

## EU 2017/373 NPA

CANSO workshop in Brussels

18<sup>th</sup> January 2019 Bruno RABILLER, Nicolas FOTA, Marta LLOBET EUROCONTROL

## **Notice of Proposed Amendment**





The proposed GM/AMC are based on safety methodology Safety Reference Material (SRM) and the use of Integrated Risk Models supporting this methodology

They complement the existing GM/AMC in the following areas:


- 1. Scope of the Change
- 2. Risk analysis process
  - introduction of the success approach and failure approach.
  - includes information about risk-based safety assessment.
- 3. Safety Criteria determination

Proposal done in Q3 of 2018. Consultation will take place in 2019 (Q1)





## NPA: 1.Scope of the Change **ANNEX IV** SUBPART A — ADDITIONAL ORGANISATION REQUIREMENTS FOR PROVIDERS OF AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES (ATS.OR) ATS.OR.205 Safety assessment and assurance of changes to the functional system (a) For any change notified in accordance with point ATM/ANS.OR.A.045(a)(1), the air traffic services provider shall: (1) ensure that a safety assessment is carried out covering the scope of the change, which is: (i) the equipment, procedural and human elements being changed; (ii) interfaces and interactions between the elements being changed and the remainder of the functional system; (iii) interfaces and interactions between the elements being changed and the context in which it is intended to (iv) the life cycle of the change from definition to operations including transition into service; (v) planned degraded modes of operation of the functional system; and GM1 - Scoping: This GM details what needs to be done at an early stage of the process in order to determine the (safety) impact of the change (human, technical and/or procedural) considering the current and future operational environment and functional system, the 'multi-actors' concerned and to identify the detailed safety activities to be conducted at the different stages of the change lifecycle. GM1 - Degraded Mode: Provides details to ATS service provider about the degraded mode of operation by highlighting the importance to consider any conditions (**equipment malfunction**, **staff shortfall**, **abnormal conditions** e.g. external event,...) which could affect the performance of the functional system and lead therefore to a reduced level of operational service



## NPA: 2.Risk Analysis Process ANNEX IV SUBPART A — ADDITIONAL ORGANISATION REQUIREMENTS FOR PROVIDERS OF AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES SECTION 2 — SAFETY OF SERVICES ATS.OR.205 Safety assessment and assurance of changes to the functional system (b) An air traffic services provider shall ensure that the safety assessment referred to in point (a) comprises: (4) the risk evaluation and, if required, risk mitigation for the change such that it can meet the applicable safety criteria; AMC3 — Risk Evaluation and Mitigation: It provides the means of compliance for the risk evaluation and mitigation process to be applied during the degraded mode of operation. The risk evaluation and mitigation process as proposed will provide evidence that risk is sufficiently mitigated (induced by the change or already existing) by allocating safety requirements to the different elements of the functional system affected by the change (equipment, human and procedure) in order to meet the applicable safety criteria. GM1 — Risk Evaluation and Mitigation: provides guidances for the risk evaluation and mitigation process in terms of scope and guidance for the process at different lifecycle phases: the initial risk analysis - which might be supported by an integrated risk model (to determine highest layer of safety requirements), the process at design level (to determine design safety requirements), at implementation level, related to transfer into operations, and related to operations and maintenance.

GM2 - Risk Evaluation and Mitigation for planned degraded modes: provides guidance on how to address

degraded modes in the risk evaluation and mitigation process

