

01 – Safety/Monitoring Criteria

CANSO-EUROCONTROL Workshop – JAN-2019

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#1 – Safety Criteria



- Harmful effect
- Use of Proxies
- Centralized management of Safety Criteria (incl. Proxies)
- Use of modelling:
 - Simple vs complex models,
 - Reused vs self-developed models
 - Hazard-log, USC

#1 – Monitoring Criteria



- The "system" is monitored but... Is the "changed-system" monitored?
- How to link the elements that have changed to the monitoring system?
- Do not re-invent the wheel
- Could be implemented ASAP
- Centralized management of Monitoring Criteria (similar to or even with the Safety Criteria (incl. Proxies))



01 – Safety/Monitoring Criteria

SAFETY CRITERIA

ATS.OR.210 Safety criteria (a) and (b)



- Safety acceptability based on the analysis of the risks risk differentiated
 - types of operations and
 - stakeholder classes,
- Safety acceptability assessed by using specific and verifiable safety criteria criterion shall be



- an explicit, quantitative level of safety risk or
- another measure that relates to safety risk.

ATS.OR.210 Safety criteria (c)



- Safety criteria:
 - · Are justified
 - When fulfilled, predict that the FS as safe as before or (exceptional case) the ATSP shall provide an argument justifying that:
 - any temporary reduction in safety will be offset by future improvement in safety; or
 - any permanent reduction in safety has other beneficial consequences;
 - Set SC shall ensure risk is acceptable risk
 - Safety improvement when practicable

Proxy - AMC



AMC2 ATS.OR.210(a) Safety criteria:

Other measures related to safety risks - Proxies

- Proxies shall:
 - a) When justifiable causal relationship exists between the proxy and the harmful effect,
 - b) A proxy is sufficiently isolated and
 - c) The proxy is measurable
 - quantitatively or
 - qualitatively


Proxy definition (GM)





A proxy is a measure of a certain property along the causal trajectory between the hazard/event and the harmful effects of the hazard/event in question

AMC

- 1. Causality
- 2. Independence
- 3. Measurable









01 – Safety/Monitoring Criteria

MONITORING CRITERIA

Monitoring criteria and requirements



ATM/ANS.OR.C.005 Safety support assessment and assurance of changes to the functional system

- b) A service provider other than an air traffic services provider shall ensure that the safety support assessment referred to in point (a) comprises:
 - specification of the monitoring criteria necessary to demonstrate that the service delivered by the changed functional system will continue to behave only as specified in the specified context.

ATS.OR.205 Safety assessment and assurance of changes to the functional system

- b) An air traffic services provider shall ensure that the safety assessment referred to in point (a) comprises:
 - 6) the specification of the monitoring criteria necessary to demonstrate that the service delivered by the changed functional system will continue to meet the safety criteria.

AMC1 ATM/ANS.OR.C.005(b)(2) - Monitoring Criteria (SSA)



Non-ATSP should ensure that within the SSA process for a change, the **monitoring criteria** that are to be used to demonstrate that ... that the **changed service continues to meet its specification**.

These criteria should be such that:

- a) they indicate that the assumptions made in the safety support case remain valid; and
- b) if the properties being monitored remain within the bounds set by these criteria, the service will be behaving as specified.

AMC1 ATS.OR.205(b)(6) - Monitoring Criteria (SA)



ATSP should ensure that within the SA process for a change, the **monitoring criteria**, that are to be used to demonstrate that ... the **changed service continues to meet the safety criteria**.

These criteria are specific to the change and should be such that they indicate that:

- a) the assumptions made in the argument remain valid;
- b) critical proxies remain as predicted in the safety case and are no more uncertain; and
- c) other properties that may be affected by the change remain within the bounds predicted by the safety case.

The key...



- The F.S. is currently monitored, and (assumption?) is continuously meeting the criteria (safety / specs)
- Is the current monitoring system adequate to ensure that the "Changed F.S." still continuously meet the criteria (safety / specs)?



- How to link the changed F.S. to the monitoring system?
- Do we need and updated Monitoring System to continuously demonstrate meeting the safety criteria?

Conclusions



- 15 hazards per change



1 or 2 proxies and monitoring requirements per hazard
15 hazards per change
15 changes per year
10 years
~5000 proxies and monitoring requirements to manage



Need for coordinated management of Proxies and Monitoring Criteria/Requirements at Unit level



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CONCLUSIONS

Safety Criteria



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Monitoring Criteria



- The "system" is monitored but... Is the "changed-system" monitored?
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Any Questions

