but noted the absence of proactive risk management and that most of the injured occupants had not been secured in their seats.  +
On 27 February 2012, the crew of an Airbus A330 en route at night and crossing the East African coast at FL360 encountered sudden violent turbulence as they flew into a convective cell not seen on their weather radar and briefly lost control as their aircraft climbed 2000 feet with resultant minor injuries to two occupants. The Investigation concluded that the isolated and rapidly developing cell had not been detected because of crew failure to make proper use of their weather radar, but noted that activation of flight envelope protection and subsequent crew action to recover control had been appropriate.  +
On 21 November 2013, an A330 rejected its take off from Brisbane after an airspeed indication failure. Following maintenance intervention, a similar airspeed indication fault on the subsequent departure was reported to have been detected after V1. Once airborne, reversion to Alternate Law occurred and slat retraction failed. After an air turnback, it was discovered that the cause of both events was blockage of the No. 1 Pitot Head by a mud-dauber wasp nest which was created during the initial two hour turnround at Brisbane. Investigation of a 2014 event to a Boeing 737 at Brisbane with exactly the same causation was noted.  +
On 8 March 2013, the crew of a Qantas A330 descended below controlled airspace and to 600 feet agl when still 9nm from the landing runway at Melbourne in day VMC after mismanaging a visual approach flown with the AP engaged. An EGWS Terrain Alert was followed by an EGPWS PULL UP Warning and a full recovery manoeuvre was flown. The Investigation found degraded situational awareness had followed inappropriate use of Flight Management System  +
On 9 June 2014, a 'burning odour' of undetermined origin became evident in the rear galley of an Airbus A330 as soon as the aircraft powered up for take off. Initially, it was dismissed as not uncommon and likely to soon dissipate, but it continued and affected cabin crew were unable to continue their normal duties and received oxygen to assist recovery. En route diversion was considered but flight completion chosen. It was found that the rear pressure bulkhead insulation had not been correctly refitted following maintenance and had collapsed into and came into contact with APU bleed air duct.  +
On 12 May 2010, an Afriqiyah Airways Airbus A330 making a daylight go around from a non precision approach at Tripoli which had been discontinued after visual reference was not obtained at MDA did not sustain the initially established IMC climb and, following flight crew control inputs attributed to the effects of somatogravic illusion and poor CRM, descended rapidly into the ground with a high vertical and forward speed, The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and the consequent fire and all but one of the 104 occupants were killed.  +
On 30 September 2010, an A330-200 was about to take off from Khartoum at night in accordance with its clearance when signalling from a hand-held flashlight and a radio call from another aircraft led to this not taking place. The other (on-stand) aircraft crew had found that they had been hit by the A330 as it had taxied past en route to the runway. The Investigation found that although there was local awareness that taxiway use and the provision of surface markings at Khartoum did not ensure safe clearance between aircraft, this was not being communicated by NOTAM or ATIS.  +
On 13 November 2012, a Garuda Airbus A330 and a KLM Boeing 737 lost separation against each other whilst correctly following radar vectors to parallel approaches at Amsterdam but there was no actual risk of collision as each aircraft had the other in sight and no TCAS RA occurred. The Investigation found that one of the controllers involved had used permitted discretion to override normal procedures during a short period of quiet traffic but had failed to restore normal procedures when it became necessary to do so, thus creating the conflict and the ANSP was recommended to review their procedures.  +
On 3 May 2017, an Airbus A330 and an Airbus A319 lost prescribed separation whilst tracking in opposite directions on a radar-controlled ATS route in eastern Myanmar close to the Chinese border. The Investigation found that the response of the A330 crew to a call for another aircraft went undetected and they descended to the same level as the A319 with the lost separation only being mitigated by intervention from the neighbouring Chinese ACC which was able to give the A319 an avoiding action turn. At the time of the conflict, the A330 had disappeared from the controlling ACCs radar.  +
On 14 February 2017, an Airbus A330-300 preparing to depart Narita entered the active runway at night without clearance as another Airbus A330-300 was approaching the same runway with a landing clearance. ATC observed the conflict after an alert was activated on the surface display system and instructed the approaching aircraft, which was passing approximately 400 feet and had not observed the incursion, to go around. The Investigation attributed the departing aircraft crew’s failure to comply with their clearance to distraction and noted that the stop bar lighting system was not in use because procedures restricted its use to low visibility conditions.  +
On 5 March 2013, the aft-stationed cabin crew of an Airbus A330-300 being operated by Lufthansa on a scheduled international passenger flight from Chicago O'Hare to Munich advised the flight crew after the night normal visibility take-off that they had heard "an unusual noise" during take-off. Noting that nothing unusual had been heard in the flight deck and that there were no indications of any abnormal system status, the Captain decided, after consulting Company maintenance, that the flight should be completed as planned. The flight proceeded uneventfully but on arrival in Munich, it became clear that the aircraft had sustained "substantial damage" due to a tail strike on take-off and was unfit for flight.  +
On 13 April 2010, a Cathay Pacific Airbus A330-300 en route from Surabaya to Hong Kong experienced difficulty in controlling engine thrust. As these problems worsened, one engine became unusable and a PAN and then a MAYDAY were declared prior to a successful landing at destination with excessive speed after control of thrust from the remaining engine became impossible. Emergency evacuation followed after reports of a landing gear fire. Salt water contamination of the hydrant fuel system at Surabaya after alterations during airport construction work was found to have led to the appearance of a polymer contaminant in uplifted fuel.  +
On 4 March 2015, the crew of a Turkish Airlines A333 continued an automatic non precision RNAV approach below the prescribed minimum descent altitude without having obtained any element of visual reference and when this was acquired a few seconds before the attempted landing, the aircraft was not aligned with the runway centreline and during a 2.7g low-pitch landing, the left main gear touched down on the grass. The aircraft then left the runway completely before stopping with a collapsed nose gear and sufficient damage to be assessed a hull loss. None of 235 occupants sustained serious injury.  +
On 26 June 2016, thick white smoke suddenly appeared in the cabin of a fully loaded Airbus A330-300 prior to engine start with the door used for boarding still connected to the air bridge. An emergency evacuation initiated by cabin crew was accomplished without injury although amidst some confusion due to a brief conflict between flight crew and cabin crew instructions. The Investigation found that the smoke had been caused when an APU seal failed and hot oil entered the bleed air supply and pyrolysed. Safety Recommendations in respect of both crew communication and procedures and APU auto-shutdown were made.  +
On 7 October 2013 a fire was discovered in the rear hold of an Airbus A330 shortly after it had arrived at its parking stand after an international passenger flight. The fire was eventually extinguished but only after substantial fire damage had been caused to the hold. The subsequent Investigation found that the actions of the flight crew, ground crew and airport fire service following the discovery of the fire had all been unsatisfactory. It also established that the source of the fire had been inadequately packed dangerous goods in passengers checked baggage on the just-completed flight.  +
On 15 September 2020, an Airbus A330-300 touched down at Medan partially off the runway as a result of misjudgement by the right seat handling pilot before regaining it and completing the landing roll. The aircraft and some runway lights were damaged. The handling pilot was an A320/A330 dual-rated Instructor Pilot conducting standardisation training on a new Captain who had not flown for 7½ months having himself not flown from the right seat for six months. The continuing Investigation has recommended that the State Safety Regulator issues guidance in support of its temporary alleviations to pilot recency requirements.  +
On 7 October 2014, an Airbus A330-300 failed to maintain the runway centreline as it touched down at Montréal in suddenly reduced forward visibility and part of the left main gear departed the runway edge, paralleling it briefly before returning to it and regaining the centreline as the landing roll was completed. The Investigation attributed the excursion to a delay in corrective action when a sudden change in wind velocity occurred at the same time as degraded visual reference. It was found that the runway should not have been in use in such poor visibility without serviceable lighting.  +
On 25 December 2013, an Airbus A330-300 conducted a stable night non-precision approach at St. Lucia but the crew found that after touchdown, atypical intervention was needed to ensure direction along the runway was maintained and also detected both ‘juddering’ and a more significant rate of deceleration than usual. Considerable impact damage to the lower fuselage and below-floor systems was subsequently discovered. The Investigation concluded that this damage had resulted from impact with water from a diverted river channel which had burst its banks and flooded the touchdown area of the runway to a depth of up to 60 cm.  +
On 17 December 2017, it was discovered after completion of an Airbus A330-300 passenger flight from Sydney to Bejing that freight loading had not been correctly documented on the load and trim sheet presented to and accepted by the Captain and as a result, the aircraft had exceeded its certified MTOW on departure. The Investigation found that the overload finding had not been promptly reported or its safety significance appreciated, that the error had its origin in related verbal communications during loading and noted that the aircraft operator had since made a series of improvements to its freight loading procedures.  +
On 22 June 2009, an Airbus A330-300 being operated by Qantas on a scheduled passenger flight from Hong Kong to Perth encountered an area of severe convective turbulence in night IMC in the cruise at FL380 and 10 of the 209 occupants sustained minor injuries and the aircraft suffered minor internal damage. The injuries were confined to passengers and crew who were not seated at the time of the incident. After consultations with ground medical experts, the aircraft commander determined that the best course of action was to complete the flight as planned, and this was uneventful.  +
On 7 October 2008, an Airbus A330-300 aircraft experienced multiple system failure indications followed by uncommanded pitch-down events which resulted in serious injuries to passengers and cabin crew.  +
On 16 April 2012, a Virgin Atlantic A330-300 made an air turnback to London Gatwick after repetitive hold smoke detector warnings began to occur during the climb. Continuing uncertainty about whether the warnings, which continued after landing, were false led to the decision to order an emergency evacuation on the runway. Subsequent investigation found that the smoke warnings had all been false and had mainly come from one faulty detector. It also found that aspects of the way the evacuation had taken place had indicated where there were opportunities to try and improve passenger behaviour.  +
On 22 December 2010, a Finnair Airbus A330-300 inbound to Helsinki and cruising in very cold air at an altitude of 11,600 metres lost cabin pressurisation in cruise flight and completed an emergency descent before continuing the originally intended flight at a lower level. The subsequent Investigation was carried out together with that into a similar occurrence to another Finnair A330 which had occurred 11 days earlier. It was found that in both incidents, both engine bleed air systems had failed to function normally because of a design fault which had allowed water within their pressure transducers to freeze.  +
On 16 August 2016, an Airbus A330-300 right engine failed just over two hours into a flight from Sydney to Kuala Lumpur. It was eventually shut down after two compressor stalls and increased vibration had followed ‘exploratory’ selection of increased thrust. A ‘PAN’ declaration was followed by diversion to Melbourne, during which two relight attempts were made, in preference to other nearer alternates without further event. The Investigation found that delayed shutdown and the relight attempts were contrary to applicable procedures and the failure to divert to the nearest suitable airport had extended the time in an elevated risk environment.  +
On 22 April 2013, a lower deck smoke warning occurred on an Airbus A330-300 almost 90 minutes into the cruise and over land. The warning remained on after the prescribed crew response and after an uneventful MAYDAY diversion was completed, the hold was found to be full of smoke and fire eventually broke out after all occupants had left the aircraft. The Investigation was unable to determine the fire origin but noted the success of the fire suppression system whilst the aircraft remained airborne and issues relating to the post landing response, especially communications with the fire service.  +
On 3 July 2017, an Airbus A330-300 was climbing through 2,300 feet after a night takeoff from Gold Coast when the number 2 engine began to malfunction. As a cabin report of fire in the same engine was received, it failed and a diversion to Brisbane was made. The Investigation found that the engine failure was entirely attributable to the ingestion of a single medium-sized bird well within engine certification requirements. It was concluded that the failure was the result of a sufficiently rare combination of circumstances that it would be extremely unlikely for multiple engines to be affected simultaneously.  +
On 19 January 2013, a Rolls Royce Trent 700-powered Virgin Atlantic Airbus A330-300 hit some medium sized birds shortly after take off from Orlando, sustaining airframe impact damage and ingesting one bird into each engine. Damage was subsequently found to both engines although only one indicated sufficient malfunction - a complete loss of oil pressure - for an in-flight shutdown to be required. After declaration of a MAYDAY, the return to land overweight was completed uneventfully. The investigation identified an issue with the response of the oil pressure detection and display system to high engine vibration events and recommended modification.  +
On 16 December 2002, approximately 1735 UTC, an Airbus A330-330, operating as Philippine Airlines flight 110, struck power lines while executing a localizer-only Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 6L at A.B. Pat Won Guam International Airport, Agana, Guam. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed during the approach. Following a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) alert, the crew executed a missed approach and landed successfully after a second approach to the airport.  +
On 24 April 2005, an Airbus A340-200 landed short of the temporarily displaced runway threshold at Perth in good daylight visibility despite their prior awareness that there was such a displacement. The Investigation concluded that the crew had failed to correctly identify the applicable threshold markings because the markings provided were insufficiently clear to them and probably also because of the inappropriately low intensity setting of the temporary PAPI. No other Serious Incidents were reported during the same period of runway works.  +
On 15 October 2007, an Airbus 340-300 being operated on a scheduled passenger flight by Air Lanka with a heavy crew in the flight deck was taxiing towards the departure runway at London Heathrow at night in normal visibility when the right wing tip hit and sheared off the left hand winglet of a stationary British Airways Boeing 747-400 which was in a queue on an adjacent taxiway. The Airbus 340 sustained only minor damage to the right winglet and navigation light.  +