




IAA – NATS FAB




UK-Ireland Functional Airspace Block



*Update on progress on
development of the FAB
Safety Case*



Proposed GSN Top-Level Argument



FAB IR 'SAFETY CASE' REQUIREMENTS

1. Common safety policy
2. Arrangements dealing with accident and incident investigation and plans on how to address safety data collection, analysis and exchange
3. A description of the safety management system in place....to avoid degradation in safety performance within the FAB
4. Arrangements; clearly identifying and allocating the responsibilities and interface with relation to the setting of safety targets, safety oversight and the accompanying enforcement measures in regard to the provision of ANS within the FAB
5. Documentation that... safety assessment and mitigation has been conducted before introducing operational [FAB] changes


Note we recognise these requirements are on the state rather than the service providers

FAB SAFETY CASE – UK-Ireland Position

- FAB Safety Case – **is** a means to address the safety-related organisational and managerial aspects within a FAB at State, NSA and service provider levels
- A FAB SC **is not** required to address the safety-relevant operational aspects; these may continue to be addressed outside the FAB Safety Case and in a conventional manner
- **Ultimately,** it is the States participating in a FAB who decide if the value and benefits from a more exhaustive approach compensate for the additional effort required effort and resources to prepare and maintain the FAB SC

UK-IRL FAB Governance Structure

Evolving UK-Ireland
FAB Governance
Structure (Feb 2011)




Discussion with the State and Regulators

- The FAB management met with both UK and Irish Regulators
- Participants
 - UK Department for Transport
 - UK Civil Aviation Authority
 - Irish National Supervisory Authority (NSA)
 - NATS
 - IAA Service Provider
- Safety Case argument structure and methodology positively received, we await formal confirmation

Discussion with EASA

- Discussions held with the EASA rulemaking officers who were involved in the production of the rules for safety
- Verbal indication that the focus of the rule is about safety management arrangements, rather than documentation of safety assurance.
- No written confirmation

Example evidence



E1-1-1

A common FAB safety policy been formed through a consolidation of the existing NATS and IAA ANSPs safety policies. It is demonstrably compliant with the Common Requirements IR (Commission Regulation (EC) No 2095/2005). It is a core part of the FAB SMM and has been signed off by both the NATS and IAA ANSPs

Next Steps

- Meet with the National Authorities to get formal acceptance of argument
- Populate the argument with evidence from the states and service providers
- Audit of UK-IRL FAB Safety Case on behalf of EC
- New EC Guidance post Audits?
- Approval of the Safety Case at the FAB Management Board and FAB Supervisory committee levels
- Agree the processes for maintenance and update

■ Questions?