



# *Implementing Just Culture principles*

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## *Need for a robust Policy*




*Giancarlo Ferrara*

*Istanbul, 20-21 September 2012*




- ATM system is a complex system **changing** rapidly
- ATM SMS is relying on well trained, skilled and motivated operators but still with **human limitations**
- New Regulatory and **Performance requirements** have been defined (e.g. EC Regulation 691/2010)
- Just Culture is seen as **fundamental for good safety management system performance** in a number of industries and ATM is not an exception
- An **effective reporting culture** strongly depends on how organisations handle blame and punishment.
- Emerging threats are **low frequency and hard to detect** (i.e. weak signals)
- Need to move **from reactive to more proactive and predictive** Safety Management strategies.





← What you know

← What you **don't know** but ....  
should keep you awake at night!




- Mistakes in aviation occur because "*errare humanum est*" and ... we'll not be able to change that!
- To have an effective SMS it is really important that even **apparently minor occurrences** are investigated to prevent catalysts for major accidents.

- To get all the safety information and learn from safety occurrences, it is important to **educate our people** to acknowledge and be honest about their mistakes
- This is an attitude that could be exploited **developing a positive and pro-active Safety Culture** across the Organization that encourages the reporting of all safety-related information
- As a first step to create and implement the right working atmosphere it is necessary to define and communicate throughout the organisation an **ad-hoc Just Culture Policy** that:
  - Clearly draws the line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviors
  - Commits the Organisation on the reference JC principles
- In this framework, it is important to ensure the **application at all levels** of the defined JC principles are monitored and supported
- An **ad-hoc process** should be also defined to deal with actions in the “grey area”






- A Corporate initiative on Just Culture **launched at the end of 2011** and sponsored by the Company Accountable Manager
- An ad-hoc **Just Culture Policy** signed and published at beginning of July 2012
- ENAV's Top Management **commitment and reference principles** defining the Company approach to Just Culture
- Sets up the overall approach to Just Culture **reinforcing the link** with mandatory and voluntary reporting system
- An ad-hoc **JC Action Plan** has been launched too.



- The **pro-active participation of workforce** considered as key element for having an efficient SMS in place
- Commitment to **protect people's honest mistakes**
- Protection to the **sources of the information**
- Non-punitive except in case of **gross negligence or willful misconducts**
- Safety data **used for safety improvement** purposes only
- Professionalism, transparency and **common trust** strongly supported



- Improvements to the Safety reporting can be further achieved by the use of **Automatic Safety Data Gathering (ASDG)**
- ASDG should only be used for **statistical analysis of de-identified and aggregated safety data** making reference to the Company Just Culture/ASMT Policy
- Protection and **confidentiality** of all the ASDG safety data shall be absolutely guaranteed
- ASDG systems are generally **directly connected to SDP/FDP** systems
- ASDG could be also used to **analyse/monitor** some specific latent conditions (such as implementation of new procedures, airspace design etc.)







- What **cannot be done** with ASDG:
- No **real-time analysis** of safety events
- No **analysis** of ATCOs performance
- No **identification** of ATCOs
- No **investigation** triggering


ASDG



- Define “what” to achieve with ASDG:
  - What type of safety events to be collect?
  - Where? (e.g. PRX/SMI and STCA in airspace managed by Rome ACC)
- What type of safety analyses:
  - Identification of hotspots and resilient areas
  - Distribution of events in the airspace
  - Identification of safety trends
  - Analyses of STCA – PRX correlation



- Define “who” shall use ASDG:
- Only HQ Safety Division (not local Safety Units!)
- Data are exclusively managed by HQ Safety Investigators
- Only HQ Safety Investigators shall decide whether data should be shared with local Safety Units or not.



- A **clear and robust Just Culture Policy** understood by all stakeholders and communicated/promoted throughout the Organisation
- Clear **definitions of acceptable and unacceptable** behaviour
- Need to **protect the source of information**, but also....
- Need to ensure the **highest operational professionalism** and discipline
- Process to deal with **actions in the “grey area”**
- Reporting system **clearly linked to Just Culture** and Safety Policy
- Monitoring/supporting the **implementation of Just Culture principles** at all levels



- Just Culture is **mainly based on trust** that takes a long time to be built and just few moments or actions to be destroyed!
- States have still **different principles/laws** which sometime override/challenge protection from blame or repressive action
- In the world there are still some cases of **prosecution against individuals/organizations reporting** safety-related occurrences
- Just Culture will ultimately work only if:
  - The **interaction with the Judiciary system** is clear and transparent
  - The **Judiciary trusts ATM** to do the “right thing”
  - Building **that mutual trust is the next big challenge** for the aviation community





